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Military Affairs

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Military Affairs

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12 April 1991

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Limits on Servicemen's Partisan Activity

91UM03324 Moscow KOMMUNIST
VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 23, Dec 90
(Signed to press 30 Nov 90) pp 52-53

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel of Justice V. Shumkov, editor of the journal on problems of Soviet military legislation: "I Ask for an Explanation": "Being Guided by Law Alone"]

[Text] "I read in the newspaper the wording of Part 5 of Article 16 of the Law of the USSR 'On Public Associations' and at once questions arose. In particular, how to interpret these words: 'service members...in their official duties are guided by the requirements of laws and are not bound by the decisions of political parties and mass public movements'? In this regard, is it possible that there would be a situation in which the serviceman who is a party member will have to choose being guided by the law in his official duties or the performance of party decisions?—Maj. L. Pronko."

Yes, such a situation is possible but only in cases in which the decisions of the party contradict the requirements of the law. Let us recall the incident not so long ago with "Greenpeace," the ecology ship of the "Greens," held at the archipelago of Novaya Zemlya by the border guard vessel "Imeni 26th CPSU Congress." Let us suppose that the commander of the border troops was a companion in arms of the "Greenpeace" crew in the "green" movement, a member, for example, of the All-Union association "Let Us Save the World and Nature." Then he would apparently face the choice between following the decisions of his kindred spirits in the fight against nuclear test grounds or of carrying out the requirements of the law on the protection of national borders. So far, however, this is more in the hypothetical realm. We have no such practice and, I would like to hope, will not have. Under the constitution, parties and mass public movements are not part of the system of bodies of state authority and administration and accordingly do not have any powers with respect to state bodies and their officials. That is, they do not have the right to interfere in their official activities. This is directly indicated in Article 5 of the Law of the USSR "On Public Organizations" and in Article 4 it is emphasized that all "public associations...operate within the framework of the Constitution of the USSR, constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, and Soviet laws." For the violation of these basic positions of the law, Article 21 provides for criminal, administrative, material, or other liability in accordance with prevailing legislation. Accordingly, it simply makes no sense at all for parties or other public associations to make decisions that contradict the law and give rise to situations such as the one presented above. All relations of public organizations, including political parties, with the state must be based above all on the principle of the supremacy of the law.

For this reason, one should draw the clear conclusion that the words "not bound by the decisions of political

parties" have no independent meaning in the given phrase. They merely emphasize and corroborate the basic idea that service personnel who are members of political parties and other mass public movements pursuing political objectives are obligated in their official activities to be guided only by the requirements of the law. This is indicated by the conjunctive "and" between these parts of the analyzed wording of the law.

So many times we must note with regret that new laws coming from within the walls of our semiprofessional parliament—just as its "senior fellows"—are far from perfection. It is hardly worthwhile to analyze in detail their merits and shortcomings as a whole. I would like to dwell on just one thing, the resolution of the question of the functioning of a multiparty system under army conditions. I was diligent and counted up that the text of the law took up almost 900 lines in eight columns of the newspaper page. And only 10 lines were dedicated to questions worrying the more than one million communist members of the army and not just them. The problem of whether or not there should be parties in the army was always among the most pressing problems in recent years. These 10 lines were stated in such a way that involuntarily a whole mass of questions and doubts arises. It is not without reason that on 10 October of this year KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA characterized them as a "model of lacy art: it is fine and elegant and you just cannot get a needle on it—What is the sense of it?"

Here are several of these questions and doubts that were heard from readers of the journal right after the publication of the law:

- Why specifically is it not pointed out that the new law sanctioned multiple parties in the army (most of our citizens do not have a sufficiently high level of legal competence and not everyone understands the legal principle: "Everything is permitted that is not forbidden by law")?
- How can one regulate the interrelationships of the "primary organizations" of different parties under the conditions of the army? For example, is it possible to have the "peaceful coexistence" in a single military collective of, say, party branches of communists and social democrats and in this case will solidarity and combat capability be guaranteed?
- When and how will party actions with service personnel who are party members be carried out? It must be taken into account that Article 5 of the law prescribes the performance of party activities only during the nonworking time of the party members. But it is no secret for anyone that for many service personnel, especially for officers and warrant officers, the workday does not always fit into an 8-hour framework and that they do not always rest on Sundays. And most of them also have obligations to their families and duties as fathers. This also requires their time. How, then, are they to deal with party matters, at night? And then when are they to sleep?

- Will all political parties and mass public movements pursuing political objectives have the right to establish their own party structures in the army and navy in the image of the CPSU (party committees, party bureaus, control and review bodies, freed secretaries in staff positions, etc.)?
- In what staff structure of the Defense Ministry will the service personnel who are functionaries of different parties be included? Who will confer military ranks on them and pay for them...?

And so on. There is no end to the questions. As a rule, a large number of questions arising when reading and interpreting a legislative act indicates a lack of precision and clarity in its wording. Of course the strictest and most objective assessments are given to it by life and the practice of its daily application. Still, it is necessary to note that in passing it the legislators did not fully realize the special significance of the question of multiple parties for the Armed Forces of the USSR. For this is a complex political experiment that carries a certain amount of risk. It requires a great deal of prudence from legislators and profound thought and responsibility in decisions.

Well, we will see as time goes on. We just have to hope and expect that the above-named and other questions that cannot be put off will be resolved to some degree or other in the draft laws on defense and military service now being formulated. And the main hope is that the army will still be an army and not a multiparty discussion club.

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Plea for Moderation in Cutting Defense Budget

91UM0332B Moscow KOMMUNIST

VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 90
(Signed to press 25 Dec 90) pp 3-7

[Article by Lt. Col. V. Makarenko under "Theory and Practice" rubric: "What Does Defense Cost?"]

[Text] Vadim Vladimirovich Makarenko. In the Soviet Army since 1971. Graduated from the Red Banner Military Institute in 1977. Until 1986 served in different positions in the Far East and Leningrad military districts. Now senior instructor in the department for military geography and foreign armies of the Red Banner Military Institute.

The country finds itself in a state of crisis. Under these conditions, the reduction of the military budget seems to some of our specialists and theoreticians to be one of the most realistic ways to stabilize the economy. And the reduction is under way. The military budget, which in 1989 amounted to 77.2942 billion rubles [R], was reduced to R70.9758 billion in 1990 and it is planned to reduce it by several billion rubles more in 1991. Taken

by itself, this trend seems positive in the light of the current international situation. But there are some aspects that are cause for concern.

First of all, there is the divergence in the estimates of the military expenditures of our country. Thus, at a meeting with representatives of the working people of Nizhny Tagil in April of this year, M.S. Gorbachev said that in the 11th and 12th five-year plans the "relative share of military expenditures reached 18 percent of national income here, more than any state in the world." It follows from an interview with Col. Gen. V. Babyev, chief of the financial directorate of the USSR Ministry of Defense, published in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in February 1990 that the share of defense expenditures in national income was 12.1 percent in 1989 and that in a relatively short period of time it was possible to reduce the share of military expenditures by one-third without harming defense. It is most likely a matter of different approaches to the illumination of the complex problem at hand. For example, USSR Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze frankly announced the existence of appropriations not included in the budget for the USSR Ministry of Defense. In his words, the overall expenditures for defense in the current year amounted to R77.9 billion. This was somewhat larger than the figure for military expenditures that had been previously given. But even it does not include the cost of many resources made available to the armed forces.

In the light of this, it is no accident that the estimates of our military expenditures made by academicians G. Arbatov, V. Avduyevskiy, and Yu. Ryzhov cast doubt on the officially announced size of military expenditures. USSR People's Deputy Yu. Ryzhov, for example, estimates military expenditures at R200 billion. We must agree that the difference is too large to ignore. Clearly a "scissors" has developed between the official and the actual levels of military expenditures.

The danger of this position is that at any moment this "scissors" may move and cut into living flesh, especially since the arms of this "scissors" are in the hands of bodies of executive as well as legislative power of different levels, the actions of which are frequently not coordinated. The example of housing shows how this "scissors" works. For a long time, the largest part of housing construction for service personnel was financed through the budgets of the local soviets. In Moscow, in particular, such a system existed from 1969, when the Moscow Gorispolkom was obliged to allocate 65,000 square meters of living space to the USSR Ministry of Defense annually. It ceased to operate in July 1989, despite the fact that there were 10,000 people without apartments. A decision has now been made to finance housing construction directly through the military budget. It is obvious that the local authorities can also proceed in this manner with other sources for the indirect financing of the armed forces (income tax exemptions, payment for land, utilization of the resources of local soviets and enterprises, etc.).

But will this not contradict the course of reducing the military budget? Thus, to achieve this goal, 19.2 percent less funding was allocated to military construction in particular in 1990 than in 1989. The market economy, which is already changing the prices for many kinds of combat equipment, armament, and troop supply items, will "work" against such a course. What should be done in such a case? Continue to insist that the current military budget reflects all expenditures of the society for defense? Or name the true volume of military expenditures today with a forecast for changes in them tomorrow and after that? In attempting to fit military expenditures into the Procrustean bed of the announced sum (about R71 billion), we are doing tremendous harm to the armed forces and are giving them unresolvable problems.

It is obvious to me, for example, that the level of announced military expenditures was set too low. Apparently this happened with the idea of maintaining the controlled economy, where a significant share of production would remain in the hands of the state, and of the accelerated noncapital-intensive conversion of military production, which would make it possible to maintain control over the prices of military output.

Speaking of defense expenditures, it is impossible not to take into account the current principle for bringing the army up to strength. Let us again take the budget for 1990: in connection with the reduction of the size of the armed forces, appropriations for the payment of the money allowances of service members were affirmed in the amount of R463.1 million, or 7.4 percent below the level of 1989. But we are thereby maintaining the principle of the "lifetime" service of officers, which has long since ceased to satisfy them. The renunciation of this principle, which is being pushed by life itself, in 1991 and subsequent years will require a substantial—possibly several times greater—increase in expenditures for support of the officer corps.

It is obvious that today, when the military reform is being carried out, it is expedient to establish strict control over the country's military budget. This is in the interests of the armed forces themselves. The current system for financing even direct military expenditures allows significant latitude for a redistribution of resources within the military budget. In the scope of the budget for 1990 in particular, funds were found, for example, for measures to pull Soviet forces out of Eastern Europe. The facts indicate, however, that this withdrawal is sometimes carried out in such a way that it greatly lowers the standard of living of officers and warrant officers, many of whom are adding to the number of service members without apartments. If this question were examined in the USSR Supreme Soviet as a body that determines the budget of the country, then doubtless the necessary measures would be taken for the social protection of service members.

At the same time, I am profoundly convinced that it is not only through the budget that the society can and

must control the army. Also very significant is extensive information about the activities of the armed forces, above all about studies on the combat capability of the army. For despite the fact that there is much talk here about excessive military expenditures, there is practically no discussion of the question of whether or not the army is capable of defending the country at this level of expenditures. As far as I know, however, such questions are not only discussed regularly in the U.S. Congress but are also being studied by American military people along with their allies. And this is understandable. Since they have obligations to their own people or allies, it is necessary regularly to verify the capability of the armed forces to carry them out. But on what basis, let me ask, are the decisions being made to reduce the armed forces? Only on the basis that the strength of regular American forces is 2.1 million men? Why should we then not reduce the number of soldiers employed in agriculture to the American level? Or in construction?

The question of a reduction of military expenditures has already been raised repeatedly in the highest legislative bodies of the country and republics. But no one has raised the question of where and when, for example, they worked out the operation to defend the islands of the Kurile chain, which are claimed by Japan. At the end of 1970's, it was considered essential to enlarge the garrison on these islands. So there was a danger? I ask you to understand me correctly. Personally I am in favor of resolving the territorial question, which has finally been acknowledged, through diplomatic means. But as long as it remains unresolved and as long as Japan regularly carries out "days of the northern territories" and its military power is increasing steadily, every responsible person must think about the possible variants of the development of this situation.

The people's deputies are for some reason not worried by the fact that with the disintegration of the Warsaw Pact the first line of air defense posts has approached or will soon approach the immediate borders of the USSR and additional equipment will be required to restore the previous degree of protection of our territory. For example, the question arises of whether our air forces and air defense forces will be able to carry out their missions in the Moscow and Leningrad sectors if the adversary will be able to operate with the support of aircraft for long-range radar detection and guidance. So far no mechanism has been established for the discussion of these questions in the USSR Supreme Soviet. But how, without having clarified these questions, will the deputies vote for a reduction or increase of the military budget? This is why I think that it is necessary rather quickly to actuate a system for the public assessment of national security that makes it possible to determine the reality of the threat and to find means to balance it so as to calculate what it will cost and which version is more expensive and which less expensive.

I raise the question in this way because it seems that we are not even capable of learning from our mistakes. Let us compare, for example, the flight of the hooligan pilot

Rust and his landing at the Kremlin (1987) and the flight of the traitor pilot Belenko to Hakodate in the then latest model MiG. After the noisy campaign and punishment of a number of persons "to instill fear," everything quieted down here and we would have forgotten about the incident if the poets had not reminded us of the "little bird" [Rust].

Things were different in Japan. After the failure of the Japanese air defense systems to intercept the Soviet aircraft, the mass media extensively discussed the possibilities of the radar coverage of the Japanese islands. What was the result? Their air forces were equipped with E-2C "Hawkeye" radar early-warning aircraft, there was additional deployment of mobile guidance and warning detachments with three-coordinate radar facilities, the equipment of radar posts was modernized, and F-15 fighters were acquired.

It seems that it is necessary to talk specifically and item by item about the society's defense expenditures: reduce this item and increase that one. It is possible to discuss for a long time whether or not we need an aircraft carrier or other kind of arms from the point of view of the effectiveness for defense of the development of precisely this sort of arms but the answer is in the specific assessment of what territory we can or cannot protect without an aircraft carrier. We should no longer keep these assessments secret from our own people, for NATO staffs have their own computers and can easily calculate where and what missions Soviet aircraft-carrying ships will perform. Glasnost will do away with much that is superfluous and causing unjustified tension in this matter. This applies especially to the members of the USSR Supreme Soviet, for it is obvious that the military budget will be at the disposal of the union authorities. But so far we have taken different approaches. It was decided, for example, that the tax rate will be 45 instead of 55 percent. And immediately they say cover the deficiency out of military expenditures. But if the rate were 20 percent, would the rest also come from the categories of military expenditures? It is necessary to seek the correct kind of relations and a balance of interests between the society and the army, abandoning the idea of "we will not worry about the price" but also not falling into the other sin of wanting to liquidate everything.

It is possible, of course, to reduce the number of generals, colonels, lieutenant colonels, etc. and this is already being done. But will the military budget be reduced if we are moving toward giving the soldier at least the average wage in the country for his 12 or 14-hour workday? This, after all, is the meaning of the proposed introduction of contract service. The question arises: Where to get the money for education and health care? The answer is simple: by paying money to the soldier, you are also spending some of the funds for the development of these structures of our society. Why in the rich American states does the young person go to serve in the army in order to pay for his university education, whereas in the less rich Soviet republics the student receives a stipend

and the soldier gets "his own" R7.5? But the student obtains a skill that in the future will bring him a good wage in our society with its rapidly developing market relationships. What does the soldier get? It is therefore necessary to evaluate the specialist and the soldier fairly. They themselves will distribute this money to obtain an education. In other words, pay the soldier and grant the student a loan on the basis of his future wage and there will be funds for education.

I am in favor of reducing the size of the army to the minimum level considered possible by the bodies making a professional assessment of the security of our country. At the same time, of course, there should be extensive involvement of public opinion. But I am against saving money at the expense of the soldier and officer. And one other thing. It is time to stop the practice of manning the army with privates and sergeants in a discriminatory way, selecting for it those who for some reason or other did not go to a higher educational institution. The decision of the USSR Supreme Soviet that freed some young people (students) from service in the army and increased the discrimination of others who, as a rule, are already in a disadvantageous position because these kids are from families that in many respects are "weaker" is very very unpopular among the people.

It may be that in a material sense the state gained something but in another and no less important sense, that of the defense capability and training of a powerful reserve of defenders of the Motherland, it lost a great deal.

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New GlavPUR Deputy Chief Profiled

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VOORUZHENNYKH SIL in Russian No 24, Dec 90
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[Interview with Lt. Gen. Aleksandr Ivanovich Ovchinnikov, first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate of the Soviet Army and Navy]

[Text] He was born on 23 September 1937 at the farmstead of Slobodskoy in Semikarakorskiy Rayon of Rostov Oblast into the family of an office worker. He finished the Leningrad Antiaircraft Artillery Technical School, the Military Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin, and the Military Academy of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR. He served in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (now the Western Group of Forces) and in the Carpathian, Belorussian, Turkestan, and Siberian military districts. He was a technician for the repair of radar stations and a station chief. Later he worked with the Komsomol: from secretary of a division Komsomol organization to senior instructor of the section for Komsomol work of the political directorate of the Ground Forces. After that he was deputy chief and then chief of a division political section, first deputy

chief of an army political section, member of the military council and chief of the political section for combined-arms armies, including in the 40th Army in the Republic of Afghanistan, first deputy chief of the political directorate of the Turkestan Military District, and member of the military council and chief of the political directorate of the Siberian and Turkestan military districts and sector forces.

He is Russian. A member of the CPSU since 1958, he was elected member of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee and deputy of the Uzbek SSR Supreme Soviet. He is a people's deputy of the USSR.

He was awarded the orders of Red Banner, Red Star, and "For Service to the Motherland in the Armed Forces of the USSR," second and third steps. He also received the Red Banner order of the Republic of Afghanistan and many Soviet and foreign medals.

He became a major general in 1981 and a lieutenant general in 1987.

Family: He is married to Nelli Ivanovna, a Russian with a higher education, and has a son born in 1971.

**From Among the Answers to the Questionnaire of
KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL:**

[KVS] How did you react to the new assignment?

[Ovchinnikov] I admit that I never thought about this high position and therefore the assignment was somewhat unexpected for me. I consider it as a high trust that I will justify through honest, conscientious, and fruitful labor.

[KVS] Where was it most difficult for you to serve?

[Ovchinnikov] In Afghanistan, where I was a member of the military council and chief of the political section of the 40th Army. A war was going on there. And war is a hard thing!

[KVS] How does your wife react to the moves to new places of service?

[Ovchinnikov] I will put it this way: without enthusiasm, just as any woman. Even to Moscow. Every time when she finds out about my new assignment, she is just able to say: "So, we hit the road again...."

[KVS] Why, in your view, has there been a decline in the authority of political workers?

[Ovchinnikov] I would not say this so unequivocally. It has declined for people who are incompetent and inactive and especially for those who do not conform to moral principles. Most political workers work intensively and conscientiously and have authority. But people justifiably link some negative phenomena of army life with shortcomings in the work of political agencies. Yes, they need to do more work. They are now in the stage of reform in accordance with the president's decree of 3 September 1990. The main thing here is not

to become perplexed, to determine one's place in the overall order, and to resolve questions in education, the strengthening of military discipline, and the social protection of service personnel and members of their families through political methods. The final objective of this work is a high level of combat readiness and high morale of people.

[KVS] What is your attitude toward the statements to the effect that in connection with multiple parties in the country the organizations of the CPSU in the armed forces supposedly should be dissolved?

[Ovchinnikov] I am certain that those who think this are profoundly mistaken. The army party organizations have gained a great deal of experience in the training of dependable and loyal defenders of the Motherland and it is difficult to overestimate this role of theirs.

[KVS] Whom do you consider to be your teachers?

[Ovchinnikov] It would be unfair for me to name just one or two to whom I am obliged for lessons in life. There have been many of them, commanders and political workers, and I have tried to gain for myself something good and useful from each of them.

[KVS] Is it easy to combine the duties of people's deputy of the USSR and first deputy chief of the Main Political Directorate?

[Ovchinnikov] Certainly this is a great additional burden. But it is necessary to bear in mind that the cares of a political worker of such a rank, just as those, by the way, of any other, and people's deputy are in many ways similar in their ultimate purpose: concern about people.

[KVS] Our traditional question: What will you say about KOMMUNIST VOORUZHENNYKH SIL?

[Ovchinnikov] The journal has become more interesting, bolder, and freer. It has developed a firm position in defending the army against unjustified attacks from destructive forces. But it needs to be even more on the offensive in this struggle and do more to illuminate the advanced experience of life in the troops.

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**Adm Gromov on Building Ties with Public
Opinion**

91UM0541A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Interview with Admiral F. Gromov, commander of Northern Fleet, by Captain Third Rank P. Ishchenko, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent; place and date not given: "The Mirror of Public Opinion Should Not Distort"—first two paragraphs are introduction]

[Text] One of perhaps the less noticeable but rather characteristic changes in the Northern Fleet Command's

work style is undoubtedly the change in its attitude toward public opinion. Until quite recently, many military leaders had little interest in what those outside of check-and-control points think about phenomena and events of apparently strictly military significance or what would be said and written about them. For they knew: Whatever the rest may think, they will say and write as they are "supposed to." Now that public opinion is becoming not only a moral but a material force, it can no longer be dismissed.

This question—how did an understanding of the necessity of "building bridges" with the public come about—was the first one in the conversation between our correspondent, Captain Third Rank P. Ishchenko, and Admiral F. Gromov, commander of the Northern Fleet.

[Gromov] This is a simple yet at the same time complicated question. After all, even in former times there were no special obstacles to supplying more information to the public about the life of the Army and Navy and the processes taking place there. The only thing that did stand in the way was, as we now know, excessive secrecy, which was often used to cover an elementary reluctance to wash dirty linen in public. Now, however, we see the strengthening of public liaison as a serious factor in the consolidation of the Armed Forces' standing in society and in forming the right perception among the populace in regard to our life and service. This is very important, since the mirror of public opinion should not distort—as it frequently does—the realities of the Army and Navy.

The fleet command's principal position is to let the public know as much as possible about the life of the Navy. Starting with such things as whether the bunk beds they sleep in are stacked or not, or whether there are enough lockers in the barracks, and going all the way to our difficulties, problems, or sometimes even calamities. Far from everybody understands that the image of a fully provided-for Armed Forces is outdated and out of step with reality. So, if not ourselves, who will tell the people the truth about the tremendous strain of military service and its hardships—both natural and artificial—and objectively inform them about the tasks that face our ships and units. Even though it is embarrassing for us as professionals to broadcast our mishaps or even emergencies, it is even more embarrassing to read about them in newspapers, or to hear on radio and television interpretations of events that have very little to do with the facts.

Another factor that impels us to communicate directly with the people, without intermediaries in some central office, is the fact that in our society there is a visible and growing decline in patriotism and love for the Fatherland. Such a moral value as loyalty to the military oath is being placed in doubt. Who can explain better than we that protection of the Motherland does not necessarily mean that one has to shoot. Maintaining military-strategic parity is also defense. Ensuring safe sea passage and protecting fishing from the attacks of newly emerged

pirates of the sea is also protecting the Motherland. We are trying to explain this convincingly through all available means.

[Ishchenko] How would you comment on the information that was heard all over Murmansk Oblast last January—that somewhere on the shore there is allegedly missile debris contaminating the environment?

[Gromov] Unfortunately, nobody had consulted us on this matter. We would have explained that during the training launches of ballistic missiles from our submarines their first and second stages—or, to be precise, what is left of them—fall back to earth (it would be naive to think that this happens only to Soviet missiles). There is an area on the Kola Peninsula that serves, with the local authorities' consent, as a collector for the missiles' first and second stages. Naturally, this area is not inhabited and is not used for deer grazing. We also take all the necessary precautions before every launch. There cannot be any remains of rocket fuel in these debris—it burns out entirely. Therefore, there cannot be any ecological contamination.

[Ishchenko] It so happens that we talk a lot about the problems that arise in the relationship between the fleet and the population. One would assume that your contacts are not limited to this?...

[Gromov] I can say with certainty that lately we have established a very good mutual understanding with the public and local authorities. Although it was never bad to begin with. The real breakthrough toward providing more information to the oblast population on fleet operations and concerns and its successes and problems occurred during the recent visit to the fleet of a large group of people's deputies from the Murmansk Oblast Soviet; it turned into a sort of off-premises session. On our initiative, a meeting between the fleet military council and representatives of the north-western region mass media was organized, which was reported on "Vremya." The meeting went on for several hours; then the journalists visited ships and units and had an opportunity to find out for themselves what is true and what is not among all the tales about the Armed Forces. Many of them—this is clear from their own comments and subsequent publications—have fundamentally changed their attitude towards the subject of the Army.

Other undertakings that produce a good effect, from the point of view of strengthening our influence on the correct shaping of public opinion in regard to the Navy and the Armed Forces as a whole, are so-called open military oath ceremonies and granting permission for parents visiting their sons to visit ships and units. Regularly conducted conferences and gatherings of mothers of soldiers and sailors are also effective. We are also searching for new forms of work that would help to enhance the prestige of the fleet.

[Ishchenko] It is not infrequent that I hear from my colleagues, civilian journalists, as well as from parents and friends of servicemen, that it can be very difficult to

get needed information from a unit, a ship, or the fleet. Are any changes expected in this respect?

[Gromov] This is a mostly justified complaint, and we plan to create within the next month a press group at the fleet headquarters. So far it will be on a supernumerary basis. Beside military journalists, this group will include representatives of those Navy services to whom inquiries from the media and the public are addressed most often. Besides, I believe that each ship and each unit should have an officer who, in addition to his regular duties, would also have responsibility for liaison with the public. I think that this will make it possible to remove on a timely basis the excessive "static tension" that sometimes accumulates between the military and civilians and to form a correct image of "the man with a rifle" in the public eye.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA Editor's Mailbag

91UM0537A Moscow *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* in Russian
4 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[Readers' letters, with introduction by Vyacheslav Lukashevich, *KRASNAYA ZVEZDA* political commentator, published under the rubric "Seven Days—Letters To Commentator": "Please Do Not Identify Me..."]

[Text] Time goes by, and times change. But the letters still stack up in a solid pile on my desk, and I am grateful to the readers for their responses, their help and support, as well as their criticism. What is changing with the times then? Before, derogatory letters came unsigned. Now the reader is more daring and is not afraid to put his signature even under a sharp rebuttal of the author and, of course, of M.S. Gorbachev, the government, and so on. But, vice versa, letters started to arrive in which there seems to be plenty of common sense but the author writes at the end: "Please do not identify me..." There is a name and address following this phrase, though.

One such "unknown" writes: "I am a veteran of war and labor, with 47 years in service. It pains me to see what is happening around the country. But this is my Motherland, and I cannot deny it. We, Komsomol [All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League] members of the 1940's, were burning with patriotism and enthusiasm; we were propagandists at the age of 18 or 20. Now the "propagandists" in Moscow are old ladies "close to the poverty line." She came over to me (I thought she would ask for a ruble) and says: "Do not vote for the Union and Gorbachev; vote for Yeltsin." I chased her off. So she went to somebody else. This is what we have come to. She is probably paid by somebody for this 'work.'"

What is there in the letter, I thought, to not want to be identified?

But the mail brings many similar requests. This means that times are indeed changing. Before, as recently as half a year ago, one kind of people were afraid; now it is

others. They are already afraid of... democrats. And no wonder; it appears they do provide a good reason for this.

But let us look at the letters.

Mssr. Lukashevich! You should not try to wash Gorbachev and the CPSU clean. Communism is a utopia, and socialism is nowhere around. What has been accomplished in six years? Nothing. We should have accomplished perestrelka [shootout] first, and then started on perestroyka. The CPSU should be declared illegal, and all obkom [oblast party committee] pensioners should be shot.

[signed] A.V. Mamedov, World War II veteran, Moscow.

I am sending for the next "Seven Days," the latest issue of *PRIDNESTROVSKAYA PRAVDA*. Would be glad if it is of use.

[signed] Your friend.

P.S. Here is my address, but do not write to me, we still have surveillance. Tiraspol.

Dear editors, I have read the article "Cursing and Cussing for the Country and the Entire World" and I want to say that I completely agree with the author. Do we, ordinary people, elect deputies so that they can roll around abroad and slander their country and people? Yes, it is hard here now. But it seems to me that no foreigner visiting us pours mud on his motherland as we Russians do. Where is the shame and the conscience?

[signed] Maria Ivanovna Pustovaya, Novosibirsk.

We are not communists, radicals or conservatives; we are simply peasants, and we do not want the tsarist empire into which his highness Mssr. Yeltsin and Mssrs. Popov, Sobchak, and Travkin want to turn Russia. Where did they come from, who nurtured them, what are they doing? Oh, God! Let our people come to their senses; let the good return to our land.

Yes, we are not scientists and we are not economists, but we can see well where these democrats are leading. We, the peasants, do not need anything; we earn with our own hands the food on the table and our living. We are not hungry—as it has been trumpeted all over the world. Moscow and Leningrad are the ones that are hungry. They do not want to work; all they do is gather in rallies on the streets and fight the center. The people can see who is fighting for power and who does not give a damn about the people.

[signed] Serdyukov and others, Krasnodar Kray.

I appeal to you, miners of the Ukraine and Russia, my compatriots. I lost my son. The son I bore against the doctors' prognoses, whom I delivered in terrible pain.

So what, some would say, sons perish now by the tens and hundreds from knives and bullets.

But, compatriots, my son died from having his feet frostbitten when he was transporting Moldovan juice for the children and the sick of Sverdlovsk. There was not enough coal in the railroad car in the 30 degrees below zero. The same coal that you, the miners, extract, which is worth its weight in gold today. Only 600 kilograms are allocated for each trip, and it is of such quality that long trips in the winter involve great risks.

He could have saved himself by going to see the doctor; but he chose to walk on his blackened, frozen legs so that he could defrost the juice and save it for the kindergartens.

In times past I was proud to be a Russian, a Ukrainian by birth; now I am ashamed for those who defame the Russians, the Army, and our past; I am ashamed for those who go on strike while our sons freeze on the road.

My father was subject to repression as an enemy of the people in 1940, but I volunteered to defend the Motherland in 1941. We, medics, gave our blood and dragged officers and soldiers out of the line of fire without regard to their nationality. We, medics, even in our day, were paid 90 to 100 rubles a month, but it did not occur to us to go on strike. Imagine what would have happened if surgeons, nurses, and orderlies went on strike?

Yes, my son froze to death, but my heart aches no less for our land engulfed in insanity. I am ashamed for Yeltsin, who has started a war against the center. I cannot understand how Gorbachev can look at the people dying in South Ossetia and other regions, and at our boy soldiers putting themselves between animal-like, insane crowds. I also remember how one foreigner said during the war: "We are not going to let you build anything—we will disperse your people from inside; we, who bought off Romanov ministers and family members, we will simply buy off your boors."

Do not you understand who profits from all these confrontations and strikes?

[signed] N. Sokolskaya-Zavgorodnyaya, nonaffiliated, Soviet Socialist Republic of Moldova.

Esteemed Vyacheslav Lukashevich! Will you please finally open your eyes, fogged by nonsensical communist ideas. Today even a child can see through your primitive propagandist tricks, they are so obvious.

It is unbecoming for a respected, solid person—which you undoubtedly are—to buzz like a mosquito around Yeltsin. And your Union, which you so ardently promote, has outlived itself since the beginning of its existence. As you well know, a union is an entity built on the principle of equality, which was impossible in the environment of dictatorship and personal power.

The important thing for me is that my generation—and I judge by our unit and my friends in civilian life—can distinguish the truth from a lie. All my comrades (I do not like this word) roll with laughter over your so-called newspaper; they understand who needs the referendum

and for what purpose, and what the result will be; they do not share communist views, and many are ready to go from words to action. So there is still hope; you have not managed to corrupt our souls.

[signed] A.S. Ilyin, student of the Moscow State University School of Journalism, forced to put on a military uniform on 16 March 1991, Moscow Oblast.

Humanity has never lived without dogma and orthodoxy. They existed, and will exist. But tragic social cataclysms occur where dogmas and orthodoxies stay too long, and not only in the institutions of faith but in the institutions of power.

Those who are trying to prove the vitality of the communist idea are trying to break through an open door. But this idea will affirm itself, I think, on a different basis, in a different social structure, and probably not here. If we were to rise from the ashes in some 500 years and see the implemented "code of the communism builder," we should not cry then: We told you so! We have talked, and are still talking, too much, while we have done, and are still doing, too little. Plus, we said the wrong things and did the wrong things. That new world will not descend on us on account of our slogans, which, by the way, keep repeating the biblical commandments ("Let us beat swords into plowshares," "To each by his labor," etc.); it will come thanks to the intelligence and labor of previous generations. It looks, though, that if we judge by the "great accomplishments" of the 20th century, we are not going to make a contribution to that future.

The mind and the labor of nations rise their banners high, turn their anthems into popular music, and attract and unite the people. But the largest, richest country can be turned into uninhabitable space if this territory is mindlessly exploited. Is this not what we are learning today?

[signed] A. Kozyrev, reserve colonel, Odintsovo, Moscow Oblast.

Gromov Wins Case Against Martirosyan

91UM0537b Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA
in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 1

[Report by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Georgiy Dolzhenko: "Slander Is Slander"]

[Text] Kiev—The court duel between Colonel General B. Gromov, former commander of the Kiev Military District and currently first deputy USSR minister of internal affairs, and Colonel V. Martirosyan, together with the editors of the republic youth newspaper KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, is over.

As we have already reported, B. Gromov was indignant over the statement, published in this newspaper by V. Martirosyan, addressed to him and alleging that he may be among the forces capable of effecting a military coup

in the country. The conflict was resolved by the People's Court of Kiev's Radyanskiy Rayon. It defined V. Martirosyan's opinion, included in an interview, as slander that besmirches the honor and dignity of the general. The newspaper is ordered to publish a retraction within a month.

Sobchak Urges Military Prosecutor's Ouster

91UN12184 Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA
in Russian No 13, 3 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with USSR People's Deputy A. Sobchak by Ye. Domnysheva; date and place not given: "The Generals Violated the Order"]

[Text] Last week Moscow had to live through a hard day, and it reminded me of the 8-9 April 1989 events in Tbilisi. The same nervousness "at the top" and in the streets... This is where my conversation with USSR People's Deputy A. Sobchak started.

[Sobchak] Unfortunately, the Cabinet of Ministers decision to ban rallies and demonstrations in Moscow for the duration of the session of the Congress of People's Deputies of Russia created a very tense—I would even say explosive—situation. This decision directly contradicts the existing legislation, according to which such a ban could only be imposed together with the imposition of a state of emergency.

[Domnysheva] Here is, literally, what Deputy Opolinskiy said at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the day the congress opened: "If it is necessary to break the law in the name of the well-being of the people, it needs to be done, and then such a law should be changed."

[Sobchak] This deputy is ignorant in the field of jurisprudence. He has no notion that 50 years before him Comrade Vychinskiy had even produced theoretical justification for it. It is something else that is abnormal. Where is the Committee for Constitutional Oversight—the organ whose task is to guarantee observance of the law and the citizens' rights?

[Domnysheva] Well, not too long ago the committee chairman published an article in which he was trying to prove that the committee is not able to do many things because of certain circumstances, including its own status...

[Sobchak] This is true, there are many things it cannot do, but it certainly can declare illegal unconstitutional decrees issued from the top. In this particular case it had to be done quickly, since the government's decision endangered the lives of the people who were going to a demonstration knowing firmly that they were within the law, and that they had the decision of the Moscow City Soviet and of the Russian parliament on their side. While at the same time there was a decision of the Cabinet of Ministers to stop the rally. What if a confrontation did take place? Who would be responsible?

[Domnysheva] Are you saying that you do not agree with the interpretation of the USSR Procuracy's information memorandum on the results of the investigation of the 9 April events in Tbilisi?

[Sobchak] This is more a political than legal document, and its purpose is to justify the necessity of using force. It puts the blame on the rally organizers and those who perished. However, the parliament commission on Tbilisi established beyond any doubt that General Rodionov, General Yefimov, and Lieutenant Colonel Baklanov directly violated the order given to them by their superiors. The people were used not to protect objects, as was the order, but to disperse the rally. There is an instruction, and an order had been issued, not to use truncheons against women and children; nevertheless, they were used.

[Domnysheva] Does the parliament commission have documents that prove these violations?

[Sobchak] We also have the testimony of those in charge—the same Lieutenant Colonel Baklanov—let alone the testimony of the victims. But, most importantly, the memo is further proof of the extent to which the reality differs from the facts quoted by the procuracy today, and from the statements of Chief Military Procurator Katusev at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, where he directly accused the rally participants, and almost the entire Georgian people, of organizing a bitter confrontation and resistance, and of forming commando teams from specially trained people, although no commando was identified by name. There were scary phrases about the realistic danger of physical elimination of the republic leadership and the communists. But we have established, absolutely beyond doubt, that before 8-9 April there was not a single case of a politically motivated attack or criminal act committed against military personnel or against the communists, let alone against the republic leadership. By the admission of the military themselves, the demonstration of military equipment provoked the people into a confrontation, and by the time the troops arrived at the square there were over 10,000 people there instead of the expected 200-300. Then the square, with so many people in it, was cleared in eight minutes. In the name of what was there such a rush—even if we agree with the conclusion that the majority of the victims were simply crushed and trampled in the crowd? Who created this crush?

I want to especially point out that the information memo does not confirm what the chief military procurator said at the congress—that home-made explosives and flammables had been used at the square. At that time Katusev said that he had absolutely reliable information on that; now, not a word. The procuracy still has not explained what they mean by the word "commando." This is not a legal definition—the criminal code does not contain such a thing.

When the Tbilisi events were discussed at the second congress, deputies were especially incensed by the chief

military procurator's words alleging that Georgian men hid behind women for self-protection, that they pushed women at the lines of soldiers, and that is why they died. This statement was insulting to Georgians. Judging by the USSR Procuracy memo (we knew it all along), this statement may today be characterized as slander against the Georgian people, as it has no foundation whatsoever. I think the time has come to say that Chief Military Procurator Katusev, who deceived the Congress of People's Deputies and made false statements before the highest organ of the country, should bear responsibility for his actions and be removed from his post. I believe that people's deputies should bring this issue up at the Supreme Soviet.

When we remember Tbilisi, we need to think of Moscow now. To remember what so far has been only a threat. But it seems to be a real threat. That is why I am worried today. I am worried about us, the people, and the future of our democracy.

Lt Gen Grekov Answers Armenian Accusation

91UM05274 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
3 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Lieutenant General Yu. Grekov, first deputy commander of troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Colonel V. Kaushanskiy; date and place not given: "Armenia-Azerbaijan: "Why Is There An Outpost on the Border?"]

[Text] Not long ago the Armenian Ministry of Internal Affairs [MVD] disseminated a statement directed to the command element of the Transcaucasus Military District. In particular, it expressed dissatisfaction over the "illegal actions" of units of the Soviet Army that control a five-kilometer zone of the Armenian-Azerbaijani border. The statement claims that 40-60 percent of the personnel of these units, including the commanders, are Azerbaijani, it is they allegedly who let militants and subunits of the Azerbaijan OMON [special-purpose militia detachment] pass through controlled territory absolutely unhindered. In other words, there is a vague hint that the actions of the military are maintaining the "high temperature" on the border.

Our correspondent asked Lieutenant General Yu. Grekov, first deputy commander of the troops of the Transcaucasus Military District, to comment on the statement of the Armenian MVD.

[Grekov] First of all, I would like to direct your attention to the time of the appearance of this statement. Spring is coming. The snow is melting in the mountains. The gorges are drying out, and the paths that lead to hamlets that are exhausted from dissension are becoming clear. You do not have to be a prophet to predict a worsening of the situation.

March and the beginning of April have already continued the record of casualties, among both the military

and civilians. An attack was perpetrated on military outposts the other day in the rayon of Lachin. Militants moved under the cover of fire from automatic weapons. It was necessary to defend oneself. The attackers took casualties. It is clear that someone very much wants the departure of the Soviet Army subunits from the border zone and is testing the steadiness of the nerves of the soldiers and officers, supposing that where bullets cannot reach perhaps slander will inflict wounds.

[Kaushanskiy] But perhaps, nonetheless, there are violations among the soldiers?

[Grekov] I have been at our outposts more than once, but I do not recall anything to indicate that our military has set up some kind of pass system on the border of the two republics. We do not even have the right to do this. No one has transferred border guard functions to us.

Apparently it is appropriate to mention that as early as last year the Azerbaijani side made a decision to reinforce its border in order to secure itself against penetration by extremists into its territory, and additional contingents of Internal Troops and militia were sent here. A special-purpose detachment of the Azerbaijan MVD was established, and engineering installations are being set up on the border of the republic. These facts are well known.

But the task of the servicemen of the Transcaucasus Military District is to prevent the terror of bandits against the peaceful population, regardless of national origin. There can be no priorities here, inasmuch as we are talking about our own, Soviet people. I consider it necessary to emphasize a position of principle in this respect.

Moreover, soldiers are being dispatched to Nagorno-Karabakh to guard bridges, tunnels, and other important national economic installations. And time has shown that there is no other way yet.

You know, I went through Afghanistan, and I saw all kinds of things, including the most miserable war scenes that were not for the fainthearted. But when in the settlement of Zabukh I counted 29 bullet holes in the windshield of a KamAZ vehicle that was riddled point-blank and saw how the bodies of the dead youths were disfigured, then I shuddered.

And the picture of the flight of residents from the village of Askipar? I will never forget this. The village was subjected to fire from 100 mm city-busting guns. I regretted that I had not taken my video camera that day. I would have taken one frame after another that was reminiscent of the chronicle of the Great Patriotic War... The smell of burning from the explosions of shells, old women pushing carts in front of them with odds and ends, and the bellowing of scattered cattle. And my heart was wrung. I recalled Afghanistan once again...

I regretted another thing also: There was no one from the cohort of our "democrats" next to me. More precisely,

those of them who vituperate loudly and demagogically about "Army butchers" and their victims.

[Kaushanskiy] Yuriy Pavlovich, apparently it makes sense to concretize those same 40-60 percent of Azerbaijanis who serve in border area rayons of the republic. Do these figures correspond to reality?

[Grekov] These figures are close enough to the truth and correspond fully to the decision of the Azerbaijan Council of Ministers to reinforce their borders. But to use these figures for any kind of a denunciation of the military would hardly be feasible or logical. It is known that the callup into the Soviet Army in Armenia was suspended by a decision of the parliament, and that a process is going on to establish national armed forces. But they, of course, will consist 100 percent of representatives of the native population. In a word, any hint at allegedly frightening figures, in my opinion, is calculated more for foreign effect. These percentages depend entirely on the will of the governments of the two republics, but not on intrigues of the Soviet Army.

But for the sake of truth, let us look into the problem from another angle also: For how long will young boys from Russia, Belorussia, and the Ukraine expose themselves to the bullets of militants? A reasonable question. And, indeed, it is very painful for the parents of the soldiers and for the parliaments of the Union republics. It is simpler to put an end to violence through political means at the negotiating table.

[Kaushanskiy] You said that a troubling spring is awaited in the border area rayons. Let us once more turn to your prediction. What is it based on?

[Grekov] First, on personal observations: With the approach of warm weather the migration of militants to the mountainous areas gets under way. Second, the statistical level of attacks, like mercury, has already started to climb. Third, the presence of destructive forces that possess significant reserves of weapons. You see, the Armenian Army has still not disarmed in fact.

However, there are also enough heated voices and eager hands that have not dropped their weapons in Azerbaijan.

By the way, this is also indicated by a statistical reference cited in the Armenian MVD statement to cases of the Azerbaijani side's seizure of hostages, rustling of cattle, firing on population centers, etc. But is retaliatory counteraction really "incited by" the Army? Is violence not a derivative of violence? It is clear that the Armenian MVD is not conducting a search for the guilty ones in this direction, and it is trying to find a way out of the crisis not in toughening the fight against armed bandits in the border areas but in placing all responsibility on the military.

Gathering of Ussuri Cossacks Elects Military Hetman

PM0104110691 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Report from A. Dolgikh roundup of correspondents' reports under the rubric "Army and Navy: News Service": "The Cossacks Got a Hetman and the Hetman Got a Saber"]

[Text] At the Khristorozhdestvenskiy Church in Khabarovsk, military padre Father Tikhon has consecrated the banner of the Ussuri Cossack Army [Ussuriyskoye Kazachye Voysko].

Later, a large Cossack gathering was held at the district Officers' Institute, attended by hetmans and representatives of all the Cossack armies which are being revived east of Baykal. The gathering was also attended by Lieutenant General V. Bogachev, deputy commander for rear services and chief of rear services of the Far Eastern Military District; Major General of Justice V. Gurinovich, the district's military prosecutor; Lieutenant General V. Butenko, chief of the Far Eastern Border District; and kray leaders.

The participants in the gathering adopted a decision to divide the Ussuri Cossack Army into two districts—Maritime and Khabarovsk, and also to form a union of Cossacks of the Transbaykal and Far Russia, with its center in Khabarovsk. In a departure from tradition, it was decided not to appoint the first official hetman of the union, but to elect him by a vote of military hetmans. Lieutenant General V. Bogachev was elected. He was presented with his Cossack general's shoulder straps and an engraved saber.

Strategic Missile Troops Hold CPSU Conference

91UM05254 Moscow KRSNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 23 Mar 91 First Edition p 2

[Report by Major A. Dolinin: "Party Conferences": "Following a Course of Renewal"]

[Text] In the Strategic Missile Troops one officer out of every eight and one warrant officer out of every five is a member of the CPSU. The communists are calling the tune in the accomplishment of complex assignments pertaining to assurance of the high combat readiness of the units and subunits. It is not fortuitous, therefore, that many of those who are directly on alert duty and who head combat crews came to be elected delegates to the Missile Troops' party conference.

The report of Major General G. Batanov, chairman of the organizing committee for leadership of reforming party structures in the Missile Troops, and the speeches of Major S. Glotov, people's deputy of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic]; worker A. Demin, delegate to the 28th CPSU Congress; Army General Yu. Maksimov, commander in chief of the

Strategic Missile Troops and deputy USSR defense minister; servicemen communists Yu. Fisenko, A. Vlasenko, and I. Oleynik, and other delegates paid much attention to problems of perestroika and the renewal of party work and methods of increasing the party organization's influence on the activity of the forces.

The delegates voiced concern about the fate of socialism, the fatherland, and the armed forces. It was observed that political forces whose aim is to discredit the name of Vladimir Ilich Lenin and his teaching as the theory and practice of social development are making their presence known in society with increasing insistence. The communists of the Missile Troops perceive the attempts to erase the name of Lenin from the people's memory as nothing other than part of a precisely coordinated campaign whose purpose is social revenge and a change in the form of government and social system.

The conference delegates appealed to all communists and men of the Missile Troops to join their efforts in consistent defense of the purity of the Leninist banner and to support the proposal of many plant and military collectives concerning the organization on 20 April 1991 in all Missile Troops units, enterprises, and establishments of an all-union unpaid working Saturday and the channeling of some of the resources from it into the restoration and development of Lenin museums and memorials. The forces' party organizations have already transferred 60,000 rubles to the V.I. Lenin Museum Defense Fund.

O. Baklanov, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee; Ye. Makhov, acting chairman of the CPSU Central Control Commission; and Colonel General G. Stefanovskiy, deputy chief of the USSR Armed Forces Main Military-Political Directorate, participated in the conference and spoke.

Baku Garrison CPSU Conference Held

91UM0522A Baku BAKINSKIY RABOCHIIY
in Russian 6 Mar 91 p 2

[Article by Captain Uzeir Dzhaferov, member of the USSR Union of Journalists: "Garrison Communists Sum of Results"]

[Text] Troops of the Baku garrison have held their 21st party congress. Participating in its work were the troop commander of the Transcaucasian Military District Colonel General V. Patrikeyev; department head of the CPSU Central Committee V. Namestnikov; and head of the Department for Legislative Initiatives, Legal Questions, and Interethnic Relations of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan, A. Golubev.

Officer V. Buslovskiy gave the report from the political organ concerning the course of perestroika, renewal of party work, and the program of actions of Communists.

Both the speaker and many of those who participated in the discussions noted that significant changes had taken place in the country since of the last party conference. A tangle of interethnic problems has developed, the situation in one region or another frequently gets out of the control of the power organs, and this ends up in anarchy and bloodshed. Transcaucasia has also become a hotbed of this, a place where separatism and nationalism have reached their highest peak, economic and cultural ties are being destroyed, and simple workers are suffering. This pertains especially to Georgia and Armenia. It is in these republics that it is difficult for the Transcaucasian servicemen guarding the southern borders of the region.

Officer V. Buslovskiy addressed the following words to officials from the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan: "In a situation where there continues to be a confrontation between two republics, Armenia and Azerbaijan, it is both psychologically and physically difficult for our military servicemen who are performing difficult duty in the border regions. They deserve daily concern and attention from the local authorities. The republic leadership and its president, Ayaz Niyaz ogly Mutalibov, are always interested in the affairs and concerns of the officers and all personnel, for which we are grateful. Since fate has dealt us a 'hot spot,' the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, where, unfortunately, peace-loving citizens and our young troops are dying, we must, along with the Azeri soldiers, do everything possible to stabilize the situation. This is our military, patriotic, and civil duty. It is a matter of honor for us.

Ya. Nasirov spoke at the conference. On behalf of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Azerbaijan and the republic's workers, he expressed gratitude to the men of the garrison who had honorably performed their duty in the regions bordering on Armenia. He analyzed the sociopolitical situation in the republic in detail and discussed the tasks that face the Azeri people.

Then there was a dialogue with the participants in the party conference. Addressing those who had gathered there, the troop commander of the Transcaucasian Military District, Colonel General V. Patrikeyev, stated directly that in the Transcaucasian region only troops serving in Azerbaijan were in favorable conditions. In this republic there are none of the anti-Soviet attitudes which are being manifested more and more distinctly in Georgia and especially Armenia. Military servicemen, along with the leaders of Azerbaijan and the republic president, are doing everything possible to guarantee the safety of the republic's population and the inviolability of its borders. The Azeri people are respectful to their military protectors, and this helps the military to carry out the tasks they face.

Delegates to the 21st party conference elected a party committee for the association for the first time. This is a qualitatively new organ of party management, created as

a result of the reform of the country's Armed Forces and intended to raise the level of political training of Army Communists.

Further on True Size of Defense Budget

91UM0522B Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 13, Mar 91 p 6

[Article by Professor B. Rayzberg, doctor of technical and economic sciences and chief scientific associate of the Scientific Research Economics Institute of the USSR Gosplan: "Reader Responds: The 'Case' of the 150 Billion"]

[Text] Official figures on USSR military expenditures for 1989 were published for the first time in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY No. 45 for 1990. According to them, the overall annual military expenditures amounted to a total of 78 billion rubles [R].

There is reason to assume that the figures given in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY are fairly precise "line by line"—at least in so far as they can be established by the existing imperfect statistics. But still on the whole they are far from complete.

Thus, the table does not give the expenditures on the operation of arms, which in the United States, for example, amounts to about \$80 billion a year (ARGUMENTY I FAKTY gives only expenditures on maintenance and repair in the amount of R3.5 billion).

The research and development mentioned in the table pertains to models of military equipment for individual branches of the armed forces. But there is also basic and applied military research conducted by academic and branch institutes and financed from the state budget.

Nor do the military expenses include expenditures on training specialists to work in the defense branches of industry or military training in civilian educational institutions.

The figures given do not include data on capital investments in defense branches of industry financed from the state budget, including funds used for the development of the national economy. There are no figures on the expenditures of these branches for maintaining military secrets.

It should also be noted that figures on material expenditures for military purposes have been lowered because of the fact that the materials are delivered to the military departments at preferential prices. The subsidy is also paid for by that same state budget but it does not come under "military" expenditures.

The table also bypasses losses related to the opportunity cost of using land and natural resources for military facilities (not to mention the ecological consequences) and of taking military servicemen away from work in the national economy.

True, for the sake of fairness one must exclude from the military expenditures on maintaining the Army and construction, that proportion that goes for the aid the Army renders to the national economy.

If we add to the figures on USSR military expenditures given in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY all those items that are not taken into account in them, it turns out that the figure of R140-150 billion a year more fully reflects the real expenditures.

The same thing is shown by an estimate made in another way. Since the overall annual volume of products of the defense branches of machine building is no less than half of the overall output of the machine-building complex, which equals R300 billion, the defense complex accounts for R150 billion. Eliminating from the output of the defense branches the consumer goods they produce (approximately 40 percent), we see that the annual military output is roughly R90 billion per year. And another R50-60 billion goes for maintaining army personnel, operational-economic expenditures [operativno-khozyaystvennye raskhody], and military construction. Again we end up with R150 billion.

Servicewomen's Representative Meets Shlyaga

91UM05074 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Interview with G. Derevitskaya, senior instructor for work with the families of servicemen of the Military Political Directorate, Leningrad Military District, by Major A. Zotov; place and date not given: "To Be Closer to the People"]

[Text] As KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has already reported, representatives of the female aktiv of the Armed Forces studied for 10 days at a seminar sponsored by the Moscow Higher Party School. On one of the days, they met with Colonel General N. Shlyaga, chief of the Main Military Political Directorate of the USSR Armed Forces, in the Central House of the Soviet Army. G. Derevitskaya, senior instructor for work with the families of servicemen of the Military Political Directorate of the Leningrad Military District who took part in the meeting, will share her impressions with us now:

[Derevitskaya] We customarily refer to the significant role of the family. However, these issues are frequently put on the back burner when it comes to actual deeds. We have now understood, especially at the meeting with the chief of the Main Military Political Directorate, that this work is finally beginning to directly influence our lives. If nothing else, the following aspect testifies to this: In the course of a reform of political organs, instructors for educational work with the families of servicemen are arriving in the troops, in large units, and at oblast military commissariats.

[Zotov] Galina Vasilyevna, as you see it, what can make your efforts more effective?

[Derevitskaya] To begin with, the status of instructors for educational work with families definitely needs to be determined. To this day, we do not know our rights or responsibilities thoroughly, and this narrows the scope of our activities.

[Zotov] How useful was your training at the seminars?

[Derevitskaya] Very, and this is not an exaggeration. We familiarized ourselves in depth with the issues of the women's movement in our country, and pondered what families would feel in the environment of a transition to market relations. We met with heads of ministries and departments, creative-arts intellectuals of the capital city, and representatives of the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic Communist Party Central Committee.

Dispute Over Afghan Vet's Housing in Dushanbe

91UM0507B Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian
22 Mar 91 Union Edition p 3

[Article by V. Litovkin: "They Are Taking Away the Houses... of the 'Afgantsy'"]

[Text] The building of 20 cottages for soldier-"afgantsy" [veterans of the Afghan war] is about finished in Dushanbe, the capital of Tajikistan. However, legitimate owners of these houses cannot receive housing allocation vouchers... Rizoali Odzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Affairs of Soldier-Internationalists, narrates:

The concept of building such houses in our city emerged about a year ago, immediately after the well-known February events during which soldier-afgantsy turned out to be virtually the only force capable of pacifying enraged crowds. They were the ones to form a very thin chain between residents of the capital city and soldiers of the Internal Troops. They argued at the top of their voices, and they persuaded the people to calm down, go home, and prevent further bloodshed... They were the ones to help the rayon and city authorities to establish communications and supply fuel and foodstuffs to schools, hospitals, and day-care centers...

Many good things can be said about my comrades, reservists who displayed their best traits during these bitter days—courage, nobleness, and their readiness to sacrifice everything for the people. I would like to stress one thing: The city Union of Veterans of the War in Afghanistan demonstrated once again that it is a force which can be relied upon at any difficult moment.

The city did not forget the courage of the "afgantsy." The decision to help the "afgantsy" comprehensively with solving their problems was made at a session of the city soviet right away. It was resolved to build 40 cottages for them on Eastern Hills of the capital city because 70 percent of 2,000 internationalists had no housing.

One-half of these houses are virtually ready. Chairman of the Dushanbe City Executive Committee Maksud Ikramov was extremely helpful in the course of building them. He pushed through the paperwork, sought out construction materials, and saw to it that funds allocated for the cottages were used precisely for this purpose rather than elsewhere. The leadership of the republic and the USSR Ministry of Defense also made a contribution. The "afgantsy" themselves did not stand by idly. They worked at the construction site every Saturday, Sunday, and in their spare time. They knew that they were working for themselves.

Now they want to take these houses away from the "afgantsy." The pretext is the most obvious and, at first glance, impeccable: Hundreds of teachers, other specialists who are badly needed in the city, and representatives of the creative-arts intelligentsia are in the same situation as the "afgantsy..." An outflow of professionals from Dushanbe is under way, and this process should be stopped...

All of this is true. However, 20 houses will not solve the problem. You cannot be kind to everybody at the same time, especially to the detriment of others. It is impossible to distribute what rightfully belongs to others. The city, its people's deputies, and the executive committee should keep their word given to the "afgantsy."

They have already been cheated many times: when they were sent to fight a war and to die on someone else's land, when they were promised tremendous preferences which it is virtually impossible to exact, and when they were promised help with going back to normal life, but were left alone to face its difficulties... Perhaps, this is enough! Is it not clear that power which is not capable of keeping its word and which reneges on its own decision is not power anymore, and the authority it enjoys among the people may turn out to be marginal?!

The "afgantsy" are not asking for anything illegal; only what was earned and erected with their own hands. Given this complex situation, the city executive committee should also understand the obvious: If it keeps the promise to the soldier-internationalists, other people, who also badly need housing, will believe it, and will know that it will keep its word in the future as well... A firm course, consistency, morality, and honesty are the main things which all of us lack badly at present.

Comment on Danger in Creating Republic Armies

91UM0438A Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian
23 Jan 91 p 1

[Extract from appeal by military scholars to parliamentarians of the country: "One of the Myths of History"]

[Text] Plans for the creation of republic armies have emerged in various regions of our country in recent times. In particular, this idea is emphasized in the statement by B.N. Yeltsin at a press conference on 14 January of this year. Engaged in studies of military

problems over many long years, we are quite alarmed at these designs. They lack scientific argumentation.

...The idea of creating parallel armed forces within the framework of a single state is entirely unsound and extremely dangerous...

Quantitative assessments conducted in a number of scientific centers show that the degree of combat readiness of combined republic armed forces will be only a fraction of the combat readiness of the presently existing USSR Armed Forces. This sharp decrease is explained by a number of reasons. Because of the absence of a unified system to provide cover, fragmented republic armies will not be able to repulse a potential air-space attack by an enemy, which would be the basis of a modern strategic operation. Each border republic is capable of conducting a defense in one echelon only, a fact which predetermines enemy superiority in a given theater of combat operations.

In creating republic military formations, republics and the country as a whole will confront the tremendous absolute growth of material and financial expenditures. Available data show that to maintain one regiment, consisting of 1,000 individuals, of a national formation in Armenia in 1990 cost 35 million rubles [R].

Deployment of a single motorized rifle division, taking into account the establishment of a repair and maintenance base, storehouses, housing and barracks, etc., would require expenditures of more than R7 billion. The training of just one officer in a military educational institution today costs the state an amount in excess of R50,000. Then we must add appropriations for the institutions of the republic ministries of defense (committees) with their corresponding systems of staff headquarters and command and control organs.

The emergence of republic armies within the Union will augment interethnic instability as well, and will elicit negative foreign political and foreign economic processes and phenomena...

The substantive role of republic armies in consolidating the defensive capability of the Union is one of the myths which have appeared in the modern history of our homeland.

From an appeal by military scholars to the parliamentarians of the country.

Georgia Revises Constitution on Military Service

91UM0438B Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
5 Feb 91 p 2

["Law of the Republic of Georgia on Introducing Amendments to the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Georgia"]

[Text] The following amendments are to be introduced into the Constitution (Basic Law) of the Republic of Georgia:

1. Articles 29, 30, and 61 shall read as follows:

"Article 29. The term of mandatory military service or alternative service and procedure for accomplishing it are determined by the law."

"Article 30. National military formations are obligated to defend the interests of the Republic of Georgia and its territorial integrity, to shore up the defensive capability of the republic, to ensure the repulsion of any aggression, and guarantee civil peace.

The obligations of state organs, social organizations, responsible officials, and citizens in ensuring and solidifying the security of the Republic of Georgia are determined by legislation of the Republic of Georgia."

"Article 61. Service in national military formations of the Republic of Georgia is the sacred obligation and patriotic duty of a citizen of the Republic of Georgia."

2. Article 104 shall be supplemented with a new Point 31, to read as follows:

"31) establishes procedure for the organization of national military formations of the Republic of Georgia and conscription in them";

Point 31 is to be regarded as Point 32.

3. Article 113 shall be supplemented by Points 16, 17, and 18, to read as follows:

"16) determines annually the number of individuals subject to conscription for military service;

"17) confers military ranks;

"18) appoints generals and commanders to their posts."

4. In Point 19 of Article 104 and Point 3 of Article 115, the words "of the commander" are to be replaced by "of the commander in chief."

[Signed] Z. Gamsakhurdia, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Republic of Georgia.

Tbilisi, 29 January 1991.

All-Army Party Conference Resolution

91UM0536A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
4 Apr 91 First Edition p 2

[Resolution of the First All-Army Party Conference: "On the Present Situation and Measures for Ideological Unification and Organizational and Political Consolidation of the Party Organizations of the USSR Armed Forces"]

[Text]

1. The First All-Army Conference has completed the period of formation of electoral organs of CPSU organizations of the Army and Navy and organizationally secured the creation of a unified party organization of the USSR Armed Forces as a component of the CPSU.

The party organization of the USSR Armed Forces operates on the basis of the USSR Constitution and legislation of the USSR. It is guided by the CPSU Program and Rules and by the rulings of the supreme governing organs of the party, as well as by the Instructions on the Work of CPSU Organizations in the USSR Armed Forces.

2. Evaluating the present situation and expressing the will of a body of more than one million communists in the Army and Navy, the conference resolutely opposes the process of eliminating parties from the Armed Forces, condemns communist servicemen who leave the CPSU in these times that are difficult for the party and for the whole country, and declares the fidelity of the personnel of the USSR Armed Forces to the USSR Constitution, socialist choice, and the policy of comprehensive renewal of Soviet society.

Acknowledging its responsibility before the fatherland, the communists of the Armed Forces favor the further implementation of perestroika, the consolidation of the USSR as a united federative socialist state, and the immediate signing of the Union treaty.

They consider it necessary to take more decisive measures to uphold the social system in the country, they condemn the activities of antisocialist, nationalist, and separatist forces, and they repudiate attacks on the military and attempts to disparage its importance to society.

The party organization of the USSR Armed Forces considers its most important duty to be to provide for the defense capability of the country at a level of reasonable sufficiency and for the organized implementation of military reform to preserve a united USSR Armed Forces, to support high combat and mobilization readiness of the Armed Forces, to unify personnel, and to mobilize them to fulfill their civic duty to defend the state.

3. To consider the main goal of all communists of the Army and the Navy to be the ideological unification of party ranks on the basis of Marxism-Leninism and aggressive and purposeful work to replenish their ranks with leading servicemen and to implement the rulings of the 28th CPSU Congress and of the supreme organs of the party to defend the USSR Constitution, and to realize in the activities of the troops (forces) the policies of the USSR Supreme Soviet, the president of the USSR, and the government of the USSR.

For party organizations to persistently ensure that each member of the CPSU becomes a political fighter for the party, consistently raises his ideological and theoretical level, masters modern forms of political struggle, takes an aggressive position on life, and takes a direct part in the education of the personnel of the Army and Navy by explaining to them the ideologies of V.I. Lenin, the ideals of the Great October Revolution, the strategies and

tactics of perestroika, the role and place of the USSR Armed Forces and by revealing the activities of anticonstitutional forces.

For the all-Army party committee and its bureau to carry out concrete measures to increase ideological and educational efforts with each communist, to impart to them political stability and ideological maturity, to persistently work to keep ideological work from lagging behind the realities of life, and to show initiative in the formation of public opinion in military collectives.

To establish the active provision of political information to members of the CPSU. To restructure the system of party training and theoretical and practical training of the ideological aktiv and of each communist. To more fully make use of all forms and methods of ideological work, the possibilities of verbal agitation and propaganda, and the mass media. To resolve the question of the creation of all-Army district (group, fleet) organs of the periodical press.

For the party committees to ensure the active participation of communists in general political actions to defend the cause of V.I. Lenin and to consolidate the unity of the Army and the people and in mass military and patriotic measures dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War.

4. For party committees and supervisory commissions to take measures to further organize the political consolidation of party organizations. To consider the most important directions of their activities to be to provide for the efficient operation of the reformed party structures, to strengthen their vertical ties among themselves, to ensure independence in work within the framework of the CPSU Rules and unity of the activities of communists on the platform of the party Program, to establish an efficient system of party information, and to intensify the efforts, first and foremost, of the primary party organizations.

Within party organizations, to conduct wide and concerned discussion of the new CPSU Program and to summarize everything valuable that practical party work has created in the years of perestroika.

To make fuller use of the accumulated positive experience of efforts to turn party organizations into the political core of the military collectives and to ensure the personal example of each communist in service and conduct. To more actively support social principles in party work and to reinforce horizontal structures that have proven themselves, soviets of secretaries, and multicandidate and public elections of the party aktiv.

For party committees and primary party organizations to develop Leninist norms of party life, to raise the culture of relations between communists, and to foster party fellowship, solidarity, and responsibility before the party collective.

While developing the process of democratization of interparty life, to take measures to ensure the strict observation of the requirements of the CPSU Rules in each party organization, to ensure supervision and the obligation to carry out party rulings and commissions, and to reinforce party discipline. To constantly analyze the state of the party ranks and the placement of communists.

Under conditions of independence of party organizations in their acceptance of people for membership in the CPSU, to improve the system for replenishing the party ranks, educating young communists, and forming in them the qualities of political fighters of the party. To pay attention to those who leave the ranks of the CPSU and ensure glasnost when examining their statements.

With the goal of revealing the opinions of communists on timely issues of party life, clarifying the real state of party forces inside party organizations and increasing confidence in the possibilities of the party, to improve experience in conducting individual interviews with members of the CPSU.

5. For party committees and party organizations, on the basis of the 28th congress resolution "On Basic Directions of Military Policy of the CPSU at This Present Stage," to master their new place and role in the general system for ensuring the security of the USSR and implementing programs of military reform. By means of party methods of operation, to have an influence on the problems of combat and mobilization of troops and Navy forces, to ensure that communists set an example in the fulfillment of their official duties, and to demonstrate constant concern for the improvement of their military skills and professional competency and for the creation of the necessary conditions permitting them to most fully make use of existing reserves, opportunities, and the creative potential of communists and all personnel for qualitative resolution of the tasks of combat and operational training, alert duty (service), and mastery and use of equipment and weapons.

To form and foster among communists and all personnel a legal culture and a respectful attitude toward laws, the military oath, and military regulations, to create in multiethnic military collectives a healthy moral atmosphere, and to raise their commitment toward the life and health of people and the reinforcement of military discipline and law and order.

For the party organizations to work out measures and take active participation in the fulfillment of the comprehensive program of social development of the Armed Forces to the year 2000, to demonstrate daily concern for the needs and inquiries of communists and all servicemen, laborers, clerical workers, and members of their families, and to react in a strict and principled manner to violations of law and social justice.

Relying on social opinion, democratization of official relations, and the broadening of glasnost, for party

organizations to make full use of their rights and opportunities to select and place military personnel and to actively oppose nonobjectivity and protectionism in the evaluation of their activities and their official career.

6. For party committees, as the basic structural links of party organization of the Armed Forces, to improve the style of their activities, to overcome the inertia of the period of reorganization and formation, and by their practical affairs and action declare their independence, consolidating role, and ability to lead communists in the resolution of current problems.

For the all-Army party committee to render aid to newly elected committees of units, institutions, combined units, military training institutions, armies and flotillas, districts and navies, the central apparat, and branches and services of the Armed Forces in the establishment and organization of practical activities in regard to general party proposals and specific tasks decided by the military collectives where they are elected.

To demonstrate concern for the ideological and professional growth of party personnel and their social protection in accordance with the status approved by the CPSU Central Committee and the rulings of the government of the USSR. To organize training and retraining of the newly elected party aktiv.

7. On the basis of rulings of the 28th CPSU Congress, the law "On Public Associations," and the accumulated experience of party work, for the party committees to improve the mechanism of relations between party organizations and organs of military administration, military political organs, and public associations and organizations. To take part in joint efforts to resolve key problems in the training of the Armed Forces, to educate military personnel, to enforce undivided authority, to increase the authority and responsibility of communists for the state of affairs in assigned areas of official activity, to educate personnel, and to provide social and legal protections for them.

Via communists elected to membership in officers assemblies, women's councils, and various commissions, as well as trade unions and Komsomol and other organs, to support the operation of democratic institutions in the Armed Forces and to conduct CPSU policy in military and labor collectives.

To demonstrate constant concern for the efficiency of the work of communists elected to soviets of people's deputies. To work out with them unified approaches to timely questions of the military policy of the party and the life and activities of the Armed Forces. To respond in a timely fashion to their proposals and inquiries and actively influence the activities of deputies clubs.

For party committees to establish close ties with local party organs and actively interact with them in the implementation of rulings of party congresses and plenums and of decisions of the CPSU Central Committee.

in the organization of military and patriotic education, and in the training of youth for service in the USSR Armed Forces.

To support the veterans movement, to develop ties with healthy forces of public organizations at the local level, and to more fully make use of their efforts in the interest of reinforcing unity of the Army and the people and preparing for replenishment of troops.

To demonstrate initiative in bringing before the CPSU Central Committee, the president of the USSR, and the USSR Ministry of Defense questions concerning the most important problems of the daily functions of the troops (forces) and of party work.

For the supervisory commissions in their practical activities to be strictly guided by the CPSU Rules and decisions approved by the appropriate organs, to monitor the implementation of the rulings of congresses and conferences and the observation of democratic principles in the activities of party committees, to resolve issues connected with the observation by communists of party discipline and norms of public morals, to defend the rights, honor, and dignity of members of the party, and to carry out systematic supervision of the implementation of the party budget and the conduct of the economic activities of institutions of the party committees. To take party action against people guilty of suppressing criticism, abusing their official position, and committing other violations of the norms of party life.

To recommend that all party committees support close interaction with supervisory commissions created on questions of the practical execution of the CPSU Rules and rulings of the party congresses. Together with the supervisory commissions, to persistently attempt to achieve unity and purity of Army party ranks and improvement of the authority and independence of local party organizations.

The party conference charges the All-Army Party Committee with examining and defining the necessary structure and number of its party apparatus, the organization of its activities, and the material and technical supply and financing of all party organs of the Armed Forces. It is considered advisable to establish special funds of party committees which stimulate aggressive activities of party organizations in the Army and the Navy.

To charge the All-Army Party Committee with studying and summarizing the recommendations and wishes received from the delegates to the conference, including those concerning individual provisions of the Instructions on the Work of Organizations of the CPSU in the USSR Armed Forces, and with issuing appropriate proposals to the CPSU Central Committee.

Armed Units Within Latvian People's Front Rejected

91P50151A Riga SOVETSKAYA MOLODEZH in Russian 22 Mar 91 p 5

[LETA report in the "Latvia: Chronicle" column: "The People's Front of Latvia Does Not Want To Arm Itself"]

[Text] The Board of the People's Front of Latvia considers the establishment of independent government structures to be a step toward the independence of Latvia. Therefore, it is actively participating in the discussion on the creation of a defense system. On March 19 the Board adopted a resolution which states that the creation of military, paramilitary or other armed units is the exclusive function of government institutions and that proposals for the establishment of such units within the People's Front are categorically rejected. The Board set up a working group which will enlist the help of experts in preparing an organizational concept for a Latvian army and self-defense police force. Until such time as the government can guarantee the protection of especially important facilities, the People's Front of Latvia will continue its unarmed people's defense of these facilities.

Liberal Democratic Party Secretary Views Relations with CPSU, Army

91UN1216A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 91 First Edition p 4

[Interview with A. Khalitov, member of the Supreme Council and secretary of the Central Committee of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union for organizational questions, by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Major S. Knyazkov; place and date not given; published under the rubric "Who Is Who": "A Party of a Centrist Tendency"]

[Text] More than a year ago the first constituent congress of the Liberal Democratic Party of the Soviet Union (LDPSS) took place in Moscow. For the first time since 1917 the congress of a political party other than the CPSU took place legally in this country. In this fashion the right of public institutions to have their own political parties as protected by the USSR Constitution was exercised.

Major S. Knyazkov, our correspondent, met with A.Kh. Khalitov, member of the Supreme Council and secretary of the Central Committee of the LDPSS for organizational questions.

From the files of KRASNAYA ZVEZDA: Akhmet Khari-sovich Khalitov was born in 1929 in Yelabuga. He is Tatar. He graduated from Timiryazevskiy Agricultural Academy and finished postgraduate study. He worked as the chief agronomist of an MTS [vehicle and tractor station], chairman of a kolkhoz in the Moscow region, head of a laboratory, and chief specialist in the USSR Ministry of Agriculture. From 1954 to 1981 he was a

member of the CPSU. He has more than 100 scientific and other publications, two monographs, and five patents on inventions.

[Khalitov] A year has passed since the constituent congress. I consider that event to be a momentous landmark in the political life of our state.

I recall that the Statute of the LDPSS was adopted and the governing organs of the party were elected at the congress. Vladimir Volfovich Zhirinovskiy, a figure with a rightist orientation, became the chairman. He stands for the natural and historical path of development and for the preservation of the territorial integrity of the state.

[Knyazkov] Does this mean that the liberal democrats support the conservative views that are generally called "rightist" views among the people?

[Khalitov] Our party is of a centrist tendency: It shares neither the extreme right nor the extreme left views which undermine the state. In other words, we do not support those extremist forces in the democratic movement that wish to destroy our entire house solely to remove the Communists from power.

[Knyazkov] You are in favor of territorial integrity of the Union. Please explain why.

[Khalitov] Yes, I repeat: The basic provisions of the Program of the liberal democrats include preservation of the Union and territorial integrity of the state—the concept of sovereignty extends to the whole country and not to its components; recognition of the equality of the rights of private property ownership alongside other forms; and resolution of ethnic issues only within the framework of the Constitution and the law.

[Knyazkov] How many members does the party now have?

[Khalitov] According to our information there are approximately 15,000-20,000 members of the party in the country. Large organizations of the LDPSS exist in Moscow, the Moscow region, Odessa, Rostov, Stavropol, Belorussia, and the Ukraine. But quantity is not the main thing for us. Practical work and the ability of members of the party to win the hearts and minds of people is important to us. In the end we are interested in having people learn about us and, when the next elections arrive, vote for our representatives.

[Knyazkov] In what fashion do you propagandize your views? Like other parties with a democratic orientation, using rallies, demonstrations, and mass meetings?

[Khalitov] If the liberals were to adhere to such tactics, like pseudodemocrats, then we too would probably resort to rallies and other forceful forms of expressing one's opinion. But we do not do this because the outcry from rallies does not produce an additional kilogram of bread or liter of milk.

We are first and foremost analysts, and we believe that the hero in the eyes of the people today should not be the fighter or the destroyer but the creator. So we propagandize our views using our own newspaper LIBERAL, of which I am the editor, and through the interviews of our leaders in the various mass media. In addition, party congresses will take place annually and conferences—regularly: All-Union, national, and regional conferences. We invite representatives of other parties and of broad circles of society to them. Incidentally, the second congress of the LDPSS will take place on 13 April in Moscow at the Palace of Culture imeni Rusakov.

[Knyazkov] How are relations between the LDPSS and the CPSU?

[Khalitov] On the whole we support the CPSU as the ruling party and seek areas of agreement with it. Of course, the Communists have made many mistakes. Their half-measures are costing the country very dearly and exasperating the people. One cannot make half a cut or do half of a surgical operation. You have to carry the matter through to the end quickly and decisively.

Why do we seek agreement with the Communists? Because there are many liberal-minded, wise, and intelligent people among them. They are no longer yesterday's sailor-Bolsheviks who decided everything by force. Among them there are very many professional workers who know their job well. There are also laborers, peasants, scholars, servicemen, diplomats, etc. In addition, on the whole they are loyal to the Fatherland.

[Knyazkov] You are quite different from other parties of a democratic orientation with such an approach to the CPSU.

[Khalitov] Yes, we are against anarchy and for supremacy of the law. But it cannot be emphasized enough that we have many disagreements with the Communists. However, we are genuinely against any actions directed at the forcible removal of the CPSU from power. We believe that there is no problem that cannot be decided at the negotiating table through legal means. The Communists have expressed their agreement with this.

[Knyazkov] A final question. What is the opinion of the liberal democrats on the military and its role in society?

[Khalitov] In our view, today the military is the only institution of the state in which demoralization has not cropped up on a destructive scale. Yes, in some ways it is sick, but we hope for its recovery and not its end, as some do.

We need to restore normal, conscientious operations as quickly as possible and avoid a mass rebellion. Only in this fashion can we endure and restore to the Fatherland its former greatness.

Ethnic Soldiers in Baltic MD Polled

91UM05484 Riga SOVETSKAYA LATVIYA
in Russian 23 February 91 p 2

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel N. Stepanets, instructor in the department of military teaching and psychology of the Tallinn higher political and construction service school: "On Time and on Oneself: Results of a Poll of Servicemen of Indigenous Nationality From the Baltic Republics"]

[Text] This urgent period of perestroyka has posed difficult problems for our society and for the Armed Forces. What do those who are presently at the very epicenter of opinions and events think about all of this? What do the rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants who are representatives of the indigenous nationalities of the Baltic republics think about what is happening in the country and in the Baltic region in particular?

A comprehensive sociopsychological poll conducted at a number of units of the Baltic Military District helped to answer these and a number of other questions. The issues may be tentatively divided into two sets: General political questions, and the military questions that are closely tied with them; in the course of the poll the latter occupied a somewhat larger place in terms of volume. The basic method of conducting the poll was via an anonymous questionnaire. In fact, many servicemen voluntarily indicated their last names, which would seem to indicate the firmness of their personal positions. In a number of instances this basic method was supplemented with individual interviews.

The way the poll was conducted bears a number of significant features noticeably influencing the degree of accuracy and objectivity of the points of views expressed by rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants on any particular question.

First, the poll was conducted during and soon after the well-known tragic events in Vilnius and Riga; that is, during the January aggravation of the situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Second, the poll coincided in time with the beginning of preparations for the all-Union referendum on the fate of the USSR, and it took place on the eve of the well-known poll of citizens of Lithuania on 9 February and the preparations for the republic-level polls of residents of Latvia and Estonia designated for 3 March. However, I make the reservation that the servicemen were not asked questions that paraphrased the all-Union referendum.

Third, the poll was conducted in the period when the situation connected with the latest conscription campaign had reached its greatest tension in the Baltic republics.

Thus, what do Latvian, Lithuanian, and Estonian rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants of the Baltic Military District think these days? When asked how well they know the situation in their republic, the majority—56.8

percent—answered that they are familiar with the situation on the whole but do not know it fully. Another 34.2 percent of those polled answered that they know about the situation only somewhat, and only nine percent believe that they know the situation thoroughly.

The poll indicates that 40.6 percent of the servicemen get their information from the central press, radio, and television; 25.2 percent indicated letters from relatives and acquaintances from their republic as their basic source of information; 16.1 percent regularly read newspapers and journals of their republics; 14 percent of them are familiar with the situation in their homeland through conversations with visiting relations and acquaintances as well as recruits from home; and 23.9 percent of the soldiers and sergeants, that is almost one-fourth, indicated that they get their information from practically all the aforementioned sources.

When asked about central mass media reporting on the situation in the Baltic republics, 31 percent of those polled declared that they trust it, 20.6 percent reacted negatively, and 48.4 percent were unable to answer.

The servicemen also expressed their opinion of the position of the press, radio, and television of the Baltic republics. The poll indicates that 33.6 percent, that is to say one-third of those polled, trust their own mass media, 27.7 reacted negatively, and 38.7 did not answer the question.

Of special interest are the questions on attitudes toward military service. Of those polled, 29 percent noted that during their service their ideas about the military changed for the better. The poll also showed a far from uniform attitude toward alternative service. Expressing their opinion of countrymen who have refused service in the USSR Armed Forces and registered for alternative service, 26.4 percent of the servicemen support their actions, 38.7 percent do not support them, and 34.9 percent were unable to respond to the question.

The poll asked, "If you were presented with the opportunity to choose service in the USSR Armed Forces or alternative service in your republic, which would you prefer?" In response, 42.5 percent are in favor of the opportunity to choose service in the USSR Armed Forces, 26.5 percent are for alternative service, and 31 percent were unable to give an answer.

Speaking of service in the military, servicemen from the Baltic republics reacted in different fashions to the opportunity to choose where they carried out military service. Thus, 67.7 percent are convinced it would be better to serve in their own republic and 20.6 percent believe that it is better to serve beyond the borders of their own republic inasmuch as this broadens their exposure to the USSR in general. And 11.6 percent of the rank-and-file soldiers and sergeants answered that they basically do not care where they serve.

The scourge of today's military is deserters and run-aways, that is to say those who leave their duty station.

And although a tendency toward a decline in that phenomenon has been noted, it is still too early to speak of a fundamental resolution of the problem. The soldiers and sergeants were given the following question: "Have you considered leaving your duty station and going home?" According to the poll, 65.9 percent answered that they have not considered it; 20.6 percent answered that they have considered it but changed their minds; and 13.5 percent suppose that with an aggravation of the sociopolitical situation in their republic they might decide on such a step.

The poll asked whether interethnic conflicts in the country undermine the friendship and unity of servicemen of different nationalities. According to the poll, 49.8 percent declared that they do not; 43.2 percent believe that some tension is felt in relations between servicemen of different nationalities; and only seven percent presume that conflicts in the country have a negative influence on interethnic relations in military collectives.

And how do servicemen of other nationalities treat servicemen of Latvian, Lithuania, and Estonian nationality? According to the responses, 52.9 percent of those polled believe that others relate to them in a normal, friendly manner; 41.3 percent noted that relations with them are satisfactory on the whole; and only 5.8 percent expressed the opinion that representatives of other nationalities treat servicemen from the Baltic republics poorly.

And finally, one more interesting and important aspect. It is connected with the attitudes of servicemen from the Baltic republics toward antimilitary laws and acts adopted in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia. About 19

percent of those polled view these acts positively, 33.4 percent negatively, and 47.7 percent believe that questions of the USSR Armed Forces on the territory of the republic should be decided in coordination with the USSR.

Without going into great detail, it is probably necessary to look at a number of conclusions that result from the poll in general.

First, at a time when many fundamental problems of our society are at the stage of legislative and practical resolution, one should not set one's hopes on extremes. As we see, we do not need dogma, ambition, and dilettantism but rather knowledge of the problem—concrete, deep, and comprehensive knowledge.

Second, youths conscripted from the Baltic republics are not indifferent to the fate of our society and their republics and to the problems of military service. And the points of view not only can but must be disparate in a process that is truly democratic. So that with development they will become points of contact on the basis of general human values.

Third, today one must not indiscriminately declare, as representatives of some movements are so hasty to do "in the name of all of our youths," that "all our youths want," etc. This inevitably leads to mob rule, anarchy, and chaos.

And, finally, the last point. This sociopsychological poll is not an "isolated instance." From various points of view it allows us to look more broadly at the wide spectrum of problems and foresee, predict, and anticipate many things. And, of course, to improve educational work with servicemen on the base of all of this.

Weapons Stolen From Small Arms Plant

91UM0367B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRUDA
in Russian 14 Feb 91 p 2

[Article by V. Mikhaylov: "It Is Bad to Steal. Especially Machine Guns..."]

[Text] Vladimir Oblast—The recent cold weather did not spare Kovrov either. It took me a long time to warm up in the office of local judge Nikolay Lavrov. Not even the judge's strong tea could overcome the chill. My teeth clattered like the breech mechanism of a machine gun. The judge handed me the bulging file of an indictment in a case like none other to date. Reading it, I felt as though in a crater caused by a recently exploded....

In the fall of 1988, Strizhin, a worker at the Kovrov Machine Plant,¹ in collusion with Rubov, stole the barrel of an aircraft machine gun from the enterprise and traded it to L. for a liter of alcohol.

Rubov then stole three signal pistols. After that, in collusion with K., he stole 30 signal flares on three different occasions. He sold them to S. for 2,100 grams of alcohol.

In the summer of 1989, in collusion with Rubov, Strizhin stole the barrel of an improved Kalashnikov assault rifle (PKM).

And on it went. A plant for the production of firearms, disguised from the CIA and other foreign secret services by the sign "Machine Plant," became an ordinary factory from which the workers carry off everything not tied down.

"On October 1989," Strizhin testified, "Guslyakov and I left the plant at the end of a shift. We stopped at a store on the way, bought two bottles of vodka and headed for the garage of an acquaintance to drink. On the way we met Pugalin and a group of men. From all indications they were also on their way to the store. Pugalin asked whether it was possible to steal a Kalashnikov assault rifle. Guslyakov said that it would be easier to steal an improved Kalashnikov assault rifle, which we produce.

We parted at that point. Soon thereafter Strizhin and Rubov made a few calculations, deciding that since Pugalin needed the gun very much, he would be prepared to pay 3,000 for it.

"I have to think about it," Rubov said. He did some thinking and then showed up early at work one day. "No one was in the shop at that time," he told the investigator. "I went to where the cases of parts for item number... were located. I arranged them in my pockets, under my belt and coat, and carried them to the cloakroom. I removed them from the plant on three different trips. The entrance checkpoint? Why, no one has checked me there in 22 years. Management was interested in the plan and not in maintaining order at the shop."

Many people like to make or fix things after work, or watch television. Rubov assembled an assault gun after work!

"The assault gun fires most effectively at a range of up to 1,000 meters. Its direct firing range at a human-figure target with head and chest exposed is 420 meters; at a running human-figure target, 640 meters. It has a rate of fire of 250 rounds per minute. Its bullet retains its armor-piercing capacity to a range of 3,800 meters." (Manual on 7.62-mm Kalashnikov Assault Rifles developed by the Main Combat Training Directorate of the Ground Forces).

Pugalin, who is not employed and has a record of numerous convictions, never got his hands on the gun, however. It went from one city resident to another, until it settled down for "safekeeping" with a local loader. Pugalin was indignant that "they ruined such a good thing." The industrious men weighed their chances of "doing it anyway," and stole yet another PKM. Once again they collected the parts in the assembly section and passed safely through the entrance checkpoint. That evening, in someone's apartment, Rubov assembled "the item skilfully and with the speed of an expert," in 40 minutes. He checked it out. All of the parts worked perfectly.

Pugalin operated like a true businessman. He bought the gun for 1,725 rubles and sold it to a driver he knew for 5,000, who hauled the "item" to Moscow and sold it through a middleman to some "southerner." When it was delivered, the latter stated that he was prepared to acquire all kinds of weapons in unlimited quantities, "even bombs."

"Where is the gun?" the investigator questioned "the southerner."

"I sent it on to Nagornyy Karabakh, to protect the Armenians," is the reply entered in the record. Off the record, he said: "It is now in the mountains, firing at our enemies."

"For firing in mountains, the gunner has to possess special skill and resourcefulness in positioning and setting up the gun, particularly for firing with great quadrant elevations." (Manual on the 7.62-mm Kalashnikov Assault Gun...)

The "outrages" were reported to the minister of defense industry. The mechanism for taking steps to prevent the theft of state property was activated. The number of guards was increased. The shop in which the thefts were committed was isolated. A metal detector was set up at the exit, as though at an airport. And the trial of the thieves, the sellers and buyers was designed to intimidate also those who are still free but entertain thoughts of stealing.

The fear will pass, though, and the Soviet worker will demonstrate once again his genius for finding a way around the most incredible barriers. Incidentally, this

was demonstrated not long ago by a warrant officer whose unit was withdrawing from Mongolia. He had accumulated an entire arsenal over the years. With the help of subordinates the warrant officer would remove the warheads from the powerful missiles and fill the space inside with weapons, ammunition, grenades.... Customs officials did not bother to inspect the missiles.

The nation nurtured the military-industrial complex for decades. Mountains of weapons were stockpiled. Now there is concern. The disappearance of 5,500 rifled gun barrels has recently been recorded in the nation, a search is underway for 165 flame-throwers.... Enough for a division, and then some! And how many are not in the count?

"Yes, the criminals are arming themselves," I was told by Vasily Sharonov, Kovrov's prosecutor. "But then that is what thieves are all about. What is troubling, however, is the fact that ordinary people are acquiring weapons. Machining things, making things themselves.... We are applying Article 218 of the Criminal Code of the RSFSR, 'Illegal Carrying, Keeping, Acquisition, Manufacture and Sale of Weapons, Ammunition or Explosives,' with ever increasing frequency. This small city presently has six unsolved murders. The last one involved the shooting of a girl with a homemade pistol."

I also heard statements such as the following about local morals: "The residents of Kovrov look upon weapons as though they were fountain pens."

When rumor spread among the people that there was a place in the nation where machine guns could be bought without any trouble, couriers began arriving. They reconnoitered the access routes to the plant and tried to get jobs there. One person who came to the personnel department was actually on the All-Union wanted list.

One emissary who kept pestering a plant driver had to be arrested. He came from a settlement near the Moldavian city of Rybnitsa. The young man said that the settlement was divided into two camps. One was led by a driver, the other by a joiner. So the individual was dispatched to Kovrov to acquire more convincing "arguments" for use in the dispute. The visitor did not accomplish his mission. He was unable to purchase a machine gun for 1,000 rubles (the amount they had managed to scrape up).

How many more such cities with defense plants are scattered around the nation?

"The icy wind carried the snow back and forth. Two individuals restraining a third man led him to the middle of the narrow street. A fourth approached the latter, balancing a heavy machine gun, low, on outstretched arms. The two moved to the side, instantly extending the one man's arms into a cross. Without raising the machine gun, the other man stuck the barrel against the lower abdomen of the one in the cruciform stance. A short round struck him. Pieces of his clothing landed on the wall of a building on the other side." (A. Kabakov, "Nevozyrashchenets" [One Who Did Not Return])

The main hero in the story buys a pistol from a hungry "passerby" with some coupons. In reality, in Buryatia, thousands of kilometers from Kovrov, a soldier steals several cases of grenades from a depot. He sells them for pennies or trades them for home-brew. The buyers are ordinary workers, a student from Ulan-Ude.... Weapons are becoming an necessity of life. Like bread, salt or matches.

Another enterprise in Kovrov produces motorcycles. The system there is far more rigid than at the machine plant. This does not keep desperate muzhiks from rusting motorcycles, however. There are more of these per capita than machine guns in Kovrov. For now.

Civilian View of Drug Abuse in Military

91UM05341 Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 4 Apr 91 p 4

[Article by Oleg Tekhmenov: "Crucial! Addicts With Arms"]

[Text] *Drug addiction in the Army? Is there really such a problem? USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs statistics show that 71,000 young people from 16 to 29 years of age are registered as "individuals engaging in nonmedical abuse of drugs." To be honest, it is very hard to believe that many of them have not or are not now serving in the Army. The more so since "drug addiction is not a contraindication for service in the ranks of the Soviet Army." This is how it was written, word for word, in the response from a rayon military commissar in Moscow City to an inquiry from the militia...*

Before speaking about drug addiction in today's Armed Forces, it would be worthwhile to look back to 130 years ago.

At that time the troops of His Imperial Majesty Aleksandr II, under the command of Major General V. Chernyayev, waged combat activities fairly successfully in Central Asia. And the Russian victories followed one after the other. They could not get along without, as they say, a little vodka here. But soon Chernyayev began to note that they began to drink less, but there were just as many drunks. What was the matter? Local "coloring" had its effect and the "demon vodka" was rather quickly crowded out by "opium smoking."

They could not get along without "dope" in civilian life either. The researcher B. Gorovoy-Shaltan discusses this in his book "Morphine Addiction, Its Spread and Practice." Thus he mentions the "Morphine Users Club" that operated from one of the ships in the Baltic Fleet, whose members engaged in acquisition and distribution of drugs. Or there is the episode in which a party member recommends morphine to his comrade "as a means of fighting fatigue and reducing the nervous strain caused by work during Yudenich's attack on Petrograd." In the book there is a story about one of the first "revolutionary trials" of the Red Navy drug addict. He was convicted and sentenced to...two months in the guardhouse and three

months in the penal regiment. Incidentally, this poor sailor was lucky because those who came after him were dealt with much more harshly. How else can one explain that during the twenties-fifties there was no drug addiction in our Army?

The Stalin-Brezhnev times passed, there were fewer executions, and the sentences were shorter. And the consequences were not slow in manifesting themselves. In the mid-sixties the psychiatrists Ye. Kagan, N. Kuznetsov, and F. Saburenko conducted an investigation in the Armed Forces. Its results were striking: They discovered "numerous cases of drug abuse among soldiers on active duty, especially when they were stationed in Central Asia." Ye. Kagan goes on to write that it was in the military units that 20 percent of the soldiers began to use drugs.

I recall a case related to me by the deputy political officer of my battalion. In 1987, when the unit in which I was serving was still on combat duty, there was an accident. With a round from an automatic rifle, a soldier wounded his comrade who had come to replace him at his post. It turned out that the sentry, who had been guarding an artillery position for two hours, had been high on drugs the whole time.

Do you think that it might have been just my regiment that was in such an undesirable state? I would like to believe that. But the investigation conducted by an instructor at the Moscow Higher Militia School, B. Kalachev, as early as 1987 leaves no hope either for myself or for the defenders of the honor of the uniform in the Ministry of Defense.

Boris Kalachev conducted his poll in three regions of the country: Kiev, Moscow, and Krasnodar Kray. About 3,000 young people who had recently been released from the Army into the reserve participated. Among the students, for example, the results were as follows:

"Those who learned about drugs in the Army": Kiev—50 percent, Moscow—14.3 percent, and Krasnodar—6.2 percent.

"The cause of the abuse of narcotics": curiosity—59.7 percent, a desire to be like their friends—28.9 percent, stress—3.8 percent.

"How frequently they abused cocaine (opium)": one to two times—50 percent (25 percent), three to five times—31.1 percent, (25 percent), frequently—13.9 percent (50 percent).

One of the reasons why the Ministry of Defense Press Center refused to help me work on this article was the obvious fear that a disclosure of the drug abuse problem in the Armed Forces would be tantamount to showing drug addicts on the launching pads of our missiles, behind the control levers of tanks, and so forth. Understandably, such "disclosures" could do the Army no good and would be just another blow to its authority. Well, about the authority I agree. But does it follow from

this that we should continue to remain silent about the problem, without noticing what has been staring us in the eye for a long time now and is threatening the lives of our people? It is simply stupid to be surprised about the fact that there is drug abuse in the Army and it is even more stupid to blame the Army for it. I hope that nobody has any doubts that drug abuse will not disappear from the Army of its own accord. But why should this take place in the Army? Incidentally, now is exactly the right time to look at who is fighting this evil in the Armed Forces and how?

First let us return to the "regiment of drug abusers." This problem has never bothered the political department very much, to put it mildly. Either they have not been able to get around to it because they have been too "busy" with ideological work or they have not had the specialists. Members of the special departments have worked with drug abusers in a purely amateur way, rather like with a "hobby." Why? It turned out that it was because of a lack of time—they had plenty to do with their counterintelligence work. And those whose activity called for their dealing with this—officers of the military procuracy—were located more than 100 kilometers from our unit and visited us very infrequently. So it turned out that the only "fighters" left on the drug abuse "front" were the platoon and regiment commanders, who were "up to their ears" in work even without that. And this is why the public burning of the cellophane package of hemp found in the storage room of the "regiment of drug abusers" elicited little more than a condescending smile from the "dope" lovers. For God only knows how much had already been smoked before that and how much had been hidden in secret places.

For those who are ready to accuse me of attaching labels and defaming army activity, I will say: Yes, there are cases of successful interaction between the Army and militia in arresting "dope dealers." The Border Guards, for example. Incidentally, Kalachev told me about the fact that in the Vladivostok military procuracy there are officers who are working successfully on this problem. But, I repeat, here I am restricting my discussion to the example of my regiment. Although, knowing the present condition of the troops and the position of the Ministry of Defense regarding drug abuse, one can boldly assert that there are dozens if not hundreds of units like mine.

Aleksandr Sergeyev is in charge of the department in the Union Ministry of Internal Affairs for combating the dissemination of drugs. Understandably, because of the nature of his activity, he is familiar with their dissemination in the Armed Forces as well. True, practically no information about this is sent from the Ministry of Defense to the Ministry of Internal Affairs.

Some times things reach the point of being absurd. Thus in our valiant aviation service it was quite impossible to find ten helicopters for Sergeyev's department. And they were needed only twice a year—during the period when the poppies were ripening in Central Asia. And they would not provide them because two years ago, when the

Army was still placing two helicopters at the disposal of the militia, one of them crashed in the Pamir. Four people died: Two operatives and two military fliers. Since that time Army General Moiseyev responds to all of Sergeyev's requests with only one word: "No."

But now the most interesting thing. Do you know that it is simply disadvantageous for the militia to apprehend drug abusers and drug traffickers in uniform? The fact is that after such so-called warriors are arrested, both they themselves and the investigation documents along with the "substantial evidence" are turned over to the military procuracy. The militia end up empty handed as a result of such an operation: The notorious "check mark" (the system lives!) does not work to their advantage. That is, all the operational investigative work that is done will be regarded as a "socially useful hobby" at best, and at worst—a waste of work time with all the consequences that ensue from that. One can only be surprised that the militia even takes on such "hopeless" cases sometimes. But sometimes you have to, whether you want to or not—for drug abusers both in uniform and in civilian clothing have extensive contacts, especially in the large cities. And this fact proves once again that neither the Army nor the militia can cope with this disease alone.

There is world experience in fighting drug abuse which, in my view, is quite acceptable for us. And so, in the first place, in practically all armies of the world there are special police-like subdivisions. In France they are called the gendarmerie and in the United States, the Military Police. Probably with our scale of barracks crime—beginning with petty thievery and ending with fist fighting and drug abuse—such subdivisions would be appropriate in the Soviet Army. The more so since the military procuracy, whose job this would be, cannot seriously fight crime at a level lower than the oblast center because of its small numbers and concentration, as a rule, in one place—the cities.

The second thing. There must be normal cooperation between internal affairs organs and workers of drug treatment facilities and military commissariats. We must know to whom we can entrust arms. There must be cooperation both in work and, if necessary, also in reporting. And this is necessary not in order to avoid drafting drug abusers into the Army—with the current tendency for the spread of drug addiction in the country, as well as throughout the world, this would be impossible—but to try in good time if not to cure "dope" lovers than at least to reliably cut them off from any drug sources. Incidentally, regarding soldiers who come from Central Asia the word "cure" sounds a little bit strange. There is a historical tradition of drug abuse in this region. And knowing that in two years the soldier will return home, where this poison can be purchased at any bazaar almost openly, to cure him is an impossible task.

And the last thing. Throughout the world the army actively helps the police in fighting drug abuse. Everyone can probably still remember the spirited attacks by the American GI's on the cocaine and marijuana plantations

in Columbia. And here are a couple of figures that reflect fairly eloquently the effectiveness of the use of army subdivisions, using the example of Mexico.

During the period of 1982-1987 troops destroyed 324,696 fields of opium poppies with an overall area of 30,562.3 hectares, which prevented the production of almost 250 tons of heroine, which would have been enough to hook 12.2 million people on drugs in a week. There was a similar operation with hemp—the basis of marijuana. Here the decisive actions of the military saved 589 million people from drug addiction. They destroyed a total of \$151.2 billion worth of "dope" which is what 124,230 tons of gold would cost.

Is our Army really not capable of this kind of cooperation with society for such a noble cause as saving their country and their people and, hence, also themselves from narcotics?

Defense Ministry Aides Killed in Automobile Accident

PM0404140791

[Editorial Report] Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 2 Apr 91 First Edition carries on page 4 two juxtaposed obituaries of USSR Defense Ministry personnel A.P. Zemskov and Yu.I. Aleksandrov. The obituary of A.P. Zemskov is signed by "V.M. Shuralev, V.S. Malashkevich, V.I. Sapenkov, V.P. Ostapenko, S.I. Klyapin, Ye.V. Kalashnikov, I.Ye. Buravkov, V.V. Mochalov, V.S. Vasilyev, A.I. Agudov, and V.V. Churkin," and reads in part: "Colonel Aleksandr Petrovich Zemskov, member of the CPSU since 1965, died as the result of an automobile accident while carrying out official duties.

"A.P. Zemskov was born into a worker's family 12 May 1945 in the city of Chapayevsk in Samara Oblast.

"He began his service in the USSR Armed Forces in 1963. He graduated from the Volsk Military School, then from the Rear Services Command Faculty of the Military Academy of Rear Services and Transportation. He served in the ranks, and was chief of the food supply service at regimental, divisional, army, and district level.

"He had served in the USSR Defense Ministry Main Inspectorate since 1987."

The obituary of Yu.I. Aleksandrov is signed by "V.M. Shuralev, V.S. Malashkevich, V.I. Sapenkov, V.P. Ostapenko, S.I. Klyapin, Ye.V. Kalashnikov, I.Ye. Buravkov, V.V. Mochalov, V.S. Vasilyev, A.I. Agudov, V.F. Suslov, and V.V. Novozhenin," and reads in part: "Colonel Yuriy Ivanovich Aleksandrov, member of the CPSU since 1973, died as the result of an automobile accident while carrying out official duties.

"Yu.I. Aleksandrov was born into a worker's family 5 November 1948 in the city of Michurinsk in Tambov

Oblast. He graduated from the Leningrad Suvorov Military School, the Kiev Higher Combined Arms Command School, and the M.V. Frunze Military Academy. He served in the ranks, was regimental chief of staff, commander of a motorized infantry regiment, and chief of staff of a motorized infantry division.

"He had served in the USSR Defense Ministry Main Inspectorate since 1987."

Commander of 'Legion of Georgian Falcons' Interviewed

91UM0148A Tbilisi VESTNIK GRUZII in Russian
16 Feb 91 p 1

[Interview with Elgudze Tsiklauri, commander of the Legion of Georgian Falcons, by VESTNIK GRUZII correspondent David Bagaturia; place and date not given: "The Legion: Georgia Above All!"]

[Text] For a long time now on D. Agmashenebeli Prospekt the attention of many passersby has been attracted by the coat of arms and placard on the building of the former Tbilisi School of Aviation officers' quarters, formerly the Georgian Cadet School. "Legion of Georgian Falcons"—says the inscription on the coat of arms, which depicts a proud bird with his head held high. Who is united by the legion, and what are the functions and goals of this society? Our VESTNIK GRUZII correspondent put these and other questions to its commander, Elgudze Tsiklauri.

[Tsiklauri] As we know, the republic has no army yet and it did not have a guard either, but it is now in the process of forming one. This is why as early as 1989 we decided to look for and set in motion some mechanism which would make it possible to organize the nation's self-defense.

The Legion is a society of the militarized type, but it is not armed and it is completely apolitical. One of its functions is physical and moral improvement of the younger generation and education of these youth in the spirit of patriotism and devotion to the homeland. But, if necessary, we can also contribute to the formation of territorial self-defense detachments, and this is why we have organized the so-called "voyevodstvos" [medieval Russian military provinces].

[Bagaturia] What are the ages of the boys in the Legion and what are their prospects for the future?

[Tsiklauri] Most of our boys are 17 years old, but in the future we intend to accept even younger ones. Here they go through the appropriate training for subsequent service in the ranks of the National Guard, the national army, and public and state security organs. We have already sent Legion members from almost all the units to perform military service in the National Guard. At the same time, regardless of their occupation or place of service, they may remain in our society.

[Bagaturia] You mentioned the special training of the students. Tell us more about that please.

[Tsiklauri] We have a teaching staff with a fairly broad range of profiles. There are specialists who are former officers, instructors in individual disciplines, and also competent educators who provide education and individual training of members of the society. Each day the Legion members take classes in several disciplines and also general physical, theoretical, and practical training.

[Bagaturia] On what principles are relations with Legion members based?

[Tsiklauri] The goals and tasks of the Legion of Georgian Falcons amount to serving to protect the interests of the homeland. Hence the main elements of the relations among Legion members. We do not divide the nation up according to the four indicators—political, religious, social, and class. Our slogan is: "Georgia—Above All!" A Legion member must be sincerely devoted to his people, he must express his interests everywhere and always, and at the same time he must not allow encroachment on the rights of other peoples on the territory of Georgia.

I think that all Georgians today and in the future should be mainly defenders of the homeland, and after that engineers, physicians, educators, and so forth.

Press Center Reports Attacks on Servicemen in Vilnius

91UM0481B Moscow TRUD in Russian 12 Mar 91 p 4

[USSR Ministry of Defense Press Center Report: "We Report the Details. Evening in Vilnius..."]

[Text] This happened during the evening of 8 March in Vilnius. Colonel S. Zhuk, wearing civilian clothing, was walking with his wife near their home. Suddenly several people jumped out from behind a fence, shouting. He repulsed the attack of two officers. The rest—and there were no less than 10 of them—surrounded the couple, shouting insults.

The colonel warned them that he was a military serviceman and took out his pistol (in this garrison the officers are permitted to carry personal weapons). He fired three rounds into the air. Only after the hooligans with metal whips in their hands tried to hit him did the officer begin to shoot at their feet. Only this could stop the assailants. They dispersed and disappeared.

Colonel Zhuk sustained bodily injuries.

Unfortunately, the last few days in Vilnius have been marked by another such incident. In the evening of 9 March at a bus stop a group of hooligans beat up T. Fazylov, a student at the Vilnius higher command school for electronic air defense. He is now in the hospital.

A legitimate question arises: When will the republic leaders, who talk so much about human rights, finally

take effective measures against those who threaten the life, honor, and dignity of military servicemen?

TEKHNIKA I VOORUZHENIYA: 1990 Index of Articles

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T-80 Tank: Production, Ordnance, Variants

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[Article by Tomasz Szulc: "The T-80 Tank"]

[Text] Soviet tanks were considered to be exceptionally modern and reliable as early as the mid-1930's. Yet another generation of these tanks gained fame in the years of World War II. After the war ended, the vigorous development of armored vehicles continued only in the USSR. Due to this, Soviet tanks were considerably superior to designs developed in other countries. The Soviet Union was the first one to adopt tanks with smoothbore guns (T-62), guns fitted with automatic loaders (T-64), and tanks capable of firing guided missiles (T-64M). In the 1970's, an entirely new type of armor was developed—so-called reactive panels providing protection against the effects of hits by armor-piercing missiles (several years later, this design was used by Israel).

In the 1980's, a new combat vehicle was adopted—the T-80, the exterior of which resembled the T-72 tank. However, the running gear of the T-80 is different: The diameter of the wheels is smaller, and their location is different. The tracks themselves are also absolutely new—they are wider, more durable, and more resistant to damage. The tracks give the tank remarkable terrain negotiation capabilities; the silicone lining of track links improve the comfort of travel.

The type of propulsion used is the principal novelty: The T-80 is the first Soviet tank powered by a gas turbine. The installation of the turbine required that the tank be fitted with high-output air filters; an exhaust outlet of considerable size is located in the back rather than on the side, as on the T-54 through T-72 tanks. The turbine ensures the required power, whereas the weight of the propulsion unit is relatively small (for example, there is no need for a gearbox; adjustment of revolutions is nondiscrete). Dynamic characteristics of the turbine engine are excellent: The T-80 accelerates instantly and achieves considerable speed. The turbine has been adapted for using multiple types of fuel. This is not a novelty in the USSR; multi-fuel turbojet engines power even combat aircraft.

The shape of the T-80 hull resembles that of the T-64 and T-72 tank hulls; the turret is also similar. The upper and lower plates of front armor are inclined at a very large angle. Small design changes compared to the T-72 indicate an optimal combination of proven solutions and new concepts. For example, the driver has at his disposal a set of three periscopes (rather than one) which makes it possible to view a sector of terrain 60 degrees wide in front of the tank. The driver, sitting in the center, may also raise his chair and drive with his head showing through a hatch, the cover of which rotates around the vertical axis.

Modernized sighting instruments are located on the turret. They include a laser rangefinder which also serves as a target illuminator for guided missiles. There is a set of optical sights with an image light enhancer. A conventional infrared searchlight, which makes driving the tank and firing at night possible, is located next to the barrel. Of course, this does not rule out the possible use of a passive heat detector at night. Ballistic computer sensors and an IFF antenna are also located on the turret.

The armament of the T-80 consists of a 125 mm gun of the Rapira 3M type with an automatic loader. It is still unknown whether this is a system for loading a projectile and a consumable cartridge case separately, which is known from the T-72, or a design which makes it possible to load projectile and cartridge case in a single action, which increases the rate of fire considerably. This is essential, despite the probability of a first-round hit approaching 90 percent and the muzzle velocity of hard-core projectiles coming to 2 kilometers per second.

Such high effectiveness is ensured by an on-board computer which automatically generates data for firing, taking into account the force and direction of the wind, the moisture content of the air and the propellant charge, the condition of the barrel, and all parameters of the movement of the target and the tank itself. The unit of fire consists of shaped-charge rounds, hard-core projectiles (with darts made of tungsten or uranium with a diameter of about 20 mm), Kobra guided missiles, high-explosive rounds (some with proximity fuses which make it possible to combat aerial targets), fragmentation rounds, and special rounds. They may also be used for indirect fire at a distance of 10 kilometers. In the event the automatic loader is down there are provisions for manual loading.

The additional armament consists of a 7.62 mm PKT machine gun mounted coaxially with the gun and an antiaircraft 12.7 mm machine gun which may also be fired coaxially with the gun.

The armor of the T-80 is made of high-strength steel. Front armor consists of laminated armor plating. Similar, though thinner, plates undoubtedly reinforce the bottom and sides of the tank. Ceramic-carbide inserts are also placed in the armor of the turret which, in addition, has an optimal shape for deflecting (ricocheting) shells. Rubber and metal skirts on the sides of the tank and in the front lower part of the hull also provide protection against shaped charges. Stowage boxes on the turret and storage bins on the fenders play a similar role.

Yet another layer of protection is provided by the blocks of reactive panels. These are rectangular prisms made of pressed explosives measuring about 210 by 130 mm. When a block is hit by an armor-piercing shell, it detonates, dispersing the cumulative stream or deforming the armor-piercing core of the shell. The panels are designed in such a way that they do not detonate when hit by small-caliber shells or shrapnel. Also, the explosion of one block does not cause adjacent

blocks to detonate. Reactive armor is installed on the front, side, and top surfaces of the turret, front armor, and the front segments of side skirts.

Smoke grenade mortars provide additional protection against effective fire. Eight of them are usually fitted on the turret, either on one side of it or on both. Grenades may be fired singly, in pairs, or in a salvo in the direction from which a tank is illuminated by a laser beam guiding an antitank missile or the pulse of a laser rangefinder. This direction is detected by a special sensor located on the turret of the tank. Grenades are fired automatically if the source of rays is in front of the tank. A smoke screen which forms after the grenades explode shields the tank from optical observation entirely; it disperses laser beams and "blinds" radar stations.

The diversity of variants of the T-80 tank, which entered production not so long ago, in the early 1980's, is interesting. Vehicles are in use which do not have provisions for the installation of reactive armor (they may be identified by a wedge-shaped splashboard on the glacis and the location of smoke grenade mortars on both sides of the turret), and even vehicles which do not have thermal sleeves on their barrels. Some vehicles do not have a folding dozer blade, which is used for preparing defilade positions independently, under the lower part of front armor. However, tanks with wedge-shaped reactive armor on both sides of the turret, as well as with sets of reactive blocks in the front and on the sides of the vehicles, are most common.

Yet another version of the T-80 was shown during a parade in Moscow in May 1990. The difference is mainly in the type of additional armor. Larger and thinner protective plates of a new generation are superimposed on the armor instead of the small blocks of reactive screens. They are complemented by aprons made of plastic around the lower segment of the turret (due to

their elasticity, they enable the turret to rotate freely). The front, "conventional" armor of the turret has been made thicker anyway.

The commander's hatch has been redesigned; an NSV antiaircraft machine gun has been placed above the hatch. It is possible to fire on aerial targets without opening the hatch by using a wide-angle sight with a small rangefinder. This sight is also used to track ground targets. By using it, the commander may track a discovered target himself, select the type of shell, and fire. He may also automatically transfer the tracking of the target to the loader while engaging in a search for other opposition himself.

There are many indications that the propulsion system of the tank has changed, and a new-generation diesel engine has been used instead of a turbine. The shape of the air-intake snorkel is completely different (before a water obstacle is negotiated, it is placed in the rear of the tank, next to the exhaust outlet, rather than over the turret). The shape of the exhaust outlet screen has also changed; an additional screen at the top interferes with the detection of the tank from the air based on its heat emission.

All of these changes have further enhanced the combat potential of the T-80 which is undoubtedly one of the best tanks of the 1980's. Its basic technical characteristics are as follows:

- Weight (depending on variant)—42 to 44 tons
- Overall length—9.9 meters
- Hull length—7.4 meters
- Width—3.4 meters
- Height—2.2 meters
- Track width—0.58 meters
- Maximum speed—75 kilometers per hour
- Range (depending on variant)—400 to 600 kilometers
- Engine output (depending on variant)—750-1,000 kW
- Crew—three

'Weather Balloon' Crosses Into Soviet Airspace

LD0204181791 Moscow TASS in English 1803 GMT
2 Apr 91

[Text] Moscow April 2 TASS—The Soviet Defence Ministry's press centre issued the following statement today:

Some news organizations have alleged that an unidentified light plane crossed into the Soviet Union from Finland at the end of March and was lost by air defence trackers near the city of Tver.

In fact, air defence radar on March 29 detected an ordinary instrumented weather balloon on the north-western border. Fighters were scrambled to identify it visually.

After flying an insignificant distance into the USSR, the balloon spontaneously burst, as often happens with them.

The episode did not transcend the bounds of ordinary activities for air defence forces, which have all the time to react to objects flying without state identification systems, proper permission or notification of air defence controllers.

A question is in order. What is the aim pursued by newspapers that float similar soap-bubbles from their pages?

Round Table: Air Defense in Gulf War

91UM05434 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
5 Apr 91 First Edition p 1

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA correspondent Col. O. Falichev report on KRASNAYA ZVEZDA roundtable: "The Shilka Versus the B-52: Experience Gained From the Gulf War"]

[Text] The results and nature of the combat actions in the Gulf War are still awaiting careful analysis by the military and the politicians... Meanwhile, KRASNAYA ZVEZDA is receiving letters from readers asking even now for an evaluation of one force or another, and for a report on how combat equipment and arms performed. S. Turko from Kiev asks, for instance: Why did the Iraqi air defenses—equipped mostly by Soviet SAM units—not show itself in action. "Our advisers were there, too. Did they train the Iraqis right, or were they more concerned about how to stuff their suitcases?" he asks at the end of his letter.

To answer this and other questions, the editors conducted a "roundtable." The participants in the discussion were Col. Strelkov, a senior officer from one of the administrations in the Staff Headquarters of the Air Defense Forces who is involved in operational-tactical research; Col. V. Suzdaltsev, deputy chief of staff of the Air Defense troops of the Ground Troops; and Colonel (Reserve) V. Zherdetskiy, a military specialist in Iraq from 1987 to 1990.

[Zherdetskiy] I will start this discussion, if you do not mind. And here is why. We have to make it clear at the

outset: There were no Soviet military advisers in Iraq, only military specialists. Judging from Comrade Turko's letter, he does not see the distinction between these two terms. There is a difference, however, and it is substantial. Advisers work with unit commanders and are, for all practical purposes, the same commanders with parallel powers. They have access to documents and personnel, have the powers of control and participation in combat work. In short, their role is far more important and involves greater responsibility than that of specialists. As for me, I went there as an authorized representative to assist in warranty service of the equipment...

[Falichev] Still, how well was Iraq equipped in terms of air defense? Which of our air defense systems were there?

[Suzdaltsev] Iraq had quite a lot of military equipment, including some of French and German make, and, of course, ours. Large objects were protected by such SAM systems as, for instance, SAM-2 (using Western terminology), Osa, and Kvadrat. Combat troop deployments were covered by ZSU-23-4 Shilka, Strela-10, and portable SAM system Strela-3...

[Falichev] What can you say about their firepower?

[Suzdaltsev] There is no secret here. All of them are, as they say, open. Take the Shilka self-propelled SAM system. Its range is 2.5 km, altitude—1.5 km. The Osa self-propelled SAM system is more effective: range 10 km, altitude—5 km. What is interesting, though, is that, according to our data almost none of the modern systems like the Osa and the Kvadrat were used to cover the troops. This is, perhaps, the explanation for the almost unimpeded bombardments of Iraqi positions from intermediate altitudes.

As to the potential of the troop-based air defenses, in principle it could work against any carrier-based tactical bombing aviation, as well as fire support helicopters. First of all at low altitudes, naturally. According to our data, it did its job quite well. I am talking about those systems that were deployed at the troops combat positions and had targets within their fire range. Here is an example. When B-52 strategic bombers, known since Vietnam, were used at low altitudes, they were fired upon by Shilka and Strela-3 systems. As a result of a missile hit, the engines on one bomber caught fire and had to be ejected. The aircraft could not fulfill its combat mission and returned to base. The press reported that another B-52 crashed, although it was trying to make it to its base in the Indian Ocean...

[Falichev] Unfortunately, the information on aircraft downed by the Iraqis is still contradictory. How many were there? What new methods did the multinational allied forces use to overcome the air defense fire zone?

[Suzdaltsev] I agree, there was a lot of fog surrounding it. I think, however, that today we can say with certainty: The multinational allied forces lost 68 planes and 29

helicopters. You will agree that these figures are somewhat different from what was reported in the newspapers. It means that if the weapons are used skillfully—even if they are not state of the art—one can conduct combat operations with them. I will remind you that the majority of systems were produced in the 1970's. As for the SAM-2, just think about it—this is the missile which was fired at Powers in... 1960. The Americans have studied this weapon thoroughly even since the Arab War, and found an "antidote" for it...

[Zherdetskiy] Among the new air defense-avoidance methods I would name the use of space means for reconnaissance of combat positions, universal use of electronic warfare equipment, and the preventive cruise missile strike... A detailed and, so to say, more competent analysis is still awaiting us, though.

[Strelkov] It is true, it is not possible to cover everything in a newspaper publication. I would only like to note that the ratio of the air power of the multinational allied forces to the Iraqi air defenses was 10 to 1. What does this mean? Each SAM division has its own fire potential. For instance, it can destroy 10 enemy planes, but if there are 100 of them, the rest will get through to the target. So, the air power of the multinational allied forces exceeded the Iraqi air defense potential tenfold.

A very important factor was the use of electronic warfare planes which "jammed" the radio channels of radar stations. There were about three support planes for each strike plane. If the automatic system for release of, let us say, dipole reflectors malfunctioned, the pilot was under orders to return to base.

Finally, another new type of weapon used in this war was the Harm anti-radar missile. Why is it unusual? Let us say, a carrier-based attack plane takes off. His on-board locator tells him that enemy ground radar is locked onto him and is getting ready to shoot at him. However, the Harm missile by itself receives information from the emitting device, stores it in its memory, and even after the ground emitter is turned off, once the missile is launched it follows the memorized beam, damaging or destroying the air defense system.

[Falichev] Would not this explain the low SAM fire activity in covering large objects?

[Zherdetskiy] I think that everything is relative. We have already mentioned that on the whole the Iraqi air defenses did what they could. In my opinion, the main reason for the relatively low Iraqi air defense activity was the lack of automated fire control. What do I mean? Modern battle management is impossible without automated systems. To shoot at targets spread over an enormous area of air space, it is not enough to see the targets on radar screens. It is necessary to quickly process this information on a computer, and to allocate targets between the divisions... During a massive attack, when there are not one or two, but tens or even hundreds of targets, it is practically impossible to accomplish this

without a modern automatic fire control system. I calculate that the lack of such a system could by itself reduce Iraqi air defense fire capability by about 40 percent.

[Falichev] Well, let us assume that we have somewhat figured out the air defense operation in the Iraqi combat detachments. What about the systems covering major objects: why were they silent? Baghdad and al-Basrah were under bombardment...

[Suzdaltsev] We can only assume that many systems were destroyed during the first massive strike on industrial centers and airfields. About 130 Tomahawk and Harm cruise missiles were used during the first strike. As a result, air defenses ceased to exist as a system: The military people know what I mean. I am saying all this not to provide a justification. Iraq also had modern foreign-made systems, such as French systems Crotale and Roland. Also armaments from other countries. Alas, they did not perform any better than ours.

[Falichev] Does it turn out that Iraqi air defense, for all practical purposes, could not hinder the international forces from accomplishing their tasks? What conclusions follow from the experience of this war?

[Strelkov] I cannot agree with that formulation. The multinational allied forces had to continue air strikes for over a month (!), working over Iraqi positions. Why? Yes, they wanted to minimize casualties. But it also proves the strength of the deployed Iraqi troops, including the air defenses. As to the conclusions, here is one of them: Combat operations in modern wars will undoubtedly start with the destruction of reconnoitered targets of the enemy forces, with air force operations. And although academician Arbatov some time ago advanced the idea that we almost do not need air defense troops, this opinion—as evidenced by these events—is incorrect. Had Iraq not had such an air defense, the multinational allied forces would have achieved their goal much sooner.

Next. This war was different from any other in that electronic warfare played a very special role in it. If we do not work in advance on ways to counter electronic warfare systems, they can nullify the efforts of some air defense systems entirely. Unfortunately—and this is not a secret—we are still behind the West in the development of electronics. And even if we wanted to, it would not be easy to quickly set up production of this technology on a base of modern materials: Our industry is not very responsive to new technologies. Therefore, I believe that we should further improve the whole system of ordering and developing new technology and armaments. Work on new prototypes of arms should be done on a competitive basis.

[Zherdetskiy] To fight more effectively in such conditions, we need to have different types of SAM and radar systems, a high degree of automation in the management of combat operations, reconnaissance, and target guidance. By the way, without reconnaissance, including

space-based reconnaissance, neither the Patriot nor the Hawk would have performed the way they did. Being highly protected against interference, they are equipped with targeting lasers. This is very promising weaponry the Americans have...

[Strelkov] Forgive me for interrupting, but lately we keep looking at the United States, comparing ourselves with them. Of course, it is necessary to analyze the development of attack and defense capabilities of the leading NATO country. However, we should not blindly copy everything they develop. I mean the air defense organization: The geostrategic situation of our country is special. That is even leaving aside the economic cost. The same Patriot missile costs \$20 to \$30 million. Count yourself...

[Zherdetskiy] You are absolutely right; Not every country can afford it. Therefore, when we talk about the effectiveness of any air defense system, we have to ask first: effectiveness against which enemy? Iraqi air defenses could not, of course, compete with the highly technologically developed strike capabilities of the multinational allied forces. This is like putting an experienced boxer in the ring against a novice...

I will probably not reveal any secrets if I say this: We have interference-proof missile systems which are capable of handling appropriate tasks. But Comrade Strelkov is absolutely right in recalling academician Arbatov's position, and in particular, his article "How Much Defense Is Sufficient?" If we fall behind in developing our air defenses, we will not catch up with the same United States later. The sad experience of Iraq is very instructive in this respect, especially considering that politics—even if it is peace-oriented—is a very capricious lady...

[Falichev] What is the prognosis for the future development of air defense?

[Strelkov] Judging from the direction of the Pentagon's weapons programs, by the year 2000 they are planning to have tens of thousands of strategic and tactical supersonic cruise and operational-tactical missiles. This proves the point: The role of air-space attack forces will keep increasing, which makes us consider air defense as an extremely important factor in the defense capability of our country. Only an army equipped with modern weapons and air defense technology will be able to withstand massive aviation strikes at the start of a modern war.

Naval Chief of Main Staff on High Accident Rate

91UM0333A Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
2 Feb 91 First Edition p 3

[Interview with Admiral of the Fleet K. Makarov, USSR Navy chief of staff, by Captain 1st Rank A. Pilipchuk: "Is the Navy Accident Rate High?"; date and place not given; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] Some mass publications print articles which burden the public with the alleged catastrophic situation in which the USSR Navy finds itself relative to the accident rate. Presented here is an interview the editors arranged with Admiral of the Fleet K. Makarov, chief of the Navy Main Staff, who responds to questions put by KRASNAYA ZVEZDA dealing with man's activity at sea and the matter of accidents suffered by the Navy.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Admiral of the Fleet! The sea has always been associated with some risk. Hence the question: Are accidents at sea fatally inescapable, a tribute to the "god of the sea," or are they a consequence of poorly designed naval materiel and inadequacies in the training of crews and command personnel of combatant ships and other vessels?

[Makarov] The problem of accidents arose at the same time as seafaring. In that time of long ago, the elements working in combination with a poor state of knowledge of the oceans and low reliability of ship construction comprised the major cause of seafaring fatalities. Navigation safety improved with the accumulation of knowledge about the world's oceans and the appearance of detailed navigation charts, a technical approach to navigation, and the associated shore infrastructure. The ocean's elemental forces do however make known their presence from time to time.

Nevertheless, I do not agree that accidents and emergency situations at sea are fatally inescapable. Analysis of accidents occurring in the world's navies carried out over a period of many decades indicates that the causes lie primarily in failure to plan ahead, lack of responsibility and discipline on the part of navigators, and major violations committed by the latter with regard to the requirements specified by guidance documents and good seamanship norms, by international and local navigation rules. Accidents at sea are often traced to a poor state of training of crews and command personnel of combatant ships and other craft with respect to on-the-spot performance of their safety duties. Tragedies in a number of cases are also of course caused by poor technical level of equipment aboard combatant ships and other vessels and low reliability of materiel. It should be understood that a combination of the abovementioned causes may lead to more serious consequences.

Thus, the loss of the liner "Titanic" in 1912 can be seen as not only insufficiency of technical equipment (radar had not yet come into being), but also the captain's failure to observe elementary safety measures: The

"Titanic" was steaming ahead full speed in an area known to present a danger from icebergs, travelling in addition at night and in a fog. The year was 1956 when the supermodern Italian liner "Andrea Doria" collided with the Swedish vessel "Stockholm" at night and sank. Investigation revealed that the captains and navigators of both ships were inept in their employment of their radars. In general, according to data provided by Lloyd's of London insurance company, in the period from 1980 to 1989, an average of 189 vessels—almost 16 a month—were either lost or suffered serious damage every year.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] What does the USSR Navy see as a trend—lower or higher—in accident rate for the last 15 to 20 years?

[Makarov] I will cite some statistics. From 1982 to 1986, the number of accidents and emergency situations compared with 1977-1981 decreased by 30 percent. Not by itself, it should be understood, but as a result of systematic preventive work. This effort included the constant participation of all Navy structures, from the commander-in-chief to the battle station officer. After the loss of the submarine in the North Atlantic due to a fire that broke out in a missile launching tube, Navy Commander-in-Chief Admiral of the Fleet V. Chernavin ordered a thorough review of the organization, principles, and methods of accident prevention. This work is carried out throughout the year, regardless of the training status and degree of readiness credited to the crew. It includes educational, organizational, drill, technical, personnel, and test measures. This resulted in reducing the average annual number of emergency situations in 1988-1990 by a factor of three compared with 1981-1985. That amount also represents the reduction in serious incidents (accidents and major disasters involving combatant ships and other vessels). Navigation incidents were reduced by a factor of four, while command-type accidents (those associated with shiphandling) dropped by a factor of three. However, in the last two years there has been a greater relative number of technical incidents involving ships (explosions, fires, flooding). In this period, they comprised almost half all the accidents involving Navy ships. Looking at the serious occurrences for a longer period of time (1985-1990), 57 percent of them are technical in nature, 43 percent linked with errors of handling of ships or weapons. Errors of shiphandling comprise a majority in the case of surface vessels, while 85 percent of accidents in the case of submarines are attributable to technical causes. These causes were responsible for the sinking of two nuclear submarines: in 1986 in the North Atlantic, the other in 1989 in the Norwegian Sea. Factual information furnishes grounds for concluding that the major causes of technical accidents are the extreme complexity and unsatisfactory reliability of some items of equipment and armament, spot cases of poor quality of new ship construction, and, in a number of cases, shortcomings in training of equipment service personnel. In 1989-1990, the Navy and Minsudprom [Ministry of Shipbuilding] acted jointly with other ministries supplying the Navy with armaments and equipment to carry

out a comprehensive analysis of the causes of technical accidents occurring aboard ships. Ways to eliminate them have been devised and written into a special decree passed by the USSR Council of Ministers and into joint agreements between the Navy and a number of ministries. Their implementation has been initiated. Development of new, more effective and reliable survivability systems is under way. It is a fact that designers have not offered a single new approach to designing survivability into ship construction in the last 20 years. Bureau designers have commenced working in collaboration with Navy organizations to write survivability programs for universal integrated damage control training systems employing personal computers. They will be used to train operators of all shipboard occupational specialties.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] A person can come across the following comparison in the press: USSR loses four nuclear submarines, the U.S. Navy, two. The reader is led to believe that our Navy has a higher accident rate. What can we learn from a reliable analysis of the two navies—ours and the foreign one?

[Makarov] The comparison is not completely accurate. The U.S. Navy did indeed lose two nuclear vessels. Our Navy lost three. The fourth nuclear submarine sank in shallow water in 1983 in a trimming area near Kamchatka. (That is the purpose of trimming—so that a submarine does not sink in great depths during her first dive.) The submarine's crew was rescued and the craft properly raised. She was restored and is now afloat and employed for simulation training for crews of nuclear submarines. A similar incident occurred in the U.S. Navy, but our press apparently prefers to say nothing about it. In this case, a submarine carrying Nathaniel Greene ballistic missiles was removed from service after suffering a serious navigation accident. According to official information, from 1945 to 1988 the U.S. Navy suffered almost 800 major accidents, including aircraft carriers and submarines.

The USSR Navy suffered its worst year in the last 20 years in 1989: three major accidents, with a loss of 45 lives. In that same year, American surface vessels and submarines suffered more than 20 major accidents, with casualties amounting to more than 60 men killed and 90 injured. However, this is actually not a matter of comparisons, but of ways to keep people from becoming victims, by improving the equipment and raising the level of preparedness and responsibility of people.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Incidentally, what kind of responsibility is carried by officials in the event of an accident?

[Makarov] The military procuracy is informed of each accident involving ships, armaments, and equipment. An investigation into accidents and accident situations is launched by organizing a special expert commission that analyzes ship's documents, the indications of recording devices, and evidence provided by eyewitnesses and others involved in an accident. It performs analytical

computations, constructs charts, and sets up modelling situations in real time aboard ships and on simulators. This helps to paint a fairly accurate picture of the circumstances surrounding an accident, filter out distortions due to stress of involved persons and other factors, and establish any violations that may have been committed by officials with regard to their regulation duties and requirements set by international and domestic guidance documents related to maritime safety. Those found guilty are punished for disciplinary, material, or criminal violation of the law.

I will cite only two examples. A medium amphibious warfare ship sailing in the area of the Kuril Islands ran aground on rocks due to serious navigation errors committed by the ship's commanding officer and was subsequently destroyed by a strong gale (there were no human casualties.) Captain-Lieutenant V. Kukalo, the ship's commanding officer, was sentenced to seven years' imprisonment. The second example, Captain 1st Rank Yu. Samoylov, a large unit commander, was discharged into the reserves for violating regulation requirements relating to navigation safety, in that he permitted his submarine to collide with a fishing trawler (without human casualties). A court fined him 15,000 rubles as partial compensation to the state for loss of materiel.

[KRASNAYA ZVEZDA] Comrade Admiral of the Fleet, today we can and must speak not of the findings reached by the state commission that investigated the loss of the nuclear submarine "Komsomolets," but of the implementation of its recommendations.

[Makarov] That is exactly where we are concentrating our efforts. Thus, to rapidly provide submarines and surface combatant ships and other vessels with lifesaving gear, the government has allocated 6 million foreign-exchange rubles for foreign purchase of 50,000 lifesaving wet suits. Several models have been purchased for testing so that we can choose the best one. Industry has ordered new equipment, some of it nontraditional, such as surface-effect craft and rescue aircraft equipped with launchable powered boats. The Navy, Minsudprom, and USSR MVD have developed measures to improve fire safety aboard submarines. This includes work on developing an atmosphere inside a ship's spaces that does not support combustion and improving the flame resistance of cables and bulkhead and hull lead-ins, and so forth. Implementation of these measures has been initiated by contracting with the respective enterprises; much work is already in progress. Work has commenced to create new fire extinguishers.

The progress made this year in implementing the recommendations put forth by the commission has already been examined twice in special conferences of USSR Navy and Minsudprom representatives. It was noted that the measures related to survivability of existing and planned ships should proceed in two directions. In the case of ships in service, they would be concentrated on creating more effective documentation and improving the operational efficiency of employing the latter by

introducing computers and providing ships with more efficient damage control equipment. With regard to the construction and design of new ships, a number of fundamentally new measures related to ship survivability and rescue of personnel has already been incorporated.

Chernavin Responds to Komsomolets Appeal

91UM0412A Moscow MORSKOY SBORNIK
in Russian No 12, Dec 90 (signed to press 17 Dec 90)
pp 27-31

[Interview with Fleet Admiral V.N. Chernavin, USSR people's deputy, commander in chief of the Navy, by the editorial board of MORSKOY SBORNIK; place and date not given: "The Tragedy Should Not Happen Again"]

[Text] As has already been reported in the press, on 5 and 6 October 1990, a "roundtable" panel devoted to the results of the work of a government commission investigating the causes of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets was held at the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Youth Affairs at the initiative of the editorial boards of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the weekly SOBESEDNIK. Participants in the meeting adopted the following document:

APPEAL

by participants in the meeting of submarine-officers, veterans of the Armed Forces, representatives of the shipbuilding industry, and relatives of the lost sailors, to the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for the Issues of Defense and State Security, the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee for Youth Affairs, and to the USSR and RSFSR people's deputies.

The final communique of the government commission investigating the circumstances and causes of the loss of the Komsomolets submarine disseminated by the mass media is the reason for our meeting. We are aware of the considerable work the commission has done. At the same time, we believe that the document released to the public does not contain sufficiently complete information about all the causes of the event, the lessons learned from the tragedy in the Sea of Norway, specific measures taken by the Navy command, and the response of shipbuilders and designers of combat vessels.

According to the information available to us, there have been no changes for the better in the fleets and formations which are substantial to any degree, just as there have been no expected changes based on the results of investigating previous accidents. We consider the faulty practice of compromises and the striving of certain forces to hush up emerging problems and smooth them over to be one of the main causes of this situation. All of this only serves to exacerbate the situation in naval collectives which is tense to begin with, undermine confidence in the headquarters, and, most importantly, reduce combat readiness and preserve prerequisites for

such accidents. We believe that it is impermissible for us to remain indifferent at this time.

We state that until now no complete and objective answers have been given to questions about the main reasons for the high accident rate in the Navy and why the measures taken are incapable of radically changing the situation for the better.

Despite the demands made by the public, specific guilty parties, with respect to the existing situation, have not been named.

The issues of social security for the servicemen and members of their families remain unresolved.

Having exhausted our own potential for influencing the situation, we appeal to you, comrade people's deputies.

We propose:

1. To organize an additional, in-depth investigation of the causes and circumstances of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets with resources at the disposal of the USSR Supreme Soviet committees and the deputies themselves, taking into account the materials of the government commission and materials submitted by the participants in the meeting, simultaneously monitoring the actual implementation of the already planned measures aimed at accident prevention on Navy vessels.

2. To set up a comprehensive panel of experts consisting of independent specialists under the auspices of the parliamentary committees, with a view to studying and analyzing the actual state of affairs in the Navy, with a subsequent review of results and proposals by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

The participants in the meeting are prepared to provide comprehensive help, provide necessary documents, and participate personally in the conduct of this extremely important work.

We consider it necessary to invite the attention of the USSR and RSFSR people's deputies to the fact that the Navy command did not see fit to take part in preparing and holding the present meeting, opposed delegating the officers invited to Moscow, and thus showed undisguised disrespect for the operation of the permanent structures of the Supreme Soviet and those who participated in the meeting themselves, revealing an unchanged attitude of conceited rejection of dialogue with a public concerned about the state of affairs in the Navy.

[signed] V.A. BOYKO, captain first rank, retired; I.V. BOKHMAN, radio equipment engineer; N.N. VATUTIN, lieutenant colonel, retired, military pilot-instructor first class; A.N. GORBACHEV, captain first rank, retired; N.U. DZHURAYEV, captain first rank, commander of damage control division; A.M. YEVDOKIMENKO, rear admiral, retired; V.D. ZHIZNEVSKIY, captain second rank, retired; V.P. ZHUKOVSKIY, captain first rank, retired; I.B. KOLTON, captain first rank, retired, senior research associate of the IAE [Nuclear

Energy Institute] imeni Kurchatov; E.P. LEONOV, naval architect; I.I. MALASHININ, rear admiral, retired; R.A. MARKOVA, housewife, mother of the perished Senior Lieutenant S. Markov; V.S. PLESKACH, captain-lieutenant, retired; Ye.N. SELIVANOV, captain first rank, chief of junior specialist school; B.Z. TAUBIN, naval architect; A.I. KHRAPTOVICH, captain first rank, retired; Ye.D. CHERNOV, vice admiral, retired, candidate of naval sciences, Hero of the Soviet Union; V.M. CHUVAKIN, naval architect.

In view of doubts voiced at the meeting concerning the objectivity of the results of the work of the government commission, as well as dissatisfaction with the absence of invited Navy representatives at the meeting, the editorial board of MORSKOY SBORNIK asked Fleet Admiral V.N. CHERNAVIN, USSR people's deputy and commander in chief of the Navy, to respond to a number of questions in which the public is interested.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Vladimir Nikolayevich, a government commission has completed work on establishing the causes of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets. Could you discuss the main conclusions of this commission, taking into account the fact that a report on this in the mass media was very short?

[Chernavin] As a result of a thorough investigation, which included conducting a great number of experiments and debriefing all individuals who were in some manner involved in this accident, as well as an in-depth study of documents, including those salvaged by the submariners, they succeeded in establishing that a fire in the electrical equipment in the priming pump installation in the hydraulic steering system or the oil separation system, due to the control and safety devices of these systems being out of adjustment, was a possible cause of the fire in compartment seven of the submarine. After combustible materials ignited under the influence of high temperatures, the high-pressure main air line lost its seal within minutes. The influx of high-pressure air increased the intensity of the fire in the compartment, which the personnel were not able to control. The high emission of heat caused the loss of seal in a number of systems and equipment in compartments 6 and 7, as well as in the adjacent main ballast tanks, which resulted in the inflow of outside water into the inner hull and main ballast tanks of the submarine. As a result, it lost longitudinal stability and, having exhausted its reserve buoyancy, sank with considerable trim by the stern.

The act of the government commission noted a peculiarity of this accident—the rarest combination of two factors which accounted for the high intensity and rapid development of the fire, namely: the start of the fire and the disruption of the seal of the main air line, which occurred close together in time. This combination of events, which requires that the crew undertake actions which are opposed in principle—sealing compartments in the case of combustion and depressurizing them in the

event of the access of excess air—substantially complicated the submarine's fight to endure.

In the course of the investigation into the reasons and circumstances of the loss of this vessel it was established that individual types of its equipment, developed in the 1960's and 1970's, were insufficiently reliable in terms of fire safety and turned out to be inefficient given increased pressure in the compartments. In addition, the imperfection of rescue equipment was noted. Also, there were design deficiencies both in the submarine itself and in the life-support systems for personnel in an emergency.

Evaluating the actions of the crew, the commission noted that the main avenues of fighting to ensure the endurance of the vessel were correct. The personnel displayed courage, and performed their duty to the end. At the same time, the personnel allowed mistakes to occur in this most complex emergency situation, including in the use of rescue equipment.

In short, these are the main conclusions of the government commission based on the results of investigating the causes of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] What main measures did the commission outline in order to prevent accidents and disasters?

[Chernavin] The commission came to the conclusion that the tragedy in the Sea of Norway calls for taking urgent measures in four main directions:

- improving vessel design;
- improving materiel reliability;
- improving the training of personnel on naval vessels;
- perfecting the country's search and rescue services and rescue equipment.

The commission developed appropriate plans for pursuing these directions and implementing them. We should note in particular that the government commission secured the appropriation of necessary funds above the Navy allocation for the implementation of all these measures. The implementation of these plans will make it possible to resolve issues which have gone unresolved for decades. Thus, for example, the Scientific Research Institute imeni A.N. Krylov of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, in cooperation with the Scientific Research Institute of the Navy, will now develop and install on submarines objective instruments which will display on many indicators the status of damaged compartments and main ballast tanks—knowledge on which the proper choice of the main directions of fighting for the ship's endurance depends at individual stages of the accident.

In 1989 and 1990, applied programs for calculating the stability and unsinkability of vessels of various designs were developed at the Higher Naval Engineering School in Sevastopol. Under extreme emergency situations,

these programs make it possible to calculate the unsinkability of a vessel using a personal computer, as well as to obtain, in an automatic or semi-automatic mode, the optimal variant of fighting for endurance when the inner hull and the tanks of a submarine are taking on water. The time for arriving at a solution does not exceed 20 seconds. We are already accomplishing the practical task of equipping our submarines with computers and programs (for all designs) which will enable us to fully abandon cumbersome diagrams.

This is just one direction of work. As far as other directions are concerned, they involve increasing the reliability of communications between command posts and compartments, searching for highly active methods of air purification, increasing the fire resistance of cables and cable lead-ins, creating special training systems for instructing submarine personnel in fighting for endurance, changing the fire-extinguishing liquid for a more efficient one accompanied by an increase in its quantity and providing an opportunity for multiple use, and so on. In a word, all directions of this work cannot be enumerated in a single interview, and there is no need to do so.

Measures aimed at perfecting the forces and means of the Navy search and rescue service and improving the quality and reliability of vessel equipment and protective gear for personnel provide for mass-producing a new design of inflatable life rafts and their delivery to vessels as early as this year. The delivery to vessels of breathing mixture purification units and automatic gas dispensing systems for individual gear will begin next year. As has already been noted, in 1991 industry will begin to mass-produce a new type of rescue wet suit which will make it possible for a person to stay in ice-cold water for up to six hours. At the same time, 50,000 of such wet suits will be purchased abroad for 6 million foreign-exchange rubles as early as this year. New, including non-conventional, rescue technologies will be made available to the Navy very shortly.

With a view to improving personnel training, the Navy has taken a number of additional measures which envisage improving the quality of combat and special training, including endurance measures, measures for search and rescue support for ships, accident prevention, and improvements in training facilities. In view of this, the curriculums of our educational establishments (schools) have been changed, and special subjects have been introduced in the Naval Academy and in the special officer classes.

Immediately after the accident, a comprehensive inspection of the preparedness of trained crews for operations under extreme conditions were held, as well as of the availability of necessary means for endurance measures and for rescuing personnel on the vessels. A joint commission consisting of representatives of the Navy, design organizations, and industry verified design provisions for the endurance of all vessels of all designs in all fleets.

The results of the work of this commission were the foundation of the joint decisions which have already been mentioned.

In addition, a number of organizational measures were taken. At the request of the Navy command, CPSU Central Committee Secretary O. Baklanov held a meeting with representatives of all interested ministries and establishments which set forth specific measures for overcoming the insufficient reliability of combat materiel. In March of this year, a conference on ensuring the fire safety of Navy vessels, chaired by Fleet Admiral I. Kapitanets, first deputy commander in chief of the Navy, and L. Rezunov, USSR deputy minister of the shipbuilding industry, was held. Representatives of central and fleet administrations, scientific establishments, educational establishments, enterprises of the USSR Ministry of the Shipbuilding Industry, and other ministries took part in the conference. Issues of design provisions for the endurance of ships were discussed at the conference, and measures to improve it were worked out. In October, the progress in implementing the decisions made was verified. Issues of a gradual transition to the technical servicing of the most complex types of combat materiel by specialists from supplier plants for the entire duration of their operation are being worked on. As you can see, work on eliminating prerequisites for emergencies aboard the vessels is under way. Our main concern at present is to implement in practice the decisions of the government commission. We believe that this should be the focus of all our efforts at present. Otherwise, we will unavoidably talk the entire endeavor to death.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] As we know, private versions of specialists regarding the accident on the nuclear submarine Komsomolets exist along with the official results of the investigation. Are you aware of them? What do you think of them?

[Chernavin] Of course, I am aware. Following the tragedy in the Sea of Norway, the government commission began to receive letters from Soviet citizens in which various versions concerning the causes of the accident were stated. The tests and experiments conducted were based on many of them. A group headed by Vice Admiral E. Chernov, retired, also organized an investigation. I will not characterize the results of their investigation. I will only note that they are built in their entirety on the culpability of the personnel, whereas design deficiencies of the vessels and materiel reliability, which were the cause of the accident and had decisive influence on its progress, are not taken into account by them, because they are, supposedly, similar to the design deficiencies of other modern submarines. Of course, we cannot agree with these conclusions. Accidents in the Navy are largely caused precisely by design deficiencies and at times the poor reliability of materiel, along with other causes. Navy personnel at large subscribe to this opinion. However, I do not belittle the role of personnel who operate such materiel.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Still, what is the difference in principle between the assessment of the catastrophe by the government commission and the conclusion of Vice Admiral Ye. Chernov, retired?

[Chernavin] First of all, the commission reviewed the causes of the catastrophe and analyzed the actions of personnel in the course of endurance measures without separating out any one cause and restricting itself to its analysis, but by investigating the entirety of causes which brought about a very specific situation on the submarine in which the crew was forced to act. As far as Chernov's reflections are concerned, only one cause figures in them—the actions of the crew aimed at saving the vessel. These actions are not viewed in conjunction with the actual situation during a specific period of time in virtually a single case.

Second, the point of departure for the government commission was as follows: Since a set of causes influenced the progress and outcome of the catastrophe they must be analyzed in order to draw correct conclusions. This is why in the process of this work eight sections were created which consisted of the most competent specialists in science, industry, and the Navy. Hundreds of various experiments and tests were performed, and a multitude of similar situations were studied under full-scale conditions. All available documents were analyzed, including the watch log of the command center of the submarine Komsomolets, which was salvaged by the personnel. Based on these and many other data, the commission came to the conclusion that four groups of causes decisively influenced the course and outcome of the catastrophe; they were the ones amounting to four directions of our work on preventing accidents and catastrophes.

Here are short conclusions by Comrade Chernov which he outlined in a memo to the minister of defense and the commander in chief of the Navy:

"1. I report to you that the prototype vessel... was reliable in operation...

2. The exceptionally poor standard of training of the crew personnel was the main cause of the catastrophe...

3. The author is aware of the design efficiencies of the submarine... I note that not a single one of them in itself was a cause of the accident that occurred, to say nothing about the catastrophe..."

These are different approaches, and hence the fundamental difference in evaluating the causes of the accident.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] The Navy community and the press continue to show a heightened interest in the tragedy in the Sea of Norway. How do you view this concern?

[Chernavin] I view it as being quite understandable: These are our common woes. However, there is concern and there is concern. We should say directly that at

present, when military activities have become considerably more open, some journalists are "concerned" only about their popularity. They frequently seek it at any cost, sometimes by means of openly exploiting the woes and problems accumulated in the military community, in particular, those associated with Navy accidents. Their "concern" not only fails to help the cause but, quite the contrary, patently harms it. Incidentally, many of our officers, petty officers, and sailors note this. The stream of their outraged letters concerning this is endless. Many of them are published on the pages of fleet newspapers and in the journal MORSKOY SBORNIK. Unfortunately, the newspapers and magazines at which the criticism is leveled do not publish these letters.

However, we should also mention another kind of concern which we share fully. It is the concern of those who are genuinely interested in improving the state of affairs in the Navy. There are veterans, representatives of various social strata of our society, young civilians, and even schoolchildren among them. These letters cannot but be moving. We are profoundly grateful to all those who strive to make their contribution to the endeavor of combating accidents in the Navy. As far as representatives of the mass media are concerned, I would like to make just one request—to be truthful and objective in depicting individual events in our lives. For our part, we are prepared to render all manner of assistance to those who are interested in covering the problems of the Navy in the press in an unprejudiced manner.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Vladimir Nikolayevich, a "roundtable" panel devoted to the accident on the nuclear submarine Komsomolets was held recently at the Committee for Youth Affairs of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Apart from USSR people's deputies, submarine-officers, Navy veterans, employees of the shipbuilding industry and design organizations, and relatives of the fallen sailors took part in the meeting. Representatives of the central apparatus of the Navy did not attend this meeting. Why?

[Chernavin] Mainly because of the obvious bias of this meeting. For the sake of brevity, I will take the liberty to quote lines from two invitations to the meeting which I received. The first invitation said that the meeting would be held "in conjunction with numerous appeals to the Committee for Youth Affairs... by voters, specialists, industry representatives, servicemen, and their families who are dissatisfied with the decisions of the state commission investigating the causes of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets..." To me, this invitation appeared biased because many of those who were invited to this meeting and who attended it later had not seen and, consequently, had not read the decisions of the government commission. This is why I for one immediately asked this question: How can one be dissatisfied with decisions of which he is not aware?

The second invitation suggested that we assign competent comrades to participate in preparing and holding a meeting of USSR people's deputies, representatives of

editorial offices of the youth press, and specialists "interested in establishing the real causes of the loss of the nuclear submarine Komsomolets..." I looked at the list of those who gathered around this "roundtable," and I may say with the full weight of authority that there was not a single person at the meeting who was a member of the government commission or who was aware of the documents based on the results of the work of its sections in their entirety. This begs a legitimate question: Why were these people not only stating their disagreement with what they did not know, but also questioning the work of hundreds of competent people on top of this?

The answer to this question is found right here, in the invitation to the meeting which, as it announced, was held "on the initiative of USSR People's Deputy A. Yemelyanenko, in cooperation with the editorial boards of the newspaper KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and the weekly SOBESEDNIK"—precisely the publications which have distinguished themselves by the greatest lack of objectivity and bias in covering the tragedy in the Sea of Norway. This is shown by their refusal to publish the full text of a letter from the surviving members of the Komsomolets crew and other materials whose authors have views of the causes of the submarine accident which are different from those of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA and SOBESEDNIK. However, they generously provide space for all kinds of writings and cock-and-bull stories for the same set of authors whose opinion on this is far removed from reality.

[MORSKOY SBORNIK] Vladimir Nikolayevich, many of our readers are interested to know what has happened to the survivors. What help has the Navy provided for the families of the lost sailors?

[Chernavin] The surviving submariners of the Komsomolets determined their future themselves; we merely facilitated the fulfillment of their wishes. For example, Senior Lieutenants A. Stepanov and A. Zaytsev, Petty Officers E. Kononov, A. Kopeyka, S. Grigoryan, and V. Gerashchenko decided to continue their submarine service. Others preferred shore duty. All of them have been appointed to various positions in naval units and establishments.

By a decision of the USSR minister of defense, the families and parents of the lost sailors were paid between 400 rubles [R] and R1,000 depending on the composition of families. Between R2,000 and R3,500 from the funds collected in the Northern Fleet. In addition, the families of sailors in compulsory service were given grants of R1,500. Housing was provided for all family members of the dead officers and petty officers in various cities of our country, according to their wishes. During a meeting in Leningrad, the families of the dead made additional requests, and we are working to meet them.

I understand that nothing can compensate for the loss of sons, husbands, and loved ones. This accident has deeply

affected all of us. As you know, work is under way on a monument to the submariners of the Komsomolets. However, the elimination of accidents in the Navy will be the best monument to them. The tragedy in the Sea of Norway should not happen again.

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Development of Wing-in-Ground-Effect Vehicles Urged

91UM04214 Moscow KR ISN:1Y1 ZVEZDA in Russian
27 Feb 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Captain 3rd Rank Yu. Gladkevich: "The Country Needs Wing-in-Ground-Effect Vehicles"]

[Text] *If the command "Cleared for takeoff after we are through the narrows" were heard today on a surface ship, many people would be astonished, and at best would think that it was some kind of joke. But the day is not all that far off when this sentence or something close to it will be confirmed in the vocabulary of naval commands. It will come about when the unusual vessels known as wing-in-ground [WIG]-effect vehicles become a regular thing.*

Even hunters in olden times noted that when it had glided from some altitude, an injured bird would hang over water for a long time. They did not guess at the physics of the phenomenon, they simply knew that they would have to go a long way to retrieve the catch. So the wing-in-ground-effect was discovered, and it has taken centuries to find out how to use it.

What is a WIG vehicle? The most popular explanation is that it is a flying apparatus designed to fly close to the surface of land or water, usually at heights equal to one-tenth or two-tenths the length of the wing. In terms of the way in which aerodynamic forces are used, the WIG vehicle is distinguished from the airplane by its use of the closeness of the supporting surface (this is the wing-in-ground-effect) and from the air-cushion-riding vehicle by its use of the passing air flow rather than air pressure created by special superchargers beneath the vessel's hull.

In other words, use is made of the sharp increase in lift on a wing occurring close to the surface of land or water. Moreover, close to the surface the lift-to-drag [L/D] ratio improves sharply: In an airplane the maximum L/D ratio attained is 13 to 15 units, in a WIG-effect vehicle it is almost double that.

It is quite obvious that the idea of incorporating in a single apparatus the advantages of the airplane and the ship had to be attractive to scientists and designers. The history of the development of the WIG-effect vehicle started about 50 years ago. Way back in the early 1930's the great Soviet aviation engineer and inventor P. Gromkhovskoy was conducting studies with WIG-effect models. In 1935 the Finnish engineer T. Kaario built the first apparatus. Vigorous work to develop the WIG-effect vehicle was also done in Sweden, Japan, the FRG,

and Great Britain. In our country, incidentally, more than three dozen experimental WIG-effect vehicles have been built.

As a rule, however, they were small devices. As far as large ships of this class were concerned, there have not yet been many successes in world WIG vehicle building. Figures have been published in the foreign press on several WIG-effect vessels for various kinds of combat missions (it is precisely the military who are showing a special interest in the subject). In particular, the large American companies Lockheed, Boeing, and Grumman and some others have worked on designs for air transport, antisubmarine, patrol, assault troop transport, and missile-carrying WIG-effect vehicles. Thus, in 1966 the Grumman company developed a design for a missile-carrying vehicle based on the "flying wing" concept, and in 1967 it had a design for an assault troop transport WIG-effect vehicle based on an airplane design. Research Affaylens Internareyts (USA) company has a design for an antisubmarine WIG-effect vehicle on order from the U.S. Navy, equipped with gas turbines. Its displacement is about 90 tons, with a speed of 180 knots, and a range of 1,500 miles at a speed of about 90 knots.

However, despite all the work, there is still only one WIG-effect vehicle in any foreign navy, namely, a patrol WIG-effect vehicle in the FRG Navy. This is explained by the extraordinary complexity and a number of fundamental development questions that have not yet been finally answered.

In the USSR, work on the WIG-effect vehicle has been under way for a long time. Some experts abroad are stating directly that in this field the USSR occupies the leading place in the world. And the publishers of the world-renowned Janes reference books, who are sticking to their own rule of providing information on everything concerned with equipment and weapons, even publish tactical-technical data on a powerful Soviet wing-in-ground-effect vehicle (WIG according to Janes' classification).

Yes, WIG-effect vehicles have not been eliminated from our shipbuilding programs. This entailed risk and courage. The ability to see future prospects in what appears now to be unpromising work is given those with perspicacity. Fortunately, we have always had such people. And we have them today, even though the process of destruction, cutbacks, and curtailment has become a regular thing even with our future navy.

Because of the catastrophe aboard the nuclear-powered ship Komsomolets, the industry has been ordered to design and develop as soon as possible unconventional rescue facilities, including the WIG-effect vehicle. The following argument is convincing to show that it is necessary and possible to improve significantly the abilities of search-and-rescue: According to expert assessments, if there had been even one large rescue WIG-effect vehicle in the Northern Fleet the crew of the Komsomolets could have been saved.

Our search-and-rescue service has an extreme need for such facilities. The main thing, of course, is the speed that WIG-effect vehicles can attain. No present-day rescue vessel has this capability. Given that they will have good seaworthiness and be stable in heavy seas (up to 5 or 6 on the scale) WIG-effect vehicles will be able to conduct rescue operations with hitherto unprecedented effectiveness. At speeds close to the speed of an aircraft, after it has arrived at the scene of a disaster a WIG-effect vehicle will be able to take aboard the crew of almost any kind of vessel or ship.

Unfortunately, the economic difficulties that the country is experiencing may seriously affect the status of WIG-effect vehicle building. And then the search-and-rescue services will remain without essential up-to-date facilities. But even in these times that are difficult for us, is it possible to reconcile ourselves to a situation in which people employed in dangerous work are not provided with the proper security?

I would like to repeat once again that Soviet WIG-effect vehicle building has a historic chance to be of very great use to society. Shall we take advantage of that opportunity?

FRG's Muller on Construction of Military Housing

91UM03424 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
30 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by TASS correspondent V. Chistyakov written specially for KRASNAYA ZVEZDA under the "Focal Point: The Housing Problem" rubric: "'FRG Doing Everything Possible'"; first paragraph is KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] The joint Soviet-German program of constructing housing for personnel of the Western Group of Forces, who are slated to withdraw from the territory of the former GDR in the next four years in accordance with agreements signed by the USSR and the FRG, is starting to be realized.

This unprecedented action was initiated on 9 October of last year, when representatives of both countries meeting in Bonn placed their signatures on the Agreement on Certain Transitional Measures. Specifically, the document calls for the German side to furnish the sum of 7.8 billion marks to be used for housing construction.

Working groups from the Soviet Union and Germany, including experts from interested ministries and departments, on the very next day following the signing undertook the extremely complex procedure of developing practical arrangements intended to regulate the numerous aspects of further cooperation. The activity of the working groups occupied a time span of more than two months, culminating in the signing of a protocol of agreement between the USSR Ministry of Defense, USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations, and the FRG Ministry of Economy as an adjunct to the Agreement on Certain Transitional Measures. I spoke with Managing Director Mikhael Muller, key staff member of the Ministry of Economy and one of the authors of the document.

"The protocol's primary significance lies in its opening a new phase of cooperation between Germany and the Soviet Union relative to implementing the housing program," he said in our conversation. "Now we have a document that sets forth major provisions of the Agreement on Certain Transitional Measures and places them into the realm of practicality. Thus, for example, it stipulates that, as far as the German side is concerned, the FRG will be responsible for the accomplishment of the measures called for by the program and their oversight. The Ministry in turn has named the Reconstruction Bank [KfW] as the agent for the programs's banking aspects and use of funds for this purpose." "We," Herr Muller continued to explain, "have no interest whatever in deriving any unilateral benefits from this joint venture: All the funds allotted—down to the last pfennig—will go to housing construction. The Ministry of Economy's sole interest is to see that the funds are used to maximum advantage. For this reason, the knowledge possessed by our experts, who are very familiar with the world of Western construction companies, will be

extremely useful to our Soviet partners. There is no point to looking for Germany's possession of a dictate in this regard, since the German specialists, guided only by the interests of the matter, will assist their Soviet partners in avoiding certain mistakes."

Also clearly defined in the protocol within the framework of program accomplishment are the obligations of the customer: the USSR Ministry of Defense. This includes the development of technical tasks and participation in the preparation of design documentation. An important provision is the Soviet Union's responsibility of holding open bidding for the selection of general contracting and subcontracting companies. Ministry of Defense representatives will work with local organs of authority to resolve all problems related to obtaining building permits and plot assignments, assist contractors in materials hauling, and free the latter from import restrictions and payment of customs fees. Finally, Soviet military builders and specialists will maintain technical supervision over the work and approve completed jobs prior to acceptance.

The USSR and the FRG have also agreed on forming a consortium of consulting firms to handle such a large project. The Soviet side will consist of Soyuzvneshtroyimport, Tekhnoeksport, Main Technical Administration of the MVES [Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations], Zagrantekhshtroy, Ministry of Defense, and the USSR Gosstroy Main Committee for Architecture. What position does the consortium occupy? It is assigned the important role of analyzing proposals offered by foreign companies making the bids and selecting contractors from these companies. Construction, hauling, and other companies other than German are expected to participate in the program. Willingness to build apartments for Soviet military personnel has been declared by dozens of large and medium companies from France, Finland, Greece, Turkey, Poland, Yugoslavia, and other countries. The consortium upon selection of contractors will participate in negotiations with the contractors, signing contracts and writing orders to accomplish specific construction jobs, services, and deliveries.

Authority to effect contractual agreements with foreign general contractors is vested in Soyuzvneshtroyimport, Tekhnoeksport, and the Main Technical Administration of the MVES.

"You may have gained the impression that we have resolved most problems by signing the protocol," said M. Muller as our conversation was drawing to a close. "This is not quite so. The enormity and uniqueness of the program are such that we will be encountering new problems as we go along. Not only are they impossible to resolve beforehand; an attempt to do so would be fruitless. It is much more important that the partners strive to cooperate effectively to attain a common goal. I can state confidently that the FRG will do everything possible to complete the program within the specified time period. In this connection, however, much will still depend on the effectiveness of our USSR partners' work. In our

limited experience in cooperating with Soviet specialists, we have become convinced of the competence they have to offer."

Military Construction of Housing in Moscow Area

91UM0342B Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 30 Jan 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Col F. Semyanovskiy (Res.): "Construction in Moscow"; first two paragraphs are KRASNAYA ZVEZDA introduction]

[Text] KRASNAYA ZVEZDA has written a number of times about the acuteness of housing for military personnel, laborers, and white collar workers of the Soviet Army in Moscow. The Specialized Military Construction Directorate, which was organized in the capital a year ago, should help to resolve this problem.

Colonel A. Shishkarev, chief of the directorate, responds to the editors' request to discuss the military builders' work.

Let me start off by saying that we are supposed to build more than 1,000 apartments every year. That however is in the future, after we effect considerable expansion of our production capacities. Nevertheless, our organization is fully capable of doing work even now. Last year we turned over to the customer 24,350 square meters of living space; this involved the sum of 11 million, 199 thousand rubles.

At the present time we are directing our efforts to erecting buildings in microrayon Fili-Kuntsevo. Plans call for building two parts—one of 362 apartments, the other of 183—of a housing complex. This year we are to start construction of more than 800 apartments at that location. Diverse facilities will be housed there. Located within the microrayon will be two schools, three kindergartens, a dairy kitchen, a lunch bar, a bread store, and other facilities.

In addition, we will erect two buildings in microrayon Nikulino, which is located in the south-west. In Chertanovo there is a housing start that will offer 300 apartments. In progress is work preparatory to constructing a 90-apartment brick building in Solntsevo.

Our number one problem is availability of construction materials, sections, and components. The Ministry of Defense does not have its own construction industry in Moscow. We are dependent on civilian supply enterprises. There presently are more than 20 of them. Deliveries unfortunately are subject to considerable interruptions.

There is another problem of no little import: personnel. It is no secret that qualified specialists are leaving for cooperatives, thus creating an extremely acute labor shortage. It was our misfortune to suffer the same fate. We now have a total of only 150 qualified laborers, with the result that we must rely mainly on military builders.

We plan to initiate construction of a tekhnikum in 1993. The graduates will form the core of our labor collective.

We are also seriously concerned that the directorate still cannot set up its own material and technical supply base where we would be able to receive products from suppliers. Also lacking is a laboratory which would carry out quality control of materials and perform appraisals. Quite a number of our Soviet Army officers, laborers, and white collar workers are in need of better housing.

We must solve all the above problems while on the move, so to speak. This is the only way we have of accomplishing our assigned tasks.

Market Raises Costs for Clothing, Basic Necessities

91UM0517A Moscow VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA
in Russian 29 Jan 91 p 2

[Article by VECHERNYAYA MOSKVA special correspondent V. Pakhomov: "Soldiers' Greatcoats By... Rationing Coupons: The Shortage of Responsibility"]

[Text] Moscow Military District—Lieutenant-General V. Litvinov, First Deputy Chief of Rear Services of the USSR Armed Forces, provided these interesting figures at the recent meeting with Soviet and foreign journalists that took place at one of the Moscow MD [Moscow Military District] automotive battalions.

One hundred nineteen thousand tons of meat in live weight, more than 66,000 tons of milk, about 230 million eggs, 300,000 tons of grain, and 200,000 tons of potatoes (with the total value of 250 million rubles [R])—this is the 1990 yield of the Ministry of Defense's agricultural enterprises. All of this went for the planned supply of the troops.

The meat situation in the country is bad, but the army sovkhoses [state farms] somehow produce three months' supply of meat, a full year's supply of milk, seven months' supply of eggs, and four months' supply of potatoes and vegetables. There are even fishing sovkhoses in our Armed Forces.

I think it was about a year ago—we, the journalists, were told in the Kantemir Division in regard to soldiers' rations that now they were entitled to two eggs a week (relatively recently eggs were a treat reserved for holidays). Now there are four. The 175-gram meat ration was increased by 25 grams. There are now to be 900 grams of potatoes and vegetables instead of 820. There is also now 120 grams of fish—the 20-gram increase came as a replacement for 100 grams of black bread. Before, there was too much bread in the ration; at least, every year savings from unused bread came to R22 million.

One more change. The soldiers will receive 100 grams of milk daily. A daily ration of fruit juice is in the pipeline. And finally, starting 1 March, the tobacco allowance will increase to R5 a month (from the present R2).

It is not enough, however, to feed the soldier; he also needs clothes and shoes. This is where the Rear Services have run into problems as never before. An increase in wholesale prices on raw materials, materiel, and fuels; financial accountability and self-financing in industry; liquidation and reorganization of a number of ministries and departments; and, not least, a reduction in the number of line items included in state orders—all of this has led to a certain discord between the Armed Forces and various branches of the national economy.

What has it all come to if in 1990 the Army was undersupplied by a good R10 billion worth of material goods? Of the needed clothing, the Armed Forces did not receive 30,000 pairs of box calf boots, 15,000 soldiers' greatcoats, 32,000 soldiers' blouses, one-fifth of the needed winter overalls for members of tank crews, one-third of the cotton uniforms, and about 10 percent of the underwear.

TYL VOORUZHENNYKH SIL magazine recently wrote that managers of many enterprises in the light, food, and petrochemical industries demand that the Ministry of Defense provide reconstruction assistance to them before placing state orders; they also demand allocation of construction materials, automobiles, equipment, and personnel, and these demands are as a rule presented as an ultimatum.

There is no doubt that the market created additional difficulties. Merino wool that used to cost R20 a meter is now R51.76; cotton went from R4 to R7.81. But although everything became more expensive, the budget remained at the same R1.5 billion. Last year, for instance, R490 million unexpectedly had to be spent for potato purchases—agricultural enterprises in Primorye and Khabarovsk Krays and Amur Oblast were selling potatoes to military units at R0.8 to R2 a kilo instead of the 30 kopeks stipulated by the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers as the maximum contract price.

The reporters were told about some new developments. For instance, starting 1 February officers will receive R50 in discretionary allowance instead of the current R20. By the way, the last time officers' rations were revised was 41 years ago, when officers were entitled to 100 grams of meat and 80 grams of fish—half of a soldier's ration.

Taking into account the especially difficult situation in supplying the military and their family members with food in a number of regions, the minister of defense decided to provide food rations in kind for officers, petty officers, and warrant officers in the Baltic and Transcaucasus Military Districts and for all Armed Forces personnel; starting 1 January, this arrangement will expand to their family members. Of course, it would be good to provide food rations for all petty officers and warrant officers who spend most of their time in the field—where

there is nothing to buy—but with the current sad state of the economy, the state cannot provide them with this opportunity.

Military-Industrial Complex Profiled

91UM0509A Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 8, 3 Mar 91 pp 8-9

[Article by Aleksey Izyumov and Andrey Kortunov, research associates, U.S. and Canadian Studies Institute: "The Monster: A Profile of the Soviet Military-Industrial Complex"—First paragraph is introductory paragraph]

[Text] The Soviet Union is a beleaguered fortress. As far as we its citizens are concerned, this is not merely a symbol born of the Revolution, it is also the air we have breathed since 1917. For us it is a law for which we were once prepared to give our last rouble to make the fortress even more forbidding. We did so because Lenin warned us: "We are confronted by the entire bourgeois world, which is only seeking a way in which to strangle us." But how do things stand now?

The subject of this analysis is the military-industrial complex, the MIC. We are not even sure exactly what it is or where it is located. Its facilities aren't called by their real names but rather by such cryptic appellations as Chelyabinsk-40, Moscow-400, Tomsk-7, etc. We in our simplicity thought the world feared us and reckoned with us because we were building socialism. Now it appears that the world fears us because we have built a militarized society. The military is the only area where the Soviet Union is recognized as a superpower. This is the singular achievement of the Soviet system. The rest is the poverty and universal shame we have finally come to recognize.

People sometimes wonder who permitted this to happen, who did all this. But who needs permission when the CPSU and the MIC are like the closest of brothers? Even today, the CPSU Central Committee Secretary Oleg Baklanov remains high and mighty wherever military interests are discussed. Go and ask the Soviet Navy Supreme Commander why the Komsomolets atomic submarine sank. What would he say? "I cannot make any statement without permission from State Commission Chairman Oleg Baklanov."

Those who know the names of those people who order our lives and society and who really pull the economic strings, would not put such stupid questions to the man in charge of our Navy. They would not be amazed at the fact that nearly all key positions in our government are filled by men from the defence industry. Our former Premier Nikolai Ryzhkov, when still in the State Planning Committee, was in charge of the Committee's defence departments which played the key roles in the country's all-important distribution centre. Our current Premier Valentin Pavlov, when in the State Planning Committee, is on record as having extorted funds for the defence industry. What about deputy prime ministers

Yuri Maslyukov, Lev Voronin, Igor Belousov, Vitaly Doguzhiev? They are all "Fathers of the MIC. They were all propelled into the government by the CPSU Central Committee on military policy.

The same applies to all other ministers who are affiliated with the MIC in one way or another. It is an especially sorry spectacle when the whole army of them appears on state occasions wearing arrays of gold heroes' stars and Lenin Prize medals. Don't look in the official lists of awards for their names. They got them through secret channels. The MIC gives and takes on the sly. Such modesty is equalled only by that of the Communist Party. But today a general outline of the MIC is known.

Diagram

This diagram shows that the top party leaders control the defence industry and military policy. The role of the Politburo was enhanced in 1973 when the defence minister and KGB head entered it. Another agency dealing with the military policy is the Defence Council. That it exists became known only in 1976 when Leonid Brezhnev was made a marshal. Soon followed the announcement that he was also the Supreme Commander of the USSR Armed Forces. This position apparently long ago accompanied the position of General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee. When this decision was made is still unknown but both positions continue to go hand in hand.

In this hierarchy the role of the Council of Ministers is purely technical—to act on what has been decided by the Politburo. The State Planning Committee (Gosplan) operates jointly with the USSR Defence Ministry and the General Staff. Disregarding details and names, the whole pyramid is still based on the same principles and connections which existed under Stalin, who, before he died, wrote in his will (perhaps the most revealing of Marxist documents): "In order to eliminate the inevitability of war, imperialism should be destroyed."

But what we know about the MIC is probably only the tip of the iceberg. It is not in vain that one Soviet scientist called the secret system of research and development institutions working on the first Soviet atomic bomb the "white Gulag," as opposed to the Gulag—the "black Gulag." While not dissimilar in size and secrecy they functioned side by side.

Everything is relative, so they say. The MIC becomes intelligible if we compare it with the MIC of, say, the United States. An MIC which for many years was condemned here as an unsurpassed monster gobbling up American tax money. This "monster" however appears tame in comparison with our behemoth. Here are some facts.

The number of employees in the Soviet defence industry is 5-8 million. In the U.S. the figure is 2.2 million. The number of tanks turned out in the USSR each year is 4.5 times those produced in the U.S. The ratios for armoured personnel vehicles are 5 times, for artillery

pieces 9 times, for nuclear subs 3 times and for bombers twice the U.S. numbers. As for missiles, the Soviet Union is way ahead of the entire globe.

How much do we pay for all this? The official sum earmarked by the USSR Supreme Soviet for the MIC this year is 96.6 billion roubles. That is 35 percent of the USSR budget or nearly 8 percent of the GNP.

We were told for years that 20.2 billion roubles were spent on defence. Not a penny more. At long last the government admitted that the military budget was 77.3 billion roubles. Most economists think even that figure is an understatement. Our defence spending is closer to 200 billion, or nearly 20 percent of the GNP. The corresponding figure in the U.S. is 6.5 per cent and in Japan, 1 per cent.

A remarkable fact about our MIC is that it is the most unobtrusive in the world. No one knows its location, there are only secret addresses. One was "Moscow-400," but upon verification the factory was found to be located thousands of miles from Moscow. This might be unknown to the Soviet man-in-the-street but not to Western experts on the Soviet economy, even greenhorns. According to them, 80 per cent of Soviet defence factories are in the Russian Republic. Twenty per cent of the largest ones are in the Urals, 17 per cent in Central Russia, 13 per cent in the Volga-Vyatka area, and 10 per cent are in or near Leningrad. In Moscow one-third of all industries work for the military. Half of the defence research and development is done at institutions with fine names that have nothing to do with the military.

A bird's eyeview of the MIC reveals military farms, bases, airstrips, ports, proving grounds, and military compounds occupying 42 million hectares of land, or 2 percent of the country's territory.

MIC for Export

The Soviet share of the world's arms exports is 28 percent. Thirty-two per cent of Soviet-made weapons goes to the Third World.

Not just the Kalashnikov automatic rifles are exported. According to U.S. figures, in the 1980's the Soviet Union delivered to the Third World 7,925 tanks and self-propelled guns, 20,470 artillery pieces, 17 submarines, 2,620 supersonic aircraft, 1,705 helicopters, and 32,210 surface-to-air missiles. All this weaponry went to the planet's hot spots in the Middle East, Asia, Africa and Latin America. According to the American Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, from 1982 to 86 the USSR supplied arms worth 78,740 million dollars to developing countries, trained nearly 78,000 personnel from those countries and maintained there some 20,000 military advisers and experts. In the 1970s and the 1980s, Soviet arms supplies went through several slumps alternating with peaks. The experts think that the arms export slumps in 1988-89 were caused not so much by policy changes, but by the fluctuations on the world arms market. There is fear that the planned cuts in the Soviet

armed forces and armaments in the coming years may prompt the Soviet defence industry to concentrate even more on its foreign markets.

The MIC needs hard currency. That is not easy to earn, judging from past experience. For example, Algeria, Iraq, Libya and Syria repaid only 23 billion out of more than 45 billion dollars in Soviet credits for military technology, by 1 January 1989. For a long time, it was the deliveries of military equipment that made the Soviet relations with these countries profitable, and a source of hard currency. Of late these countries have insistently asked for deferment of credit repayment.

The aggressiveness of the Soviet MIC has been damaging not only to us. On many occasions its expansion deformed the political development of emerging countries and militarized their way of life. It introduced adventurism into their foreign policies. The Soviet Union must take part of the blame for the conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia, and for the Iran-Iraq war. In those wars both sides employed Soviet weaponry supplied directly by Moscow or through other countries. Soviet military aid is used by repressive regimes to put down internal opposition, national minorities and religious movements.

It is realistic to stop the MIC's actions abroad? This country has no document like the American Gun Control Bill, which in no uncertain terms says what the legislative branch can and cannot do, specifies all sorts of bans and restrictions on credits and grants. Thus all talk about stopping these activities is no more than hot air.

Did many Soviet legislators know that the MIC delivered two nuclear reactors to North Korea? Now Pyongyang can very well make its own nuclear weapons. Proof that the North Koreans are developing a nuclear bomb is that they refuse to recognize IAEA guarantees.

As for Soviet missile launchers and equipment supplied to countries including those in the Middle East, they can unfortunately be employed for chemical and bacteriological warfare.

These are obvious lessons remaining unlearned.

Hands Off

Time inevitably brought about a rather hefty disturbance to the MIC: radically-minded officers among the MPs came out with a draft project for a reform within the armed forces. These officers have caused a lot of trouble for the military top brass. The latter were disturbed by the news about the activity of a group of MPs led by Yuri Ryzhov, commissioned by the USSR Supreme Soviet to

develop the general conception of the Soviet Union's national security. Even the rough draft version promised very little good for the military, it seemed. The "500 Days" programme for transition to a market economy was another headache. The power of the MIC seemed to be dwindling. After all, it topped the list of budget cut priorities. And press articles by some renowned scientists promoted the idea of a thorough conversion involving removal of the shroud of secrecy from large defence-industry plants and turning them into an open and market-oriented economy.

The onslaught was powerful indeed. Some optimists believed that the days of the omnipotence of the MIC were numbered. But then all the MIC's men came out to defend it—from the prime minister to a manager of a factory in the Tambov Region producing cloth for military great-coats. Threats, insulting the "non-professionals," and downright blackmail were employed. PRAVDA published in September 1990 an article which can be virtually called an MIC manifesto with a clearly discernible appeal: "Hands off the MIC!". Then we saw the true extent of the might of the monster.

What was the result? Overnight the president gave up the "500 Days" programme, the chairman of the Supreme Soviet dismissed Yuri Ryzhov's group as "having fulfilled its task," and the USSR Supreme Soviet voted in a new military budget which was 26 billion roubles larger than for the previous year. The MIC offered a simple enough explanation for that: everything was getting ever costlier.

The victory was complete. Whereas in the past the might of the MIC was accounted for by its unbreakable ties with the CPSU, today it actively recruits all political circles involved with it, to assist it in this struggle. The proof of that is the "Letter of the 53" to the latest Congress of USSR People's Deputies.

The MIC's former top managers—directors-general, and economic ministers—remain a pillar of support for the MIC on the topmost level. The MIC was always one of the sources of cadres of the ruling nomenklatura. Only the "glorious Lenin Komsomol" could compete with the MIC in this respect. The "alumni" of the MIC remain in key posts. The military and the top figures in the defence industry form the overwhelming majority in the Defence and National Security committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Among its members there's no civil lawyer or economist. This would be an unthinkable situation for any Western parliament, where the nomination of a head of a defence-industry complex as chairman of the parliament's committee for matters of national defence would be taken only as a bad joke.

Soviet/U.S. ICBMS*

Type of ICBM	Number Deployed	Warheads	Max Range (km)	Launch Mode	Country
SS-11 MOD 2	380	1	13,000	Hot	USSR
SS-11 MOD 3	380	3MIRVs	10,600	Hot	USSR
SS-13 MOD 2	60	1	9,400	Hot	USSR
SS-17 MOD 3	110	4MIRVs	10,000	Cold	USSR
SS-18 MOD 4/5	308	10+ MIRVs	11,000	Cold	USSR
SS-19 MOD 3	320	6 MIRVs	10,000	Hot	USSR
SS-24 MOD 1/2	About 58	10 MIRVs	10,000	Cold	USSR
SS-25	About 170	1	10,500	Cold	USSR
Minuteman II	450	1	12,500	Hot	USA
Minuteman III	500	3	11,000+	Hot	USA
Peacekeeper	50	up to 10	11,000+	Cold	USA

*As of mid 1989

Soviet/North American Air Defense Interceptor Aircraft¹

Type of Aircraft	Max Speed (MACH)	Radius (km)	Armament	Wingspan (M)	Country
MiG-25 FOXBAT E	2.8	1,450	4 AAMs	14	USSR
Su-15 FLAGON E/F	2.0	1,000	4 AAMs	9	USSR
Su-27 FLANKER	2.0	1,500	6 AAMs	14	USSR
Tu-128 ² FIDDLER B	1.5	1,500	4 AAMs	18	USSR
Yak-28 ² FIREBAR	1.8	900	2 AAMs	12	USSR
MiG-23 FLOGGER B/G	2.3	1,150	6 AAMs	8(Swept)	USSR
MiG-29 FULCRUM	2.3	1,150	6 AAMs	12	USSR
MiG-31 FOXHOUND	2.4	2,100	8 AAMs	14	USSR
F-106A DELTA DART	2.0	1,110	5 AAMs	12	USA
F-15A EAGLE	2.5	1,200	8 AAMs	13	USA
F-15C ³ EAGLE	2.5	1,770	8 AAMs	13	USA
F-16 FIGHTING FALCON	2.0	1,240	4 AAMs	10	USA
CF-18 ⁴ HORNET	1.8	1,170	6 AAMs	12	USA

¹Subsonic area intercept with external fuel²No external fuel³With conformal fuel tanks⁴Canadian

Soviet/U.S. Main Battle Tanks

Type of Tank	Weight (MT)	Speed (km/hr) ¹	Main Armament	Muzzle Velocity (MPS)	Country
T-54/55	36	40	100-mm	1,500	USSR
T-62	37	40	115-mm	1,600	USSR
T-64 A/B	35	50	125-mm	1,750	USSR
T-72 M1	41	50	125-mm	1,750	USSR
T-60	42	55	125-mm	1,750	USSR
M-60A 1/3	51	50	105-mm	1,500	USA
M-1/M-1A1 ABRAMS	55	65	105-mm/120-mm	1,500/1,660	USA

¹Revised to reflect new information

Deputy Scores Military-Industrial Complex

91UM0509B Moscow MOSCOW NEWS in English
No 8, 3 Mar 91 p 9

[Interview with Academician and USSR People's Deputy Yuriy Ryzhov by MOSCOW NEWS analyst Yuriy Teplyakov: "In Place of an Epilogue". Date and place not given. First paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] A competent opinion can never be superfluous. When this article was ready for print, MN analyst Yuri Teplyakov showed it to Academician Yuri Ryzhov, USSR people's deputy, and asked for his comment.

According to Ryzhov, "the information in this article only strengthened my belief that we are not simply a militarized economy, but what's more, our national economy is reminiscent of that of a country in a state of war. Until now it has operated on the principle of giving defence whatever it needs, rather than what can be given. It only seems that this country has been in peace times since the end of WWII. In fact, it is still fighting! We continue to rally all efforts for the sake of the fighting. Only MIC rejects to go towards meeting the needs of people, to support our daily existence."

[Teplyakov] "Why this misanthropic philosophy and our listless acceptance of it?"

[Ryzhov] "Since 1917 we have been instructed that the safety of the state is the issue of supreme importance. Remember the slogan: 'The Socialist Motherland Is in Danger!'. People were way down below. However the normal pyramid of a civilized society is reversed: first come human rights and personal security. The state itself exists for the sake of convenience of individuals. But it is different with us: a pauperized nation can be controlled only with the help of a constantly maintained image of a potential enemy. They try to intimidate us with the threat of death, because only death can be worse than life in the Soviet state."

"The country is run not simply by the military-industrial complex, but by a military-ideological complex. What are its parts? Of course, the top crust of the CPSU—from the General Secretary down to secretaries of city party committees. Then, the key figures of the national economy. I mean the entire national economy, and not only its nine defence industries. Plus the military top brass, and topping it all off is the KGB."

"All that is entangled into a tight nexus. They were perfectly cozy under a 'war-time' economy. Everything was attainable to them. Everything was excused. They were their own judges. No outside arbiter over them was possible. When they say that the main thing is the good of the country, they mean the country where they so comfortably thrive."

[Teplyakov] "Do you mean to say that it is useless to expect them to accept democracy?"

[Ryzhov] "They hate democracy. The very breeze of democratic changes is anathema to them. They wouldn't be able to maintain their power under a democracy."

[Teplyakov] "But there was some movement towards more democracy. Do you remember how we experienced a bit of freedom?"

[Ryzhov] "That was not a step towards freedom but rather a step away from catastrophe: it was motivated by a fear of collapse of the system on its own accord. Mikhail Gorbachev seemed to believe that he could steer the same old ship along a difficult course into the open sea. Something was jettisoned in order to decrease the ship's draught. But as soon as they saw that the crew was getting out of control, they started a return to the past. In my opinion, the turn back began in the autumn of 1989."

"But it is not a matter of Gorbachev's role alone. You mustn't think that only the KGB and the CPSU are militarized. With us, the very Soviet power was built according to a military blueprint. The intellect of the parliament and its MPs is idle. In fact, MPs were needed only as a front to conceal operations by some other figures."

[Teplyakov] "I have the impression that you yourself have experienced that."

[Ryzhov] "I have. Last March I gave the president 10 pages describing my concept of national security. I wrote that there's more to it than just the military. I believe that national security is comprised of economy, ecology, culture, and information. Priorities can vary in the course of time. The state, like a family, must be able to assess its resources and choose where to employ them at any given moment to the greatest benefit. A commission of MPs was specially set up for the development of this concept."

"What came of it? Before the Washington visit, I asked the president about the fate of my report. He said: 'I'm still reading it and you can have my opinion about it tomorrow, from Anatoly Lukyanov.' Soon afterwards, Lukyanov let me know that the president decided to dismiss the commission because it had fulfilled its mission. The MPs had to return to work at their original committees."

"That was the end of the drama about a new conception of national security. The president is treating this issue like the former CPSU Central Committee General Secretaries: security is the army and the KGB."

"I was not surprised. That was quite consistent. In a war-time society everything which encroaches on its main pillars must be dumped. But that's a dead end."

[Teplyakov] "One man can make a mistake. But all the presidential advisers together?"

[Ryzhov] "There are increasingly fewer competent people in the president's entourage. This is not a chance occurrence. I explain it through the president's personal

character, his biography. Perhaps he wants to have someone like Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev (who is his military adviser) near him. He wants this type: middling, preferably not very high competence. Perhaps that is not the president's whim. It is rather a social necessity. Such people are closer to Gorbachev and he prefers to deal with them, because he feels some kinship with them."

[Teplyakov] "Why did you single out Akhromeyev?"

[Ryzhov] "Because he continues to say that a military threat to this country is still on. This belief explains all our actions and all the power which the MIC wields. But let's face the truth. Who wants to harm us? Who wants to conquer a country with a dislocated economy and an insensible population? Who would even think of it? It would be easier for 'imperialism' to buy us up lock, stock, and barrel. It would be more profitable to buy us up through a system of trade. The West dictates its conditions. We, like any third-world nation, would be glad to receive even a small positive effect."

[Teplyakov] "Is it possible that Akhromeyev or anyone else among the top figures of the MIC can't see the forthcoming doom?"

[Ryzhov] "Of course they can see it. For example, everyone of them sees the pernicious effect of monopoly rule in the economy. But they prefer to keep that monopoly all the same, because it is the only way for them to survive. Theirs is the role of the lumpen. All of our society has been lumpenized: from labourer all the way up to president. Everyone is afraid to even peep into the future."

"The military top brass know the real value of the army and its arsenal. Incidentally, they opposed the U.S. Star Wars project for that very reason: the technological level involved in the project was unattainable for the USSR either materially or intellectually. The project could nullify the importance of the Soviet Union's nuclear-missile potential ensuring the current parity of forces. To maintain this parity was the ultimate goal, for which we spared no effort and impoverished the country."

[Teplyakov] "So is it true that the MIC was the stumbling block for the president in his radical reform?"

[Ryzhov] "My answer is that the MIC was not the least important factor in the prevention of the development of democratization. At the start of perestroika, we tried to convince Gorbachev that a non-privatized economy would collapse, and that the arms race in which we were involved through the force of circumstances and by our own efforts was too much for us. At first, Gorbachev listened to us and the world felt this. Politicians spoke not only about coexistence but even about the Soviet Union's integration into the world community. There was a certain improvement in the situation abroad. But no internal changes have pulled through. The people

representing certain forces capable of energizing the military machine remained. Everything inside the country stayed the same, even the people in key positions. They immediately manifested their presence in power as soon as the real threat to the MIC emerged."

"That was noticed by us here as well as by the Western public."

[Teplyakov] "What's to be done? Should we all simply give up and die?"

[Ryzhov] "Even in the best-case scenario, we will need decades in order to fight the monster from the past. But we will fight all the same. Either we overpower the MIC, or it continues to oppress us. Our generation will not live long enough to see the joy of our victory. However, it is quite possible that our grandchildren will ask 'what's an MIC?', just like today children ask 'what's a dinosaur?'"

Special Purpose Medical Detachments Created

91UM0367A Moscow TRUD in Russian 25 Jan 91 p 4

[Interview with Col A. Tereshenkov, deputy chief of medical service of the Turkestan Military District, by V. Biryukov, under the rubric "Mini-Interview": "Medical 'Special Purpose'"]

[Text] Tashkent—Military medics are ordinarily among the first to arrive at the scene of earthquakes, flooding and other natural disasters. They will now be there to help even more rapidly. An order issued by the nation's minister of defense has established five special purpose medical detachments: in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Khabarovsk and Tashkent. Col A. Tereshenkov, deputy chief of medical service of the Turkestan Military District has shared some information on them:

[Tereshenkov] The Tashkent detachment is based at the district hospital. The new subunit has special equipment, a supply of fuels and lubricants, medicine and food. The detachment can operate autonomously for three months, handling up to 400 sick and injured.

[Biryukov] Operate within the borders of our republic?

[Tereshenkov] Anywhere in the nation. In extraordinary situations, even abroad. And it can be relocated not just by rail or air, but also by means of its own transport equipment. All of the detachment's operations are coordinated with those of civil defense units.

[Biryukov] What kind of incentives are provided for the personnel to work under extraordinary conditions?

[Tereshenkov] Increased pay rates. Recent exercises have shown that the medics have to work far harder when providing assistance to victims of earthquakes, floods and industrial accidents than under ordinary circumstances. Add to this the inevitable personal hardships, the separation from family and friends....

Deserter Collection Company in Kiev MD

91UM0402A Moscow NEDELYA in Russian No 8,
18-24 Feb 91 p 7

[Article by Lieutenant Colonel V. Sitovskiy, Red Banner Kiev Military District: "A Collection Company of Deserters."]

[Text] We did not have anything like this in our army before. A new military unit has come into existence; one that was not foreseen by any table of organization of the Armed Forces.

During a quarter of a century of army service I have never even heard an idea about such a company. This is why I set off for the regiment which temporarily adopted this unusual unit.

...A man in civilian clothes addressed Captain Yuriy Tanislavskiy: "Where do you receive deserters here?" "Why? Did you come here with your son?" asked the captain with interest. "No, I came to give myself up."

This is how Private Vyacheslav Denisenko, who had previously been serving in the Leningrad Military District, arrived at the collection company. What was it that forced him to leave his military unit?

Denisenko has had a difficult life. Corrective labor colony, illnesses, several operations, and then an unhappy assignment to a construction battalion where his colleagues took a dislike to him and used to beat him up. Denisenko requested transfers to other units, wrote to several People's Deputies, as well as to the Union of Writers, the military commissariat where he was inducted, and to the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet. Some could not make a decision on his case, others did not want to. The desperate soldier deserted the construction battalion.

In a television program called "Soldier's Glory" [Slava soldatskaya], he saw and heard a general who announced that a subunit was being formed, which would be a collection company for servicemen who leave their military units without authorization. And so, Denisenko set off for this company.

As of now, there are 150 soldiers in the deserters' company. The biographies of some of them are more complicated than the one we talked about. But here is a very simple one. Private V. Sidoruk deserted the unit where he began his military service, and in January arrived at the collection company with his mother. He tried to convince the commanders that he wants to serve only in the Kiev military district, but in two days he deserted again... Private V. Kuchigura departed his unit without authorization in October, and since that time has been hiding out with friends; his parents brought him to the company. On the second day he deserted from this company as well. They brought him back, but during the night he succeeded in running off again... Many such examples can be given.

The Armed Forces, as our entire society, needs perestroika and renewal. It would seem that a humane individual approach is necessary for each person. The collection company somehow helps soldiers find themselves, deal with their desertion; it tries to understand them and to find a way to resolve their conflicts.

Major-General A. Pletenets, Chief of Administration of the Staff of the Kiev Military District comments, as follows:

"Of course, a subunit such as this one was not formed because the soldiers lead a good life. The flow of deserters has increased. These people do not know where to turn after they have realized what they have done. If they show up at a military headquarters, they are placed in confinement. The prosecutors' offices send them back to the headquarters again. Many come to the unit in civilian clothing and without documents. Each case has to be dealt with on some legal grounds... The deserters arrive nearly every day. They have to be clothed, fed, and housed, and we have to find out the details as to why they left their units."

"At present we have competent officers working in the deserters' company. They talk with each person and listen to their explanations (of course, they verify the circumstances). The servicemen who claim to be sick are reevaluated by medics. Those who are found fit for army duty are sent out to different units. As for true deserters, they are handed over to investigative organs. No one has rescinded the law on military obligation."

Officers Apply To Stay in Transbaykal Rather Than Europe

PM0104105091 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA
in Russian 23 Mar 91 First Edition p 1

[Report from A. Dolgikh roundup of correspondents' reports under the rubric "Army and Navy: News Service": "Europe Is Fine, But the Transbaykal Is Better"]

[Text] More than one-fourth of the total number of political worker officers due for a move from the Transbaykal Military District this year have requested an extension of their term of service in the Transbaykal.

KRASNAYA ZVEZDA's correspondent was told this by Colonel V. Olovyanikov, chief of the personnel department of the district's military-political directorate. It is, frankly, an interesting fact. Nothing of the kind had been known until recently.

The district's personnel directorate has received even more applications containing similar requests. Staffers on the personnel organs see the reason for this in the instability of the political situation in a number of western regions of the country, the unbridled anti-Army campaign, and the discrimination against servicemen.

20 Estonian 'Service Evaders' in Finland

91UM0435A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* in Russian 7 Mar 91 p 3

[Unattributed TASS report: "The Fugitive—An Uninvited Guest"]

[Text] In Finland there are about 20 residents of Estonia who refuse to be drafted into the Soviet Army. All of them hope to be granted political asylum there. Each one has his own story, but they all have something in common, something that is strange at first glance: Virtually all of them wound up in Finland unintentionally. What they had in mind was to utilize the country as a stopover on their way to the West. Some of them were able to get from Finland to Holland, others to Sweden, Denmark, or Norway. However, their hopes of being welcomed with open arms did not materialize. The uninvited guests were deported back to Finland. They succumbed to a rule in force in many countries, whereby political asylum must be requested in the first country in which the requester arrives after leaving his homeland.

"Permission for residence or political asylum," stated Risto Veyalaynen, chief of the Center for Affairs of Foreigners, "can be granted only if there are adequate grounds for concluding that the requester is subject to danger in his homeland. This may be a threat to life or infringement of the inviolability of a person. Refusal to enter military service of and by itself does not constitute a basis for the granting of political asylum, either here in Finland, or in other countries. In Sweden there is even a special governmental decree dealing with this kind of situation."

Procurators on Fulfilling Military Service Law in Uzbekistan

91UM0437B Tashkent *PRAVDA VOSTOKA* in Russian 11 Jan 91 p 3

[Unattributed UzTAG report: "In the Uzbek SSR Procuracy: Guarding Law Fulfillment"; first paragraph is PRAVDA VOSTOKA introduction]

[Text] An expanded coordinating conference of law enforcement agency leaders of the Uzbek SSR was held in the Uzbek SSR Procuracy, with the participation of representatives of the Military Procuracy of the Turkistan Military District and of military commissariats of the republic. The topic of discussion was problems associated with implementation of the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation.

Work involving fulfillment of this law is still replete with serious omissions and rough spots. Major shortcomings have been uncovered in the way health agencies and military commissariats are discharging their responsibility in health care and preparation of republic youth for military service. There is a noticeable increase in number of draft-age youths afflicted with illnesses that limit their suitability for service and that constitute an

obstacle to callup. Procuracy agencies have been informing party and soviet organs of violations of the indicated law by military commissariats, soviet and state organs, and public organizations, and they have been taking urgent measures to eliminate these violations.

The difficult interethnic situation necessitates devoting more attention to international education of youth and to the molding of a high cultural level of interethnic relations. Also beset with problems is the matter of moral education of youths. Unfortunately, there is a growing number of persons on record in internal affairs agencies, persons convicted of violations, those addicted to alcohol and narcotics. Individual treatment for them has been far from adequate. The Army as a result is the recipient of draftees who tend to commit delinquencies and crimes; they violate nonregulation relations, practice hazing of younger recruits, and create an unhealthy atmosphere, one which tends to be conducive to criminal activity in military units.

In this connection, cases of antiarmy propaganda have increased in frequency, and individual citizens for one reason or another refuse to carry out their constitutional duty. This has given rise to an increase in number of reports flowing from military commissariats to procuracy offices. Pretrial and judicial investigations of persons who refuse to heed the draft call indicate that the republic for a number of years has not exhibited an increase in number of citizens evading service in the ranks of the Soviet Army. It was brought out in the conference that the sending of this kind of report to the Procuracy is often done without benefit of legal procedure. The leaders of certain local military administration agencies are not always cognizant of the requirements set by the legal rules, which establish a basis of responsibility for violation of USSR laws and specify the procedure to be followed in their application. They exhibit a tendency to be inconsistent in ascertaining the causes behind citizen failure to report to military commissariats, and they fail to collaborate with internal affair agencies in organizing a search for these persons.

Failure to respond to the callup, as stressed at the conference, constitutes a socially harmful act; every person who refuses to fulfill his constitutional obligation should be brought to justice as prescribed by law. In this connection, military commissariats are remiss in collaborating with other state and law enforcement agencies in carrying out work of a law awareness, educational, and military patriotic nature. Youths of predraft and draft age and their parents are poorly informed of the draftee's rights and duties and of the latter's liability for failure to live up to the requirements of the law.

Conference participants set down measures designed to eliminate the causes leading to violation of the Law on Universal Military Obligation. It was recommended that city and rayon procurators improve their coordination with military commissariats; maintain constant supervision over determined efforts to eliminate any violations

that are discovered; and monitor especially closely the observance of laws associated with the call to active military service.

Procuracy and internal affairs agencies and military commissariats were charged with carrying out joint analyses of the results of each callup; executing all work dealing with prevention of law violations with maximum

openness; and providing timely and complete information to the public, labor and training collectives on the form and content of tasks in progress. The participants stressed the need to inculcate respect for the law and its requirements; and to mobilize organizational and citizen efforts geared to overcoming negative phenomena in civic and ethical nurturing of adolescents and youth.

Efficiency of U.S. Air Transport during War

91UM05204 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
29 Mar 91 First Edition p 3

[Unattributed editorial response to reader inquiry from N. Balashov: "Efficiency of VTA".]

[Text] *An almost half million man grouping of troops was concentrated by the USA in Saudi Arabia over a half year. Did not the primary burden, obviously, lay on aviation for this?* N. Balashov, Minsk.

Since 7 August 1990 up to the beginning of combat operations in mid-January 1991 a 385,400 man personnel component and 318,300 tons to freight were transported into the Persian Gulf area via the efforts of U.S. military transport aviation and civilian aircraft chartered by the Air Force. Half of the freight—5,440 aircraft flights—were carried on C-141s, also one fourth—on C-5s, and the remainder on C-130s, KC-10s and civil aviation aircraft (which completed 1,900 flights).

The main portion of heavy armaments and combat equipment, as well as a portion of the personnel, in the first instance, Marines were delivered into the Persian Gulf area by sea transport.

Answer prepared from materials from ARMED FORCES JOURNAL.

Reliability of Coalition Casualty Figures Questioned

91UM04544 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 8 Mar 91
Union Edition p 6

[Article by IZVESTIYA Correspondent V. Nadein, Washington: "Our Colonel Said: 'I Do Not Believe It!' What the Conflict in the Persian Gulf has Demonstrated"]

[Text] THE WALL STREET JOURNAL newspaper cited the words of USSR People's Deputy Nikolay Petrushenko as the highest praise to the precision and effectiveness of allied weapons. "I do not believe the official reports about Coalition losses," the newspaper, citing a TASS report, quoted the words of this colonel who has gained international notoriety. "Only an extremely naive person could believe that the United States has lost 80 personnel during the month and a half long preparations for this war at the same time that during a little over a month of combat operations a total of only 70 killed and wounded have been announced."

The newspaper cited a clarification. According to official data, as of last Sunday Coalition forces have lost 145 killed in action, including 95 Americans. Another 58 U.S. servicemen have died outside the area of combat operations but during the war. Finally, 105 Americans who arrived in the Persian Gulf died as a result of various types of accidents prior to the initiation of combat.

Although the numbers cited by the newspaper are somewhat different than those that Colonel N. Petrushenko used, they still remain within the limits of the proportion that caused his doubt, or, more precisely, his accusation. Because the official data which "only a very naive person" can believe is, simply speaking, officially planted deception.

This may seem strange but THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, a solid newspaper and the mouthpiece, as we used to like to say, of American rich men, does not waste its energy refuting the charges of a Soviet military expert. And I can guess why—because there is no need to.

Alas, in this case it is hard for me to support my fellow countryman's stance. I have to simply admit that a game with combat losses numbers and a desire to transfer numbers from one column to another column that is nicer for accounting purposes is not at all inherent to the Western armies and, in particular, to the U.S. Army. What is more, it is practically impossible to ferret out amateurs here.

Begin with the fact that literally the next day the mass media publishes the names, positions, ranks, and locations from where the victims entered the Army (I remind you: They entered and were not drafted since the country's armed forces are organized on a professional basis). Each local television station news broadcast ends in silence with scrolling subtitles with the names of the dead.

They also openly, without restrictions, and immediately announce the names of prisoners of war. They talk about them as heroes and they are proud of them—even those who condemned this war on Baghdad television and who asked the Iraqi people for forgiveness. Television viewers hardly consider their fellow countrymen traitors, they sympathize with them, understanding how difficult it is for the prisoners of war. It has not even entered their heads to debate if they should "rehabilitate" those who have been captured since prisoners of war in the United States receive their normal salaries, they can be promoted to the next rank, etc. during their entire time in captivity.

Under conditions when information about losses is reliably controlled by society, the tendency to deceive one's own country is reliably blocked. But if you nevertheless make the effort and suggest that the command authorities are consciously underestimating information on the dead by a factor of two to three (an error of one to two souls, you understand, does not change the main ratios), then it is not difficult to predict the end result: A public scandal, congressional hearings, and retirement of the guilty parties no matter how high the posts are that they occupy.

I admit that these fleeting observations of the civilian world will appear to be unconvincing to Colonel Petrushenko and to some of his colleagues from the operational-tactical point of view. However, an accurate assessment

of the results of the just completed war in the Gulf is too important, first of all for us ourselves.

In this connection, many Western experts are arriving at the conclusion that the outcome of the conflict in the Gulf region has placed before the Soviet military the long urgent need to review both military doctrine, the principles of forming an army and, in particular, repudiation of the emphasis on the massive use of motorized rifle and armored units that has remained unchanged since World War II.

However, the use of computer, laser, and microwave technology must become even more important for the army's transition to the state of being equipped with modern equipment. Inasmuch as reliable modern defense does not exist outside these components, American commentators predict an increase of demands from the Soviet military for a larger share of the country's national product. In so doing, many experts stress that direct budget injections are only capable of increasing the number of already excess tanks but will not bring about a turning point in the production of the latest technical systems.

Many local newspapers cite Marshal D. Yazov's statement that the best models of Soviet (and French) military equipment did not undergo a proper test since they were poorly operated. Practically no one denies this. However, here the military technology gap is calculated to be at least one generation.

According to American experts, this latest war will be energetically and painstakingly studied by the Soviet military. The question, which no one here dares answer, is whether or not the USSR will find the material capabilities to produce a new spurt in weapons technology.

Living Conditions of Bundeswehr Officers Viewed

91UM0448.1 Moscow ARGUMENTY I FAKTY
in Russian No 9, Mar 91, p. 5

[Article by ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent Yu. Sigov, under the rubric "No One in the Bundeswehr is Dying to Serve Abroad": "How a Bundeswehr Officer Lives"]

[Text] ARGUMENTY I FAKTY Correspondent Yu. Sigov describes how the professional officer corps' problems of everyday life and military service are being resolved in the armed forces of the FRG [Federal Republic of Germany]—the Bundeswehr.

Lieutenant Colonel Konrad Freitag is a 45 year-old German Air Force regular officer. He voluntarily entered the army at the age of 19, immediately after graduating from school, and has been serving in the army since that time. Later, he studied officer courses for 13 months near Munich where he was promoted to the rank of junior lieutenant and then he studied at the Air Force military university for four years.

He Was Given Orders Assigning Him... to Bavaria

Upon graduation from military educational institutions, officer assignments in the FRG depend on the candidates' specialization and qualifications and there are no "exile" or "privileged" duty locations in Germany. Nevertheless, there is an area where every military man wants to end up—in Bavaria—because of its beautiful environment and good climate. As they joke in the Bundeswehr, its officer corps is divided into two groups: "Those who are already serving in Bavaria and those who are dreaming about it."

While determining an assignment, the military school leadership considers the availability of housing for officers: Therefore, many of them begin serving after they have been allocated housing. It is interesting that no one in the Bundeswehr is dying to serve abroad, although FRG troops are deployed to Italy, Belgium, and France. For example, K. Freitag served in Belgium for five years but complained to me that there was no German school there for the children and there was no job for his wife. And there is no difference whatsoever in a Bundeswehr officer's salary at home or abroad.

"To Marry a Captain"

K. Freitag has been serving in the army for 26 years. He receives nearly 5,000 marks per month (average salary in the country is 3,500 marks). Using this money, he has to pay for his winter military uniform (900 marks), raincoat, and officer's overcoat. In its turn, the ministry of defense pays each officer 30 marks per month for cleaning clothing and shoes.

Konrad's wife works as a teacher for three days a week and earns 800 marks per month. They have two children, the son is the oldest and is also a Bundeswehr officer and he lives apart from his parents.

After the war, the military profession was unpopular in Germany for a long time. Right now, as Frau Freitag told me, it is considered quite prestigious for a German woman to marry an officer. Incidentally, only lawyers and journalists are ahead of the military on the list of attractive professions for young people in the FRG. The majority of officers' wives in the FRG do not work because they prefer to work only in their professions and they will not serve as librarians, waitresses, or barmaids at a military garrison. In general among officers beginning with the rank of captain, wives often stop working since the husband's salary is entirely adequate to provide normal, comfortable circumstances for the family.

A German officer's work day is strictly standardized. In peacetime, he cannot exceed 42 hours per week (this figure reaches 70 hours per week in the air force but a serviceman receives additional pay or additional leave for this).

A Bundeswehr officer's maximum leave time is 35 days which does not include Sundays and Saturdays after the fourth Saturday of the month. Furthermore, an officer is

authorized to take two compensatory leaves or "administrative days" per year to resolve personal problems. A Bundeswehr officer can go wherever he likes while on leave, including abroad. Restrictions on foreign travel only apply to conflict zones. As Konrad told me, there are no restrictions for German officers on contact with foreigners.

An Officer's Family Purchases an Apartment

The Freitag family lives near Cologne which is a 40 minute drive from Konrad's duty location and rents a two-story house with 110 m² of living space. It is a seven room house with three bedrooms, a kitchen, and a large hallway. Leasing the house costs the officer's family 1,100 marks per month. When a Bundeswehr officer is transferred to a new duty location, he is not offered any housing whatsoever—he himself has to find housing that is commensurate with his own financial resources. At the same time, there is a special service at each military unit that has the addresses of suitable housing. It informs officers about houses that are for rent and about offers on houses that are for sale.

In the Bundeswehr, there are no privileges or benefits whatsoever for officers to receive housing, including for generals. They receive nearly 10,000 marks per month but they are also obliged to look for suitable housing for their own families and, accordingly, to pay for it themselves. Incidentally, officers do not particularly strive to become generals in the Bundeswehr—this is really a

great responsibility. As for "generals' privileges," personal automobiles with chauffeurs are provided to officers in the Bundeswehr beginning with the rank of division commander. The general does not have a batman and he needs to obtain authorization from the command authorities for his wife to ride in the official car.

"And I Am Not Afraid of a Pension"

Officers in the Bundeswehr serve on contracts that are normally signed for a period of from two to fifteen years. But if he desires, an officer may leave the army or retire at any time prior to the expiration of the contract's term, however, in that case he will not receive a pension. Pension payment amounts are large and therefore, having concluded a contract, a Bundeswehr officer as a rule serves the prescribed time period, even if he dislikes the conditions of his service for some reason.

K. Freitag told me that neither he nor his colleagues are afraid of retiring. Bundeswehr officers who retire are still quite capable people 40-42 years old who have technical skills and who have experience working with subordinates. And that is why many private firms and state institutions are interested in them. Usually, a German officer who is retiring has several favorable offers to work for a "civilian" firm.

As for the size of officer pensions, they can reach 75 percent of the last salary and no maximum pension or salary ceiling is prescribed in the event a Bundeswehr officer works for a "civilian" firm.

Conversion at 'Uran' Plant

91UM05024 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
26 March 91 First Edition p 2

[Article by Reserve Captain V. Nesterenko: "Conversion in Action: 'Uran's' Reserve Orbit"]

[Text] 'Uran' can trace its beginnings back to Petrine times when in 1716, where today's shops are, a sugar plant began its operations. One and a half centuries later was established—using modern terminology—a machine-building enterprise called "Old Lessner" [Staryy Lessner]. Subsequently, the first domestic automobile engines were assembled there, and collaboration with the military departments began in 1870. After the revolution, military equipment was repaired here, and after the shift to production of various military components the enterprise became a classified facility.

Now when the military budget is decreasing and orders for military production are becoming very problematical and to a certain extent holding no prospects for the future, 'Uran,' if it does not have a well-considered approach to its participation in conversion, could be in a losing position. Examples abound of military plants beginning to produce irons instead of tanks or metal bedsprings instead of aircraft. This is why serious thought was given at 'Uran,' well ahead of time, to a "reserve orbit."

Modern technology for home and family, something that the West has had for a long time now, is not simply in short supply in our country. In reality it does not exist. It was on this problem in particular that 'Uran' focused all its efforts. For example, a kitchen machine has been developed here that can automate and mechanize work not only in a private home kitchen, but in a communal kitchen as well. Another development by the firm is essentially a new agricultural machinery system comprised of nine machines. Its experimental testing in the fields of the Leningrad oblast gave astounding results: attachments for exact sowing, improved machinery for working the soil, and other innovations increased the harvest of various agricultural products by one and a half to two times!

There are also unique developments in the area of medical equipment. Together with experts of the Military-Medical Academy imeni S.M. Kirov, the enterprise developed 26 different instruments needed not only by military clinics and hospitals, but also by ordinary hospitals. And a device that has no equivalent in the world, a compact biostimulator that restores the muscular activity of people who lead a limited ambulatory life or who have spent a long time lying on hospital cots, has also aroused the interest of specialists in space medicine.

The biostimulator, however, which incidentally had been developed back in the 1970's, the agricultural machines, and much more that 'Uran' could contribute to the national economy within the framework of conversion, still exist only in the form of proposals. The

fault now lies in not being able to understand the economic system. In order to produce the agricultural machinery system, for example, rolled metal is needed, but delivery is possible only with the "blessing" of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukrainian SSR. There is, alas, no blessing. Because component parts were not delivered, it looks as if a similar fate awaits the electric mixer which could otherwise be competition for the "Philips" Company which recently established itself in Leningrad. Even what 'Uran' could produce under today's difficult conditions is, strangely enough, not given approval. The firm proposed to outfit just a few municipal polyclinics with modern equipment, but the Leningrad administration of public health has maintained a stony silence.

According to G. Korsakov, 'Uran's' general director, the firm can make ends meet even without all this production. But who will win in this situation? For a more-or-less tolerable existence, it is enough for the enterprise to produce the components and equipment that were left on the conveyor belt after "disarmament," and for which there is an established demand. One example is the deep water device, "Deniz," which was especially sought after by specialists from "Kaspmorneft" [Caspian Sea Oil enterprise] in order to be able to monitor the condition of underwater pipelines. Another is the stationary apparatus designed to monitor the condition of the bottom of a water area in places where water is drawn off.

But is it wise to limit the opportunities of a "defense" enterprise? After all, what a productive potential is being left overboard in a disintegrating economy!

Looking at the lathes working in an automated setting, capable of quickly converting to production of numerous goods, one cannot help but be amazed at the ineptness of our economic thinking about this fast-paced and—most importantly—essential period of readjustment.

Leningrad Tank Plant Praised for 'Proper' Conversion

PM0204141991 Moscow Central Television Vostok
Program and Orbita Networks in Russian 1530 GMT
25 Mar 91

[From the "Vremya" newscast: Report by V. Batalov and V. Zhuravlev, identified by caption]

[Text]

[Announcer] Now to turn to the subject of conversion. What are we getting out of it? A lot, or not that much? At any rate, in my view, considerably less than we might. And perhaps because, for instance, airplane plants are producing bicycles and baby carriages. Of course this is a useful job, and bicycles and baby carriages are useful things. But in any event we should not, in my view, be using electronics to solve simple problems. That is what makes another example—of proper conversion—all the more pleasant.

[Reporter] The defense role of one of the country's oldest plants is becoming a thing of the past. Tanks have been repaired here for decades. [Video shows plant interior] In due course the combat vehicles will be replaced on the military production lines by trucks and electric trains. Models of civilian vehicles based on tanks have already been manufactured and displayed at international exhibitions. They are intended for operations under extreme conditions—earthquakes, accidents, and fires. Now the military enterprise is getting to grips with a new profession—the military production lines are going to produce 250 railcars a year because the Riga plant is unable to meet the demand from railroad workers by itself. [Video shows A.A. Zaytsev, chief of the Oktyabr Railroad, identified by caption]

[Zaytsev] In the space of three years around 50 million rubles will have to be invested. But we won't just be investing it. We will have to farm out the manufacture of many parts and components to other enterprises. The good thing about Leningrad is that there's a large defense industry here and the directors we are negotiating with are really getting on with the job, so to speak.

[Reporter] It seems that this former defense enterprise will soon be getting its second wind. And this will make it possible to go some way toward meeting the country's demand for railcars.

Reduction in Military Factory Representatives

91UM05194 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian
28 Mar 91 First Edition p 4

[Deputy Superintendent of USSR State Acceptance A. Shomov response to a question from Lieutenant-Colonel

A. Kuzovikhin, originally titled: "Conversion Has Begun, But Along With It Reduction".]

[Text] *At the enterprise where our purchasing representative is located, the conversion of production is taking place. Naturally, the volume of work for our collective has been sharply reduced. A reduction in the TO of Soviet Army servicemen is planned.*

What sort of entry in the work record-books of those being separated should I, as leader, make so that they do not inflict morale or material harm.

[Signed] Lieutenant-Colonel A. Kuzovikhin, Chief Purchasing Representative.

Ye. Shomov, deputy superintendent for acceptance of USSR Goskomtrud:

—Based on the existing legislation, for entries in work record-books one must use the following formulation of the reason for separation: "Separated in connection with a reduction (authorized) in the number of workers as a result of the conversion of a defense industry (n. 1, article 33, KZOT [Codex of Labor Laws] of the RSFSR and related articles of the Union Republic KZOTs) with the benefits and compensations provided for by USSR Council of Ministers and VTSPS [All-Union Central Council of Professional Unions] Resolution No 1457 of 22 December 1987, as well as USSR Council of Ministers Resolution No 791 of 8 August 1990". A similar entry is also made upon the liquidation (reorganization) of enterprises and organizations in connection with conversion.

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